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The Curse of Corporate Control: A Mutual 
Insurance Company 
A Brief on Behalf of Societyt 
David Cowan Bayne, S.J. * 
The phenomenon of "control" is perhaps the most impor- 
tant single fact in the American corporate system. As the corpo- 
ration increasingly is recognized as an institution of primary 
significance (even Mr. Justice Brandeis called it "a master in- 
strument of the American economy"), the importance of control 
will grow in law as it has grown in economic and social fact.' 
Mr. Berle was right. The core concept of the American corpo- 
ration is corporate control. All other considerations are subsidiary 
or peripheral. The philosophy and law governing corporate con- 
trol are pivotal to all else. If the mores, attitudes, and conduct of' 
the top control hierarchy in the corporate society are shaped by 
high ideals and rigid strictures, the beneficence of the system will 
be assured. In turn, the inestimable impact of the corporation on 
Society will be equally beneficent. The importance, then, of' a 
thoughtful study of corporate control is incalculable. 
And what better subject for such a study than the mutual 
insurance company? The mutual company is archetypal. In it the 
t In his scholarly analysis of problems inherent in the mutual insurance company 
form, Father Bayne has produced an invaluable study of the strict-trust approach to the 
sale of corporate control, corporate opportunity, and conflict of interest. In this fascinating 
brief-written from the outset for publication-the author has added a significant com- 
mentary on Borden u. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1976), a case previously neglected 
by the commentators but characterized by Father Bayne as "the most important single 
opinion in the field of corporate philosophy in decades." 
This brief, submitted on behalf of the plaintiff-appellees, represents the scholarly 
fruit of years of litigation, culminating in an affirmance of a thorough and far-reaching 
remedy, including a $2.5 million damages award, in Rowen u. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of 
Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979). 
To preserve the author's vivid style, the brief has been reproduced essentially verba- 
tim, with only minor changes in format. Because the brief is considered a primary refer- 
ence in its own right, the references to depositions, exhibits, etc. are printed exactly as 
they appear in the brief, and without further citation. 
-The Editors 
* A.B., 1939, University of Detroit; M.A., 1946, Loyola University of Chicago; LL.B., 
1947, LL.M., 1948, Georgetown University; J.S.D., 1949, Yale University; S.T.L., 1953, 
Loyola University of Chicago. Member, District of Columbia, Michigan, Missouri, and 
Iowa Bars. Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. 
1. Berle, Control in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958). 
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power of control is virtually absolute. No stockholder investors 
intrude upon the contrbleur's uninhibited rule. The only owners 
are the policyholders. The annual meeting is a charade. Unassail- 
able control passes from generation to generation, from insiders 
to insiders. All this is referable to the control of the proxy, and 
the wide dispersal of the owners. In the mutual company, this 
power of control is as absolute and unchecked as in any type of 
modern corporation. 
Statutory protection of the policyholder owner is virtually 
nonexistent. No proxy rules. No quorum requirements. No disclo- 
sure regulation. No codified fiduciary duty. The entire burden is 
thrown on the court. The lone recourse: post-factum judicial re- 
covery under the common law. 
The Le Mars Mutual 
Q. Do you recall, Mr. Vander Meer, any specific occa- 
sion during the ten to fifteen years when you were on the 
Board of Le Mars when you took exception to any policy 
or recommendation made by John Alesch? 
A. No, I don't recall that I did. 
-Peter Vander Meer, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition a t  21. 
A. John Alesch I knew since 1934. He and I were card- 
playing buddies. 
Q. So you had a good close personal relationship since 
you moved into town? 
A. About as close as you can get without sleeping to- 
gether. 
-John Vollmar, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition a t  6. 
And the Le Mars Mutual Insurance Company of Iowa is the 
perfect vehicle for the study of a mutual company. The bigger- 
than-life realities of this little company in Iowa lend themselves 
ideally to an application of the broad philosophy of corporate 
control. The lesson of Le Mars reaches far beyond an Iowa county, 
or even a state. Le Mars is a microcosm of the mutual-company 
world. The pertinency of its lesson is nationwide. 
This is a Brief, therefore, written on behalf of Society. The 
solution of the manifold problems of Le Mars is the solution of 
the identical problems of thousands of other mutuals, to say noth- 
ing of cooperatives, fraternal organizations, savings-and-loan as- 
sociations. The lesson of Le Mars could be a prophylaxis for the 
nation, a salutary warning for the future. Further, the curse of 
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corporate control afflicts the mutual company to a degree sur- 
passed by no other kind of corporation. The burden of this Brief 
is great. 
The Burden of the Brief 
It appears to me that everything is shaping up just as 
we anticipated and I am sure that this venture can and 
will be advantageous and profitable to all parties con- 
cerned. 
-Burton Dull, Esq., Le Mars Counsel, 
to Raymond Brown, Esq., De Witt Counsel, 
Executive Committee, 
Exhibit 19A. 
At the heart of every Le Mars dereliction was an abuse of 
corporate control. The story began with the Illegitimate Sale of 
Control. Next, Looting, toward recoupment of the premium-bribe 
dollars. Thence Embezzlement, to produce the wherewithal for 
the premium-bribe. Theft  of a Corporate Opportunity was an 
expectable concomitant. Disloyalty was inherent in the whole. 
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Ray[mond Brown]: Burt[on Dull] is working on the 
changes in the minutes and getting them lined up. I do 
wonder if you people have come up with the substitute 
for the automobiles. Too bad I don't have a subagent or 
two in Hawaii and perhaps a few other nice places that 
we could send you people to check out for us, but maybe 
as time goes on we can have the Alesch Agency pro- 
moted in all the states where De Witt is at  and then we 
can all wheel and deal, can't we? 
-John Alesch, Le Mars Contrbleur, 
to Raymond Brown, Exhibit 82. 
The story of this lawsuit is really a tale of two cities. In the 
northwest Iowa town of Le Mars is headquartered the Le Mars 
Mutual Insurance Company of Iowa. For many years antedating 
this lawsuit, Le Mars was in the complete and unfettered control 
of old John Alesch (now some four years deceased). John Alesch 
held sway over Le Mars with the help of his family and a coterie 
of obedient directors, all together, the Alesch Group. 
John Alesch was undoubtedly the central character in the Le 
Mars half of this story. But he was aided immeasurably by Bur- 
ton Dull, Esq., longtime counsel to Le Mars. It was Burton Dull 
who guided John Alesch step by step through most of the machin- 
ations. It was Burton Dull who later carried on for De Witt as 
liaison man inside Le Mars. Burton Dull and John Alesch rank 
as two of the principal malefactors in this litigation. 
The Alesch Agency 
It would seem to me that this pup corporation [the 
Alesch Agency] could be used for perhaps some other 
things in the business between the two companies [Le 
Mars and De Witt]. 
-John Alesch to Raymond Brown, 
Exhibit 63. 
Up in this town of Le Mars, John Alesch, his three daughters, 
and his wife had for many years owned, or seemingly so, a little 
insurance agency (interestingly, housed in the very headquarters 
of Le Mars). This Alesch Agency played only an unassuming part 
in this story, but nonetheless served well the purposes of Alesch 
and Dull. The role of the Five Alesches-father, daughters, 
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wife-as sole owners, or seemingly so, of the Alesch Agency was 
integral, albeit lesser, to the overall plot. 
De Witt 
Q. Are these [the Le Mars Executive Committee] 
substantially the same individuals who are on your Ex- 
ecutive Committee a t  . . . De Witt? 
A. That is right. 
Q. How often did these meetings of the Executive 
Committee take place? 
A. Almost daily. At De Witt. 
-William Couch, Executive Committee, 
Deposition a t  20-21. 
My Dad started De Witt . . . . My Father was Presi- 
dent. My brother was President. I was President and 
now my son is President. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition a t  7, 18. 
Across the state in another Iowa town was the Iowa Mutual 
Insurance Company of De Witt. De Witt is the unquestioned chief 
of all the malefactors. De Witt was bent on a headlong course of 
expansion, merger, bribery, looting, and embezzlement. De Witt, 
considerably larger than Le Mars, was the undoubted center of 
all the chicanery. But De Witt, as a corporate entity, must neces- 
sarily be guided by agents, and De Witt, for its part, had been 
for many years under the complete and untrammelled control of 
a select circle of five men-Carl Smith, Raymond Brown, Wil- 
liam Couch, Carman Smith (President of De Witt, and Le Mars, 
a t  the grand old age of 33), George Howes-the omnipotent Exec- 
utive Committee, contraleur, and prime agent, and the unchal- 
lenged master of the subservient nine-man Board of De Witt. 
Just as John Alesch had his Burton Dull, so too did the 
Executive Committee have Raymond Brown, Esq., house counsel 
and himself a prime member of the Executive Committee of De 
Witt. It was Raymond Brown who implemented the plan and 
carried out the negotiations with Burton Dull. 
Thus Alesch and Dull a t  the one end and the Executive 
Committee and Brown a t  the other were major malefactors in the 
De Witt-Le Mars axis, with De Witt the chief of all. Many lesser 
parties-the Alesch Group, the  Smith  Group, the  Five 
Alesches-moved in and out and around during the eight 
years-1970 through 1977-of this tale of two cities. Exhibit 522 
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lists the Dramatis Personae. But Alesch and Dull and the Execu- 
tive Committee were the principals, behind De Witt itself. 
Q. So actually, getting the designated Board of Direc- 
tors was part and parcel of this contract? 
A. There isn't any question that the overall agreement 
was all a part of one overall transaction. 
-Burton Dull, Deposition at 71. 
I didn't know [Burton Dull] was mixed up in this deal 
like he is. 
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition at  59. 
From a legal and conceptual standpoint, the date of April 21, 
1970-the day the control of Le Mars passed from the Alesch 
Group to De Witt-serves as an excellent point of demarcation 
between the major classes of malefaction in this lawsuit: the Sale 
of Control, the Looting of Le Mars, and Embezzlement. The prin- 
cipal elements of the Sale of Control and the Embezzlement oc- 
curred before April 21, 1970, and most of the Looting after. But 
there was not a perfect dichotomy. Some Sale-of-Control details 
and the Embezzlement did carry beyond April 21, 1970. But that 
date, nonetheless, remains the ideal break-off point for this fac- 
tual presentation. 
The fourth malefaction was sui generis-the Twice-Stolen 
Agency-and was the successive work of the Five Alesches and De 
Witt. This double usurpation of a Le Mars "corporate opportun- 
ity" requires distinct treatment, both factual and legal. The 
fifth-Disloyalty-was all-pervasive, everywhere, and always. 
Every one of the substantive defendants played an active role 
of more or less importance in the Sale of Control, the Embezzle- 
ment, and the Looting. The Five Alesches and De Witt stole the 
Alesch Agency from Le Mars. Every defendant was consciously 
Disloyal, with varying degrees of culpability. 
A. The Sale of Control 
Q. Well, as a normal thing, at your annual meeting, 
what percentage of your policyholders actually attend? 
A. Very few. 
Q. And there is no requirement for a quorum? 
A. No. 
-Raymond Brown, Deposition at 82. 
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I was kicked out of Le Mars by Alesch. They didn't want 
me to know [about the Sale of Control]. They pushed 
me out. 
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition a t  59, 61. 
In the late 1960's old John Alesch was in his sixties, had 
congestive heart failure and knew he could no longer handle Le 
Mars. Further, no close relative was a t  hand to perpetuate the 
Alesch control. The prestige, the power, the perquisites, the sala- 
ries and bonuses, all would ndw be lost, unless a suitable succes- 
sor was soon found. John Alesch knew full well the value of this 
control. 
John Alesch also knew that the very nature of a mutual com- 
pany guaranteed him absolute power to hand over this valuable 
control to whomever he chose. Le Mars had no shareholders. Each 
little policyholder had only one single vote. The annual election 
of directors was the merest formality. Unorganized, apathetic, 
the policyholder owners never even came to a meeting, let alone 
opposed the Alesch slate. The annual meeting was a family affair. 
A few intimates gathered to rubber-stamp the Alesch nominees, 
whoever they might be. 
And the beauty was that old John Alesch, and the Alesch 
Group, were not risking one personal cent. Le Mars was owned 
completely by the policyholders. The Alesches were only custodi- 
ans, never owners. Not one personal cent. 
Employers Mutual 
A. And it was understood that Le Mars Mutual would 
be merged into the Employers. 
Q. Did that discussion that day have anything to do 
with Alesch, Incorporated, the insurance agency? That 
it was to be purchased by Employers Mutual? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember the amount of dollars that would 
be paid for the insurance agency? 
A. It was $450,000. 
-Burton Dull, Deposition a t  19-20. 
Armed with this unassailable power to name a new Board, 
John Alesch began his hunt for a "suitable" successor. "Suitable" 
in the sense that it come forward with a suitable premium-bribe. 
If the Alesches were to relinquish the power, the prestige, and the 
perquisites, at least they would be handsomely rewarded for the 
relinquishment. 
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The first Alesch selection was Employers Mutual Insurance 
Company of Des Moines. Employers also understood full well the 
value of control of Le Mars. More to the point, Employers was 
prepared to pay a substantial premium-bribe for that control. 
Negotiation between briber and bribed went on apace, but in the 
end John Alesch decided to hunt for a "more suitable" successor. 
Henceforward: competitive Premium-Bribery. 
(This term "premium-bribe" has gained currency in Sale-of- 
Control argot because a "premium" or gratuity is usually added 
to the true value of the contrbleur's stock, thus effecting the sale 
of corporate control for a price.) 
At this point in late 1969 John Alesch and Burton Dull began 
the successful negotiations with De Witt, through its agent, the 
Executive Committee. When the dust settled, De Witt had 
agreed to a total premium-bribe of $600,000. 
The Guises of the Bribe 
I found out later [Burton Dull] was in back of all these 
contracts. 
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition a t  59. 
Q. Did you prepare that [sales] contract, Mr. Dull, 
eventually? 
A. Eventually, yes. 
-Burton Dull, Deposition a t  39. 
This $600,000 premium-bribe passed in three separate seg- 
ments: 
(1) The "Sale" of the Agency: $400,000 
(2) The "Consultant's" Contract: 46,000 
(3) The "Pension Plan": 154,000 
The Total Premium-Bribe: $600,000 
Throughout the lengthy De Witt-Alesch maneuvers, the 
wonder is not so much a t  the dishonesty and duplicity, but a t  the 
calloused candor of the details of the dishonesty, reduced to per- 
manent record for all to read. The most notable record of all was 
a four-page letter-the Bribery Letter-from Burton Dull to Ray- 
mond Brown, November 19, 1969, spelling out precisely the exact 
terms of the Sale of Control. This damning document outlined (1) 
the Alesch "quid," (2) the De Witt "quo," and (3) tied the two 
together with a proximately causal "pro." The "quid pro quo" 
spelt Premium-Bribery . 
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In this single letter was a summary of all three segments of 
the total $600,000 premium-bribe. 
[Tlhe following will outline John's understanding of what will 
be expected from him and what in turn De Witt will do in 
consideration therefor: 
[(I) The "Sale)' of the Agency:] John will sell the Alesch 
Agency to De Witt for $500,000. 
[(2) The "Pension Plan":] It is understood also that the pen- 
sion plan will be funded prior to the 1970 annual meeting: (1) a 
pension for John Alesch of $600.00 per month for life and 10 
years certain; (2) a pension for M. H. Tappan of $400.00 per 
month for life and 10 years certain; and (3) a pension for all 
Directors of $300.00 per year for life. 
[(3) The "Consultant's" Contract:] Alesch will work for the 
Alesch Agency for a period of three years for $1,000.00 per 
month. Also . . . either Le Mars or De Witt will furnish . . . an 
automobile and operating expenses therefor. 
The above is all subject to the election of Directors approved by 
De Witt. 
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, Exhibit 4. 
Pursuant to the unfailing urge to reduce all to permanent record, 
De Witt promptly answered the Bribery Letter: "Our Executive 
Committee are in complete agreement with the proposal as out- 
lined in your letter." (Exhibit 3.) The deal was sealed. 
Although the premium-bribe was hidden under various 
guises-sale price, fees, pensions-the overall purpose was the 
same: to induce the Alesch Group to hand over Le Mars to De 
Witt without the embarrassing knowledge or consent of the poli- 
cyholder owners. An open and honest election would be danger- 
ous. An open and honest election plus disclosure of the $600,000 
would be disastrous. 
I have discussed with John the mechanics of the annual 
meeting and it is my suggestion that we hold the present annual 
meeting as though no change were being made and then, follow- 
ing this, calling a meeting of the Board and accepting the resig- 
nations of those we desire to accept [and] appoint the succeed- 
ing Directors in accordance with our hopes. 
This, in my opinion, will cause less confusion and allow us 
to make the desired changes with the least amount of objections. 
-Burton Dull to Raymond Brown, Exhibit 39. 
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1. The "Sale" of the Agency: $400,000 
A. There would have been no value in De Witt having 
any interest in the Alesch Agency . . . unless they were 
in control of the Le Mars Mutual. 
-Lorne R. Worthington, Insurance 
Commissioner, Deposition at 42. 
All the De Witt-Alesch attempts to camouflage the 
premium-bribe were childishly primitive. But the Agency-sale 
gambit was the most artless. 
The Five Alesches were the sole owners, or seemingly so, of 
the Alesch Agency, on its face absolutely unrelated to Le Mars, 
beyond the fortuity of its location in the Le Mars Home Office. 
This little "pup" Alesch and Dull chose as the secret vehicle for 
passing some $400,000 of premium-bribe. The Agency was worth- 
less to anyone except John Alesch, or someone else able to use it 
as a front for stealing Le Mars business. Why did Insurance Com- 
missioner Worthington say the Alesch Agency was worthless? 
Alesch Agency: A Pawn 
This particular transaction cannot be viewed as a nor- 
mal insurance agency acquisition. 
-David Bakst, Insurance Expert, 
Transcript a t  1464. 
The Alesch Agency had been used for years by John Alesch 
to funnel Home Office business to himself personally. Exhibit 707 
tells the tale. The total commission income generated by the 
Agency for 1969 was $36,800. Of that, some $17,800 represented 
income on business placed by the Agency with Le Mars itself. 
Another $8,200 came from policies Le Mars itself carried on Le 
Mars' new building, automobiles, and employees. (Transcript at 
623.) After all, John Alesch, Le Mars executive, would choose 
John Alesch, insurance agent, to write any insurance Le Mars 
itself needed. 
No seer need predict what would happen to this $26,000 in 
business (of the total $36,800) when a competitor took over the 
Agency. Le Mars would throw the Agency out of its headquarters, 
direct customers to another agent, place its own coverage else- 
where. Never would Le Mars let commission income flow to com- 
petitor De Witt. Without a covenant not to compete by Le 
Mars-and there was no covenant-the Agency would be de- 
nuded overnight. With only $10,000 in independent commissions 
left, what- then? 
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Alesch Agency: A Kept Woman 
The operation in Le Mars should have been a little less 
than 50 percent [of commission income] in terms of' its 
expense. 
-David Bakst, Insurance Expert, 
Transcript at 1526. 
With income reduced overnight, with the Agency out on the 
street, whence the normal Operating Expenses? No longer will Le 
Mars supply free telephone, utilities, clerical help, office space, 
whatever. But even that is not all. John Alesch will be gone. Or 
if retained, retained at $12,000 per annum. Whence the $12,000? 
Worthington, Bakst-any expert-could only conclude: the 
Agency was worthless, under any normal conditions. 
With a worthless Agency, the calculation of the premium- 
bribe is effortless. The Agency had $100,000 in cash on hand, its 
total value. The Five Alesches got $500,000. The differential: 
$4OO,OOO. 
The Quid Pro Quo 
Q. [Tlhe $500,000 wouldn't be paid unless there was 
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Le Mars? 
A. Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of 
them. There is no question about that. 
-Burton Dull, Deposition at 40. 
Again guilelessly, the Agency-sale Agreement to Sell Stock, 
drawn b y  Burton Dull, was not a simple contract of sale, but 
incorporated quite incredibly the baldest stipulation: "This 
agreement shall not become effective unless and until all of the 
present Directors of the Le Mars Mutual have submitted their 
resignations and qualified successors, as designated by [De 
Witt], have been qualified as Directors of the Le Mars Mutual." 
(Agreement to Sell Stock, Alesches and De Witt, Exhibit A, 3,4.) 
Here again, conveniently, remarkably, was the proximate causal 
connection between the passage of the $400,000 premium-bribe 
and the Sale of Control. The total absence of any other connec- 
tion between the Agency sale and the Board election drew blatant 
attention to the Premium-Bribery. 




Burton [Dull] said it was your intent to have the meet- 
ing of the Alesch Agency on April 21, and turn the stock 
over to us at  that time, so I will bring the certified check 
with me. [I]n turning over control of Le Mars Mutual 
on April 21, it  would only naturally follow that the com- 
plete transaction including the Alesch Agency would 
have to be made on the same date. 
-Raymond Brown to John Alesch, 
Exhibit 41. 
Thus on April 21, 1970, the $400,000 in premium-bribe 
passed, and De Witt took over the Le Mars Board, manned pre- 
dictably by the omnipresent Executive Committee. Conven- 
iently, John Alesch and Burton Dull also sat on the new Board. 
Thus did the first of the three segments pass. Note: This $400,000 
from De Witt went exclusively to the Five Alesches. The others 
were to receive theirs in more direct ways. 
Epilogue 
In the early days after the De Witt takeover (before he was 
treated so shabbily) old John Alesch was most solicitous in his 
thoughtfulness of De Witt (and of himself, incidentally). He was 
justly concerned lest the Iowa Insurance Department uncover the 
premium-bribe. His fatherly suggestion: "You might want to give 
some thought to building up the value of the Alesch Agency and 
thus when you are audited by the Insurance Department in three 
years you would have a strong argument with the Department as 
to the value of Alesch Agency." (John Alesch to Raymond Brown, 
Exhibit 63.) John Alesch must have been gratified. De Witt 
heeded his word: "We will want to try to build up the value of 
this Agency to increase the market value as we will have to show 
it in our annual Statements." (Raymond Brown to John Alesch, 
Exhibit 64.) 
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2. The "Consultant's" Contract: $46,000 
Q. And it was the Executive Committee of Le Mars 
then that was working through the Alesch agency to 
manage Le Mars? 
A. Well, the Executive Committee of De Witt, too. 
Q. They were substantially the same people? 
A. Yes. 
-Raymond Brown, Deposition a t  120. 
For the second segment, De Witt decided that this time John 
Alesch would be the lone recipient. And the "pup corporation 
could be used" again as the conduit. 
Remember that now the Alesch Agency was wholly owned by 
De Witt. The Alesch Agency was De Witt. This was post-April 
21, 1970. With this setting, any unearned dollars passing to John 
Alesch from the Alesch Agency would in effect be extra bribe 
dollars from De Witt to John Alesch. 
How, then, to use the "pup corporation" to pass the dollars? 
The answer was ready. The Alesch Agency was now owned com- 
pletely by De Witt. So if old John Alesch was a "consultant sine 
cura, " any dollars paid would be De Witt dollars and hence pure 
premium-bribe. The result was the "Consultant's" Contract. 
WHEREAS the services and advice of John H. Alesch are 
needed for the Alesch Agency and the Le Mars,Mutual: 
John H. Alesch does hereby agree to act as a consultant and 
adviser to employees designated by De Witt to succeed him. Mr. 
Alesch's responsibilities will be only as consultant and adviser 
to these persons. 
The Alesch Agency agrees to pay John H. Alesch $1,000 per 
month for the services, advice and consultation, to furnish an 
automobile and to pay all the expenses for said automobile. 
-John Alesch and Alesch Agency, Consultant's Contract, 
Exhibit A. 
In the years before his death, $36,000 for "advice" and a 
minimum $10,000 in free automobile passed to John Alesch to 
augment the basic premium-bribe of $400,000. The money was 
pleasant, but John Alesch was accustomed to work for his pay, 
and more to the point, to run the show. It hurt his pride deeply 
to be shunted out of his job. Perhaps the indignity was not worth 
the $46,000. 
I myself have felt this pressure to no end, and will advise 
that this was most of my trouble in my recent illness. [I]t does 
cause many heartaches to Alice and myself. Am sure that you 
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too would feel badly after so many years of hard work with De 
Witt if you were left in the cold as we have been treated. 
I am at a loss as to know just what is expected of me, since 
I am not advised or asked of any changes. 
-John Alesch to Raymond Brown, Exhibit 95. 
The terms of the deal were clear: John Alesch was to do nothing 
to earn his $46,000, except hand over Le Mars. Not even advise. 
Or be consulted. 
[Alpparently you feel you are being put out of your office 
against your wish. We had no intent of forcing you out of your 
office if you wanted to keep it. We understood you only wanted 
a desk available when you occasionally would come to the office. 
We want your services continued in an advisory capacity as 
before if your health permits. We felt that John Breese should 
assume full responsibility for the operation of the Company. 
-De Witt to John Alesch, Exhibit 93. 
And John Breese was a De Witt man, on a full salary of $15,000, 
paid by Le Mars to De Witt. John Alesch had no duties, and he 
hated the whole deal. 
Again conveniently and remarkably, the same deftless ap- 
proach (1) tied the "Consultant's" Contract to the "Sale" of the 
Agency and (2) then connected both causally to the Sale of Con- 
trol. The "Consultant's" Contract went on to emphasize that 
John Alesch's duties-"only as a consultant" to De Witt peo- 
ple-were "part of the consideration of: (1) this Consultant's 
Contract, and (2) the Sales Agreement between the owners of the 
stock of the Alesch Agency and De Witt." (John Alesch and 
Alesch Agency, Consultant's Contract, Exhibit A,) Thus did De 
Witt add $46,000, to increase the Alesch bribe to $446,000, all 
with the continuing blessing of all parties. 
3. The "Pension Plan": $l54,OOO 
I never knew retiring directors were to get a pension. I 
don't know who voted to get a pension. I wouldn't have 
voted to approve it. I have no recollection of a pension 
discussed at  a board meeting. 
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition at  40, 45. 
For the third segment of the premium-bribe De Witt decided 
on a naive subterfuge, and this time each and every member of 
the Alesch Group was to be included, except the three Alesch 
daughters who had already gotten theirs. 
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Up until the pivotal April 21, 1970, the directors of Le Mars 
had never enjoyed any pension of any kind. But late in 1969 the 
Alesch search for guises for the premium-bribe produced a ready 
device. Why not fund a bountiful "pension plan" for all? How 
simple a way to pass premium-bribe dollars from De Witt to the 
"resigning" Board to assure the "resignations" with a minimum 
of fuss, and recalcitrancy. 
In all, De Witt agreed to $154,131.53 in a one-shot, single- 
premium payment to fund generous pensions all around: (1) Old 
John Alesch was to get $600 a month for life or ten years certain; 
the cost-$69,011; (2) the Le Mars president, Milton Tappan, 
long retired in Lauderdale, $400 a month for life or ten years 
certain; the cost-$51,004; (3) the ten "lesser parties" on the 
Board, $300 annually; the cost-$34,116.53. The total outlay: 
$154,131.53, again with the continuing blessing of all parties. The 
testimony of J.D. Hattam, Insurance Auditor, Arthur Young & 
Company, details the names and numbers. (Transcript at 259- 
63.) Since none of this $154,000 was a valid debt, since no pen- 
sions had hitherto ever been funded, the full amount was pure 
Premium-Bribery. 
Thus De Witt bought assurance that the lesser members of 
the Alesch Group would not upset the applecart a t  the last min- 
ute. 
Under whatever guise, the total $600,000 was a crass 
premium-bribe passing from De Witt to the Alesch Group for the 
illicit Sale of Control of Le Mars to De Witt, and always abetted 
by the Smith Group. 
- Burton Dull---- 
Q .  Over these years since 1958 when Mr. Dull has been 
on a retainer, did he also charge for work not on 
retainer? 
A. The agreement was that the only time there'd be an 
additional charge is if the Dull Law Firm represented us 
in a suit. 
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, 
Director, Transcript at 771. 
Burton Dull's singular role throughout the Premium-Bribery 
negotiations-and afterwards-demands special attention. Bur- 
ton Dull spanned the days of John Alesch, with the Premium- 
Bribery, the Looting, and the Embezzlement, on through the 
Twice-Stolen Agency and down to the very present. During all 
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this time, Burton Dull was on a set retainer as Le Mars counsel. 
After the De Witt takeover he was also a director. As counsel and 
director, Dull was the Le Mars liaison with De Witt in all the 
malefactions, and he was paid well for his work. "I found out later 
[Burton Dull] was in back of all these contracts." (Clyde East- 
man, Le Mars Director, Deposition at 59.) 
Burton Dull and John Alesch began the negotiations for the 
Sale-of-Control premium-bribe as early as mid-1969. The corre- 
spondence and meetings with the Employers Mutual were abor- 
tive. But the consummation meeting among Dull, Alesch, and 
Raymond Brown, De Witt counsel, firmed up the total $600,000 
premium-bribe per the Dull-Brown Bribery Letter. 
What remuneration did Burton Dull receive for his years of 
"services," first to Alesch alone, then to Alesch and De Witt 
together, and finally to De Witt alone? The "remuneration7? came 
from Le Mars, always from Le Mars, since Le Mars paid Burton 
Dull from beginning to end. 
Remium-Bribery Remuneration 
A. This $10,000 was entirely for payment [by Le 
Mars] of past services. 
Q. So by past services you mean the consultation with 
the Insurance Department and the preparation of the 
[Agency-sale] contract and other [premium-bribe] 
negotiations that took place? 
A. Yes. The amount, as I recall, had been suggested 
originally by Mr. Alesch and then we did discuss it with 
Mr. Dull as to whether this amount was agreeable with 
him. 
-Raymond Brown, Transcript a t  397-98. 
Burton Dull's regular retainer took care of most of his 
Premium-Bribery pegotiations and the work on the Twice-Stolen 
Agency, but John Alesch had promised a bonus for drawing up 
the Premium-Bribery Agency-sale contract and the actual closing 
of the deal. This was the $10,000 approved by Raymond Brown 
and noted in the Special Report of Arthur Young & Company 
(Exhibit 508, 111). 
But Burton Dull was to receive much more than a mere 
$10,000 for the betrayal of Le Mars. 
Directorship and Retainer 
Q. Did you know that Mr. Dull was going to be named 
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a director of Le Mars a t  the time this transfer took 
place? 
A. No, of course not. I didn't know anything about this 
Dull that I heard so much about. Except I found out 
later that he was the one that was in back of all these 
contracts and stuff. I hadn't even heard of him. 
Q. Did you know that Mr. Dull was going to get his 
retainer increased from $600 a month to $1,000 a month 
as soon as the transfer took place? 
A. I should say not. I should say not. I didn't know he 
was mixed up in this deal like he was, but it seems like 
he was. 
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition at  58-59. 
The intriguing Brown Doodle Notes (Exhibit 236(7)) con- 
firmed in detail that Mr. Dull had in fact bargained with De Witt 
over his reward for his role in the Sale of Control, and for his 
liaison work inside Le Mars after the takeover. Brown's Doodle 
Notes indicated that Dull wanted $1,500 a month. The $1,000-a- 
month retainer-total $87,000 to date-was the negotiated result. 
This $87,000 covered all Dull's "services" to De Witt during and 
after the Sale of Control. Which Le Mars dutifully paid. The new 
$1,000-per-month retainer began on the key date of April 21, 
1970. The Special Report of Arthur Young & Company carries the 
statistics. (Exhibit 508, 111.) What Burton Dull received in the 
years before the takeover remains to be calculated. 
B. The Looting 
We don't intend to milk [Le Mars] for a t  least five 
years. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, to 
Russell W. Sandy, Le Mars Supervisor, 
Deposition at  48. 
Burton Dull was correct in his remark at  the outset to Ray- 
mond Brown that "this venture can and will be advantageous and 
profitable to all parties concerned." De Witt did not wait five 
years to prove him right. 
On the crucial date, April 21, 1970, De Witt took control of 
Le Mars. From this point forward, with calculation and design, 
De Witt milked Le Mars systematically over the succeeding seven 
years. As with the Premium-Bribery, the direct Looting took on 
various guises: The Management Contract-$190,000; Fabricated 
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~x~enses-$103,000; Coerced Expenses-$449,000. (Exhibit 
508.) 
A warning is in order. Although the Looting was effected in 
two stages, first by "contract," second without contract, the pat- 
tern was continuous from April 21, 1970, to mid-1977, and was 
accomplished by the same stratagem: forcing Le Mars to pur- 
chase multifarious "services" from De Witt. 
The Recoupment Letter 
I think a Director can adequately serve two different 
masters. 
-William Couch, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at 67. 
I see no problem in representing both sides. 
-George Howes, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  52. 
I did not see anything inherently contradictory in my 
position of President of both [De Witt and Le Mars]. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  50. 
Perhaps the second most brazen De Witt-Alesch document 
was the celebrated Dull-Brown Recoupment Letter. First, in the 
Bribery Letter, Dull and Brown had spelled out for all to read the 
exact terms of the De Witt Premium-Bribery. Now, in a second 
gift to posterity, the coldly calculated intent of the parties was 
again reduced to permanent record for all to read. The Recoup- 
ment Letter obligingly combined (1) an avowed intent to loot 
with (2) an open admission of long-term planning and anxious 
anticipation of the spoils: 
I have not and will not attempt to prepare the agreement 
between the Alesch Agency and Le Mars until after we have had 
an opportunity of discussing this matter further. The provisions 
of this contract, of course, will be the means of [De Witt's] 
method of recouping its payment to the owners of the stock of 
the Alesch Agency. 
. . . It appears to me that everything is shaping up just as 
we anticipated and I am sure that this venture can and will be 
advantageous and profitable to all parties concerned. 
-The Dull-Brown Recoupment Letter, Exhibit 19A. 
Special attention should be paid to this Recoupment Letter of 
Burton Dull to Raymond Brown. These two had put the deal 
together for De Witt. A truism: A premium-bribe is never paid 
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without recoupment in mind. De Witt did not pass $600,000 in 
premium-bribe money without larceny at  heart. This Recoup- 
ment Letter identifies the brand of larceny: Management 
"Services. " 
1. The Management Contract: $l9O,OOO 
I, 
To my knowledge, nobody represented Le Mars in pur- 
chasing the Managerrlent Services from De Witt 
through the Alesch Agency. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  38. 
When the Management Contract was negotiated, there 
wasn't anyone representing Le Mars. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  52. 
On that same April 21,1970, the little Alesch Agency became 
the wholly owned subsidiary of De Witt. Any monies flowing into 
the coffers of "this pup corporation" now flowed necessarily into 
the coffers of De Witt. This little pup therefore could now serve 
a third purpose. First, it had been the conduit for $400,000 of the 
premium-bribe passing from De Witt to the Alesches. Next, it 
carried De Witt dollars in premium-bribe from De Witt to John 
Alesch for "Consultation" fees. Now, it was to be the conduit into 
De Witt for a long series of false management fees flowing from 
Le Mars. The flow was reversed. The total: $190,000, under the 





Q. And it was the Executive Committee of Le Mars 
then that was working through the Alesch Agency to 
manage Le Mars? 
A. Well, the Executive Committee of De Witt too. 
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Q .  They were substantially the same people? 
A. Yes. 
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at 120. 
Note well: after April 21, 1970, the Executive Committee 
controlled all three boards, De Witt, Le Mars, the Alesch Agency. 







J. Ray Judge 
D. M. Molyneaux 
W. L. Rutenbeck 
Carl Smith Carl Smith 
Raymond Brown Raymond Brown 
William Couch William Couch 
Carman Smith Carman Smith 
George Howes George Howes 
John Wilkinson John Alesch 




The upshot: The Executive Committee (as De Witt) suggested to 
the Executive Committee (as Alesch Agency) that the Executive 
Committee (as Alesch Agency) suggest to the Executive Commit- 
tee (as Le Mars) tha t  perhaps Le Mars might retain Alesch 
Agency to manage Le Mars. No matter that Le Mars was already 
being ably managed by paid employees of Le Mars. No matter 
further that "substantially the same people" were already being 
amply compensated by Le Mars. If Pooh Bah could do it, why not 
the Executive Committee? The result? A Management Contract 
between Le Mars and the Alesch Agency: 
WHEREAS Le Mars Mutual is in need of trained personnel 
to manage their complete operation: The Alesch Agency agrees 
to furnish such personnel and Le Mars Mutual agrees to pay the 
Alesch Agency $2,500.00 per month for these services. 
It is agreed that the Alesch Agency will furnish the services 
of John Alesch to carry out this management contract. 
-Management Contract, Exhibit 20. 
This Management Contract was signed for Le Mars by Ray- 
mond Brown of the Executive Committee, and for the Alesch 
Agency by William Couch of the Executive Committee who could 
"adequately serve two different masters." 
Throughout the entire term of this Management Contract, 
the Alesch Agency was a total sham. The Alesch Agency had no 
life of its own, but was staffed completely by Le Mars employees 
already fully paid by Le Mars. Here was double compensation. 
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Payment once by Le Mars to the individual employees. Payment 
twice by Le Mars to De Witt through the conduit of the Alesch 
Agency. John Alesch was right: "[Tlhis pup corporation could 
be used for some other things in the business between the two 
companies [Le Mars and De Witt]." 
Through deposition after deposition of De Witt insider after 
De Witt insider, it became embarrassingly, and culpably, clear 
that Le Mars was the same after the takeover as before. The same 
people continued to man Le Mars. Le Mars was the same old Le 
Mars. But now suddenly on April 21, 1970, Le Man needed all 
kinds of help-some $190,000 in help under a Management Con- 
tract. (And $552,000 worth later without it.) 
There was no change in personnel of Le Mars after the 21st of 
April, 1970. 
-William Couch, Executive Committee, Deposition at 47. 
I don't recall any change in personnel of Le Mars on the 20th 
day of April, 1970, as compared to the personnel that were em- 
ployed on April 21, 1970, or April 22, 1970. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition at 24, 29. 
Q. [I]f on April 22, 1970, Le Mars has retained John Alesch 
as chief executive officer and chairman of the board, why would 
they pay the Alesch Agency for his services? 
A. I don't know that I can adequately answer that question. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition at  29. 
Q. And in your opinion, did John Breese [on full-time, $15,000 
Le Mars salary] assume shortly after April, 1970, the. overall 
management of Le Mars? 
A. He did, with the help of the Executive Committee. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition at  32. 
The Clandestine Contract 
Q. I show you the Management Contract between Le 
Mars Mutual and the Alesch Agency. 
A. I have never seen that before. I was not aware the 
Le Mars Mutual was paying [De Witt] considerable 
sums of money on a yearly basis when I resigned as a 
Director [on July 1, 19761. I don't think I missed any 
Board meetings [in 14 years]. 
-J. Ray Judge, De Witt Director, 
Deposition at 13-14. 
The Executive Committee did not want its looting known, 
even to some of its own Board. The Executive Committee felt 
guilty enough without facing the "outside" De Witt directors. J. 
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Ray Judge was associated with De Witt for fifty years, knew Carl 
Smith, his brother, his grandfather, was a director for 14 years, 
missed no Board meetings to July 1,1976. Yet the entire deal was 
concealed from him. 
Thus did De Witt "recoup" from the Le Mars treasury 
$190,000 of the original premium-bribe paid "to the owners of the 
stock of Alesch, Inc." 
2. Fabricated Expenses: $1 03,000 
Q. I think you've already testified you were an em- 
ployee of Le Mars all those years, were you not? 
A. Right. 
Q. When the Le Mars Board of Directors decided to 
achieve a more favorable mix of business, would you tell 
the Court what personnel achieved the results, to your 
knowledge? 
A. It would be the [Le Mars] in-house underwriters 
and fieldmen. 
-Donald Coats, Transcript at  1905. 
Q .  [Albout the only time you see the [De Witt] 
Board Members is at the annual meeting? 
A. Yes. 
-Donald Coats, Transcript at  990. 
But in mid-1973 the Insurance Department unobligingly 
began to meddle in the matter. The result: The Department felt 
constrained to suggest (as Richard Baldwin of the Department 
put it (Deposition at 43)) "that Le Mars and Alesch abrogate 
this agreement." 
(Dolorous Interjection: The end of the Management Contract 
saw the end of the personal fees collected by the Executive Com- 
mittee. The cessation of false "services" meant the cessation of 
false fees. (Exhibit 426, Alesch, Inc. B.S., 12-31-74.)) 
With the mandated end of the Management Contract, what 
to do? The answer: a second gambit to "recoup" their "payment 
to the owners of the stock of Alesch, Inc." With this new ploy, the 
Executive Committee (as De Witt) whispered to the Executive 
Committee (as Le Mars) that Le Mars might now be interested 
in employing De Witt directly (and thus succeed the Alesch 
Agency) for those manifold "services" that Le Mars had hitherto 
successfully performed itself. 
Again, expectably, the Executive Committee (as Le Mars) 
concurred completely with the Executive Committee (as De 
2271 CORPORATE CONTROL 249 
Witt) and contract or no, De Witt milked Le Mars of an addi- 
tional $103,000. 
Nothing thus far was quite so bald as this $103,000. Recall: 
The Executive Committee itself never even graced the scene at  
Le Mars. All the management of Le Mars was done by Le Mars 
at Le Mars. Yet the Executive Committee of De Witt in De Witt 
billed Le Mars $103,000 for "administration fees" by the Execu- 
tive Committee of De Witt itself. De Witt admitted this openly 
in Interrogatory No. 11. And this $103,000 only covered three 
years, 1974, 1975, 1976. How can a competitor charge a competi- 
tor for nonexistent "services"? 
Thus during this entire period the very persons performing 
the De Witt "services" for Le Mars, and billed by De Witt against 
Le Mars, were fully paid employees of Le Mars. By this second 
gambit did De Witt "recoup" $103,000 of their "payment to the 
owners of the stock of Alesch, Inc." 
3. Coerced Expenses: $449,000 
Q. Who negotiated the contract between Le Mars and 
[De Witt] for the use of the computer? 
A. There wasn't any contract provided. 
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  116. 
I see no problem in representing both sides as to how 
much is to be paid. 
-George Howes, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  52. 
We never asked anyone at  Le Mars whether they felt our 
charges were fair and reasonable. 
-John Howes, De Witt Director, 
Deposition at  40. 
But De Witt was not satisfied. De Witt's own Operating Ex- 
penses a t  home needed pruning. How better than forcing Le Mars 
to share the load? All across the board-stationery, computer, 
telephone-Le Mars could help bear the burden. And the thought 
was father to the deed: Some $449,000 in "services"-coerced 
6 6 services"-were imposed on Le Mars by De Witt, charged 
against Le Mars by De Witt, in the same three years, 1974, 1975, 
1976, after the Insurance Department called a halt to the Man- 
agement Contract. The Special Report of Arthur Young & Com- 
pany (Exhibit 508,II) gives the breakdown through 1975. Le Mars 
Interrogatory No. 7 covers 1976. 
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And yet, all this time, as Melvin Gearke, longtime Le Mars 
general manager so bluntly put it: 
A. The only thing [De Witt] does for us is furnish computers 
to kick out renewals that we used to do by manual typewriter. 
They have nothing to do with underwriting at  all. 
Q. The complete and total underwriting is done in Le Mars? 
A. Done in Le Mars, yes. 
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, Director, 
Deposition at 58. 
In all, over seven years De Witt successfully extracted from 
Le Mars a total of $742,000, without interest. 
C. Embezzlement 
[Tlhe following will outline John's understanding of 
what will be expected from him and what in turn De 
Witt will do in consideration [for control]. 
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, 
Exhibit 4. 
At the end of the protracted bribe negotiations between De 
Witt and the Alesch Group, De Witt finally committed itself to 
pass $600,000 to buy the Board of Le Mars. The exact terms of 
the bribery were detailed in the infamous November 19, 1969, 
Bribery Letter: Alesch would deliver the Board if, but only if, De 
Witt remitted $600,000. 
Once thus committed, the "bribed" Alesch had no trouble 
delivering the Board. All dutifully resigned. De Witt minions 
moved in. This was "what was expected from" Alesch. 
But "briber" De Witt had pledged $600,000. This was "what 
in turn" De Witt would do to buy the Board. And $600,000 is a 
lot of money. Whence De Witt's "consideration" for the Sale of 
Control? 
Now, in your ordinary garden-variety bribery, the briber 
usually reaches into his own pocket, takes out his own dollars, 
pays off the bribed, and takes over. Thus did De Witt, but only 
up to a point. When De Witt paid the Alesches the $400,000 
segment under the Agency-sale guise, and again with $21,400 of 
the $46,000 "Consultant" segment, the bribe dollars did come 
from the De Witt pocket. Thus far, garden-variety bribery. 
But at that point De Witt either ran out of its own dollars, 
or became inspired, or whatever. In any event, the garden-variety 
bribery ended. Henceforth, De Witt would steal the bribe dollars 
directly from the Le Mars till, and then pass them on to the 
Alesches. 
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Pension Payments. Thus inspired, De Witt first embezzled 
from Le Mars $154,000 in cash which it paid over for the sole 
benefit of the Alesch Group under the third, "Pension-Plan" seg- 
ment of the bribe. This cash was readily traced by J.D. Hattam, 
Insurance Auditor, Arthur Young & Company, (Transcript a t  
260-61) to The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company of To- 
ronto, Ontario, Canada: amount $154,131.53, check #80337, dated 
April 20, 1970 (Exhibit 604). Thus, instead of paying this $154,000 
segment of the premium-bribe itself, De Witt stole the dollars 
from Le Mars and avoided the circuity of later recoupment. 
"Consultant's" Contract. In this segment of the premium- 
bribe agreement, De Witt had agreed to pass John Alesch 
$36,000. After De Witt had paid only $21,400 through its Alesch 
Agency, it decided to steal the rest from Le Mars. For the last 
years before his death, John Alesch got $14,600 of his premium- 
bribe dollars from the Le Mars till. The Special Report of Arthur 
Young & Company carries the figures. (Exhibit 508, IV). 
The Automobile. De Witt had included in the premium- 
bribe a free car, and upkeep. Here, too, De Witt decided to steal 
the $10,000, or whatever, from Le Mars and thus satisfy its 
premium-bribe obligations. By a convenient oversight De Witt 
simply let the cost of the car and its daily upkeep come from the 
Le Mars treasury. (Exhibit, Le Mars Interrogatories.) To this day 
De Witt has never restored this outlay of $10,000 or more, thus 
embezzled from Le Mars. 
In all, therefore, De Witt embezzled $178,600 from Le Mars, 
and used the dollars to bribe the Alesch Group. "Embezzled," 
because De Witt had full control of Le Mars and, more to the 
point, fully controlled and engineered the two transactions. Most 
importantly, both De Witt and the Alesch Group had long since 
negotiated to this $178,600 in the "De Witt consideration" for 
buying the Le Mars Board. The Alesch Group delivered the 
Board, De Witt delivered the bribe dollars, of which $178,600 was 
embezzled from Le Mars. 
D. The Twice-Stolen Agency 
I saw no conflict between John Alesch's personal inter- 
ests and the corporate interests of Le Mars in having the 
Alesch Agency in the offices of Le Mars. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at 21. 
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[De Witt] bought the Alesch Agency to increase our 
business in Northwest Iowa. 
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  26. 
That little "pup," the Alesch Agency, was the most mal- 
treated being in this whole sordid tale, and its maltreatment was 
not only through Premium-Bribery and Looting. The history 
began with the Five Alesches and continued after April 21, 1970, 
with De Witt. 
1.  The Five Alesches 
Q. Why was Alesch Agency given 700 square feet in the 
new building, utility-free space? 
A. The Agency had always been with the Company. It 
always, even though it was separate, it had always been 
in the same building. 
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, 
Director, Deposition at  84. 
The early history of the Alesch Agency tells the story well. 
From the day (and probably before) that John Alesch bought the 
Alesch Agency from the Le Mars founder sometime before 1950, 
every bit of the Agency, both Assets and Income, belonged wholly 
to Le Mars. From the outset the Alesch Agency never had a life 
of its own.. Le Mars supplied its Financing, Management, Over- 
head, Image and Goodwill. Le Mars in truth owned the Alesch 
Agency, until the Five Alesches stole it, and all its income. 
Financing 
We each paid $50 a share for our stock in Alesch Agency. 
-Alice Alesch, Deposition at  12. 
In the yean after its inception, and after John Alesch re- 
ceived it from the Le Mars founder, the Agency had been unincor- 
porated. But in 1962 it became Alesch, Inc., and the Five 
Alesches purchased it for a grand total of $15,000. (The very 
Agency for which they received $516,000 some eight remarkable 
years later.) This $15,000 valuation came more than a decade 
after John Alesch took over. And why was its capitalization so 
low? Because every cent of its Financing came from Le Mars. 
When a corporation does not need to pay for salaries, furniture, 
wages, utilities, overhead, or anything, self-financing is an effort- 
less chore. Since John Alesch controlled Le Mars (as the founder 
had before him), Le Mars most graciously supplied John Alesch 
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(and the founder before him) with all the necessaries of corporate 
life, free for the taking. From its first breath sometime before 
1950, the Alesch Agency was the legitimate offspring of Le Mars. 
Every bit of its being belonged to Le Mars. 
Management 
And Mr. Alesch ran his Agency and also managed the 
company. 
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, 
Director, Deposition at  84. 
From the very first day that John Alesch took over the 
Agency he was a full-time employee of Le Mars, receiving a full- 
time salary. In 1970-the year the Five Alesches "sold" the 
Agency-John Alesch received $17,400 as the chief executive offi- 
cer of Le Mars. His sole obligation was to manage Le Mars. Yet 
at the same time, on Le Mars time, at Le Mars expense, as the 
top officer of Le Mars, John Alesch was managing and building 
an insurance agency. The Agency's informative Federal Tax Re- 
turn revealed that he was the while working 100 percent of his 
time for Alesch Agency-no mean feat-at a salary of $9,000 in 
1967, 1968 and $12,000 in 1969. (Exhibit 509-11.) 
Thus, over the formative years of its life, this offspring of Le 
Mars was being nurtured and protected, guided and guarded, by 
Le Mars itself, in the person of its chief executive officer, on 
company time, on company salary, at company expense. 
Overhead 
Q. To your personal knowledge, who handled the State 
reports on accidents for the Alesch Agency? 
A. The Claims Department of Le Mars, Le Mars Mu- 
tual. 
-Donald Coats, Transcript at  981. 
[Tlhere is reserved to John Alesch the right to use 700 
square feet in the [Le Mars] building for the real estate 
and insurance business of John Alesch. 
-Deed of Land to Le Mars by John Alesch. 
Nothing went into the formation and growth of the Alesch 
Agency that did not come from Le Mars. For all the years the Five 
Alesches "owned" the Agency, it lived as the ward of Le Mars. 
With the lone exception of a monthly rental-at one period it was 
only $100 a month-every bit of overhead, the heat, the light, the 
telephone, the desks, the typewriters, whatever, were contribu- 
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tions of Le Mars to the support of its offspring. These monthly, 
yearly, contributions enhanced the value of the Agency, and 
added appreciably to the monthly, yearly income. Le Mars owned 
the Alesch Agency. Add to this the invaluable clerical help, both 
direct and the incalculable indirect, and the result is the same. 
None of the Alesch Agency belonged to the Five Alesches. 
Image and Goodwill 
I knew the Alesch Agency would sell Le Mars policies. I 
knew John would naturally get commissions on those 
policies. 
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition a t  50. 
John Alesch was probably one of our larger agents. 
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, 
Director, Deposition a t  86. 
Clairvoyance is not needed to discern the reason for housing 
the Alesch Agency in the Le Mars headquarters. Le Mars is the 
pride of the region. And the Home Office itself does not sell poli- 
cies. The agents do. But the many regional customers of Le Mars 
did not know this. Where to buy a policy then? Who better than 
a Le Mars-approved agent, approved by none other than the top 
Le Mars executive? One step across the hall-a change of hat. 
John Alesch sold another policy. 
Nor was that all. The prestige of the Le Mars headquarters, 
the aura of the Le Mars highest officer, would aid sales inestima- 
bly. Would not, moreover, other agents butter their bread by 
referrals when the problems of coverage were too recondite? Or 
outside the letter of the permissible underwriting coverage? 
Not only was the Agency the legitimate progeny of Le Mars, 
but the Agency used this birthright to the utmost. And this too 
was the just property of Le Mars itself. 
Thus, every bit of its being, the entire Alesch Agency, from 
its initial Financing long before John Alesch, to the notable dol- 
lars spent in Management and office Overhead, to its Goodwill 
itself, all belonged to Le Mars. Nothing belonged to the Five 
Alesches. In one sad word, the Alesch Agency, its total assets and 
its income, had been surreptitiously and slowly stolen from Le 
Mars. 
Over the twenty-plus years, John Alesch took home un- 
counted undeserved dollars in full-time salary, while working 
full-time for Le Mars. Over the same twenty-plus years, the Five 
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Alesches skimmed off annual dividends in an untold amount. 
However so much its true asset value, that value certainly 
belongs to Le Mars. An accounting of the undeserved salary, and 
the equally undeserved dividends, must be added to this value, 
because Le Mars has a right to all returns from the Agency as 
well. 
2. The Second Stealing 
[De Witt] bought the Alesch Agency to increase our 
business in Northwest Iowa. 
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at 26. 
De Witt has abused the Alesch Agency in many ways over 
the years. The maltreatment of the "pup" continued from April, 
1970, to the present, again in a second "usurpation of a corporate 
opportunity." De Witt in its turn also proceeded to steal the 
Alesch Agency. 
Although never theirs to sell, the Alesches nonetheless had 
"sold" the Agency to De Witt. Assume, arguendo, that De Witt 
now had a legitimate investment (an assumption grounded on a 
second assumption: that the Alesches disgorge the De Witt in- 
vestment to Le Mars), what now? How is De Witt to recoup its 
investment? 
The baneful effects of the De Witt takeover of the Alesch 
Agency were threefold, all illicit: (1) the marked Diversion of Le 
Mars business to De Witt, (2) the illegal Conversion of Alesch 
Agency annual Income-rightly Le Mars'-to De Witt, and (3) 
the unjust Appropriation of the increment in Alesch Agency Asset 
value-rightly Le Mars'-to De Witt. These three illicities coa- 
lesced into the Second Stealing. 
In the Enemy Camp 
From 1970 forward, the Alesch Agency sold policies of 
Le Mars and also sold policies for De Witt. I do not see 
any conflict. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  68. 
The weakest part of our business was in Northwest 
Iowa. 
-George Howes, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  18. 
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We wanted the business from the Alesch Agency itself, 
which a good deal of it had been going into other insur- 
ance companies. So, we was interested in getting that 
business in De Witt. 
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, 
Deposition a t  26. 
The Executive Committee could "not see any conflict" in 
planting a De Witt-owned, De Witt-controlled outpost in the ten- 
ter of enemy headquarters. Before April 1970, the considerable 
regional business a t  the Le Mars Home Office was routed across 
the hall to old John Alesch's personal pocket. Now the diversion 
continued, but the pocket now was De Witt's. But this was a 
diversion with a difference. True, John Alesch personally pock- 
eted commissions that belonged to Le Mars, but at least John 
Alesch placed his policies with Le Mars. Le Mars lost the Alesch 
commissions, but kept the underwriting. Not so now with De 
Witt. "They said it would give De Witt more outlet for our insur- 
ance. The purchase of the Alesch Agency would allow us to ex- 
pand in Northwest Iowa." (J. Ray Judge, De Witt Director, Depo- 
sition at  9.) Mr. Judge was right. Henceforward, the customer 
still stepped across the same hall. And Le Mars still lost the 
commissions. But now Le Mars lost the underwriting business as 
well, "the business from the Alesch Agency itself, which had been 
going into other insurance companies. So, we was interested in 
getting that business in De Witt." And that they did. 
So successful was De Witt "in getting that business in De 
Witt," that the marked results appeared shortly. In the year 1970 
the Alesch Agency had placed exactly zero business with De Witt. 
Not one policy. But by 1974 the entire picture had changed. The 
Agency billed over $60,000 in premiums alone for policies placed 
with De Witt. In this short time, De Witt ranked second only to 
Le Mars in business written by the Agency. De Witt received 
more than double any other underwriter. Meanwhile, the place- 
ments by the Agency with Le Mars remained stagnant. (Exhibit 
425(3).) De Witt indeed did succeed "in getting that business in 
De Witt." 
Somewhere, somehow, the exact figures on the extent of the 
De Witt depredation will emerge. All that is patent now: De Witt 
stole untold Le Mars business after the De Witt takeover. (More- 
over, be assured that the De Witt incursions on Le Mars business 
were not reserved exclusively to the Alesch Agency.) 
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The Income Conversion 
I remember that the Alesch Agency was producing an 
annual net profit of somewhere around $35,000. 
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, 
Deposition a t  29. 
John Alesch was probably one of our larger agents. 
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, 
Director, Deposition a t  86. 
The theft by De Witt of Alesch Agency income from Le Mars 
followed the same modus furandi of John Alesch. The pattern was 
virtually identical. The Overhead, Management, Goodwill, all 
were the "gift" of Le Mars to De Witt. Le Mars produced the 
Agency income, all to the profit of De Witt. 
Overhead. In the Agency's Federal Tax Return for 1971, the 
first year after the takeover, De Witt again obligingly laid it all 
out on the record. The Alesch Agency showed no expenses what- 
soever for rent, office space, utilities, telephone, or maintenance. 
No overhead charges at all. Thanks to Le Mars. Just as they had 
been for John Alesch, these contributions were an excellent aug- 
mentation to the income of the Agency, and De Witt. (Exhibits 
512, 513, 424(10).) 
But then came the year 1975, after De Witt in a surge of 
prudence (induced no doubt by the instant litigation) decided to 
lodge the Alesch Agency outside the Le Mars Home Office. The 





-Exhibit 427, Alesch, Inc. 
B.S., 12-31-75 
The De Witt Income Statement had been enhanced appreciably 
over those years. 
The fascinating interlude over the then rent-free status of the 
Agency in Le Mars headquarters is instinct with insights into the 
mentality of the Executive Committee and the extent to which 
Conflict of Interest permeated its life. At one point the De Witt 
Board found out that the Agency was living rent-free in the Le 
Mars Home Office: "I first became aware that the Alesch Agency 
was not paying any rent for office space in Le Mars, that informa- 
tion came out after the lawsuit came into being [May, 1973j." 
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(John Wilkinson, Outside De Witt Director, Deposition at 44.) 
But even then the Executive Committee simply could not bring 
itself to make Le Mars whole with reasonable rent. In an uncon- 
trollable spasm of magnanimity the rent was set at $150 per 
month. And who set the rent? The answer came from Carman 
Smith of the Executive Committee who did "not see any conflict" 
in the situation: 
Q. Were you aware that for a period of time after April, 1970 
that the Alesch Agency was not paying rent in the home offices 
of Le Mars? 
A. I'm not sure I was aware of it then. I am now [1976]. 
Q. And who decided the amount of rent should be paid by the 
Alesch Agency to Le Mars? 
A. I think the Executive Committee of De Witt probably was 
the determining factor on that, who decided. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t  40. 
After that  the Agency Tax Return showed the $150 per 
month-but nil else in Overhead. 
The prudent move out of Le Mars headquarters saw the Rent 
jump to $4,000 per year. (Exhibit 427.) Res ipsa loquitur. 
Management. As in the days of John Alesch, so too in the 
days of De Witt, the management of the Alesch Agency was sup- 
plied exclusively by Le Mars. In the three years before his death 
but after the De Witt takeover, John Alesch, on a Le Mars salary, 
managed the Agency. And if John Alesch happened to be absent, 
who took over at the Alesch Agency? Another full-time Le Mars 
executive, John Breese, on a full-time $15,000 Le Mars salary. 
Q. Who operated Alesch Agency when your husband was in 
the hospital? 
A. John Breese. 
-Alice Alesch, Deposition at  21. 
Breese was working for the Le Mars. I know he helped Alesch 
Agency a lot. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition at  25. 
Q. Did the Alesch Agency pay Mr. Breese anything for the 
services he rendered? 
A. No. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t  39. 
Goodwill. The Alesch Agency continued to bask in the sun 
of the Le Mars Home Office. Again the regional public had no 
idea of the true state of affairs. If an agency is housed in Le Mars 
headquarters, it must be owned by Le Mars. If one wants to 
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support home industry, how better than at  Le Mars? Could any- 
one even conceive that Le Mars' arch competitor, De Witt, could 
own an agency in the Le Mars headquarters? Everything already 
said of the Alesches' theft of the Agency income is also pat for De 
Witt. 
The Agency Increment 
I was interested in getting the Agency because I thought 
i t  was a great opportunity for us to secure business. We 
had very little business in Northwest Iowa. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition a t  9. 
As the days passed, the "usurpation of corporate business 
opportunity" continued apace, and the combined fruits of all De 
Witt's marauding became manifest. Not only did De Witt cash 
in on "a great opportunity for us to secure business" (ironic that 
the word-and concept-should be used so opportunely), but the 
little "pup" grew, too. The Le Mars input in dollars, in dollars of 
Overhead, Management, and Goodwill, in added dollars of busi- 
ness from Le Mars' "largest agent," increasingly paid off. In the 
five years after the takeover De Witt reported in its official An- 
nual Statement to the Insurance Department that the little pup 
had grown to a net asset value of $414,000 by 1975. By mid-1977, 
query. 
Yet all of this appreciable increment, all of it except $150 per 
month, is referable to the input of Le Mars. 
In the end, then, De Witt owes Le Mars calculable sums for 
Diversion of Le Mars business to De Witt, Conversion of Alesch 
Agency income to De Witt, in commissions, salaries, dividends, 
and Appropriation of the increment in Alesch Agency asset value, 
still "owned" by De Witt. 
Only a thorough Accounting can uncover all these substan- 
tial sums. 
For the most part, then, thus ends the tale of two cities. The 
intrigue, deception, chicane, are truly worthy of a Dickensian 
plot. It indeed was the worst of times for poor hapless Le Mars. 
It was the best of times for De Witt, the Alesch Group, and the 
Smith Group. 
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The principle that a contract to resign a public office or 
to exert influence to secure the appointment of another 
is void against public policy has been too long estab- 
lished to require the citation of authority for its support 
2 
. . . .  
Q .  So actually, getting the designated Board of Direc- 
tors was part and parcel of this contract? 
A. There isn't any question that the overall agreement 
was all A part of one overall transaction. 
-Burton Dull, Deposition at  71. 
Mr. Berle was indeed right when he said that  the 
"phenomenon of 'control' is perhaps the most important single 
fact in the American corporate ~ys tem."~  Equally important, 
moreover, is the law, and the philosophy underlying the law, 
governing that "control. " 
Understandably, the overall law of corporate control encom- 
passes a broad field. Every action of the contrbleur-that topmost 
person in the corporate hierarchy-is regulated by the law of 
corporate control. Necessarily these actions span the entire spec- 
trum of corporate activity. 
And within this spectrum of the contrbleur's manifold activi- 
ties-and his corresponding obligations-the sale of his office for 
a price poses the most arresting challenge to control law. Sale-of- 
Control Premium-Bribery calls into play all the major principles 
of the philosophy of corporate control. Further, the overall philos- 
ophy finds its most impressive expression at that charged instant 
when corporate control is sold for a price. Around the Sale of 
Control, therefore, coalesce all the major concerns of this Brief. 
The Le Mars Sale of Control will be approached from two 
aspects: Premium-Bribery and Commercial Bribery. 
A. Premium-Bri bery 
A trustee may not make use of his relations as such for 
personal emolument. An agreement for a valuable con- 
sideration to abandon the trust or to transfer it to an- 
other is void.4 
2. Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 320, 114 N.W. 1047, 1049 (1908). 
3. Berle, supra note 1, at 1212. 
4. Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 320, 114 N.W. 1047, 1049 (1908). 
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Q. [Tlhe $500,000 wouldn't be paid unless there was 
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Le Mars? 
A. Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of 
them. There is no question about that. 
-Burton Dull, Deposition a t  40. 
The thesis set for present proof is succinct: (1) The $600,000 
premium-bribe passing from De Witt to the Alesch Group (2) to 
buy control of Le Mars (3) is intrinsically illegitimate, (4) must 
be disgorged by the Alesch Group and (5) paid over to the injured 
entity, Le Mars. Proof will be laid out in three parts: The Law of 
Strict Trust, The Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe, 
and Disgorgement. 
I .  The Law of Strict Trust 
The authorities are agreed that the officers and directors 
of a company are trustees . . . in the transaction of the 
business and care of property of the corporation . . . ." 
These mutual insurance companies arose on the back of 
their founders. 
-Milton Tappan, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition a t  29. 
From the day of its foundation in 1901, the German- 
American Insurance Company was under the absolute and un- 
trammeled domination of its founder. A half-century later, this 
same company, now Le Mars, passed into the absolute and un- 
trammeled control of the founder's successor, John Alesch. No 
proxy solicitation. No disclosure. Not even a quorum. The annual 
meeting was a travesty. 
John Alesch was the unquestioned contr6leur of Le Mars. 
The policyholder owners never voted. And those who did vote 
were office employees, malleable friends, or Alesch relatives. So 
too with the Directors: they were officers, officers' wives, or cro- 
nies of John Alesch. Certainly no director questioned the Alesch 
word. 
Q. Do you recall, Mr. Vander Meer, any specific occasion dur- 
ing the ten to fifteen years when you were on the Board of Le 
Mars when you took exception to any policy or recommendation 
made by John Alesch? 
A. No, I don't recall that I did. 
-Peter Vander Meer, Le Mars Director, Deposition a t  21. 
5. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co.? 176 Iowa 362, 369, 157 N.W. 929, 931 (1916). 
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Do not be misled, however. This unassailable control of John 
Alesch was not a phenomenon peculiar to Le Mars. Rather, the 
very genius of the mutual company encourages, even mandates, 
this abuse of control by an omnipotent contrbleur. This is the 
curse of the mutual system. It is inherently defective. 
Confidence-Reliance-Dependence 
The very selection for service is an expression of confid- 
ence, and the employment, the bestowal of power. The 
shareholder selects the director to serve him in caring for 
the corporate property. . . . Is he not thereby express- 
ing his confidence? . . . He trusts all with the managing 
officers, and naturally relies on them in all matters 
touching his interest in its business and property." 
Q. As President, do you recall any times when you 
objected and told John Alesch? 
A. No. He was a competent and able executive. 
-Milton Tappan, Le Mars President, 
Director, Deposition at 22-23. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa-and the same must be said of 
most jurisdictions-truly understands this most fundamental of 
all corporate-control principles. The concise enunciation by the 
Dawson court showed a remarkable gasp  of the ultimate basis of 
corporate Strict Trust. As the Iowa court intimated, in construct- 
ing the bottommost foundation for the law of corporate control, 
one can go no deeper, become no more basic, than this: the help- 
less entity is nakedly dependent-its assets, its structure, its per- 
sonnel, its policy-on the raw power of the contrdleur. In the 
contr6leur the owners have placed unquestioning confidence. On 
the contrdleur, complete reliance, willy-nilly. 
And so it was with Le Mars. Assets, policy, personnel, every- 
thing, were totally dependent on the will of John Alesch. On him 
alone the policyholder owner "naturally relied." Their "very 
selection" of John Alesch was "an expression of confidence." 
Finally and most important, both confidence and reliance 
are reducible to dependence. It is interesting that Webster gives 
two direct synonyms for dependence: "reliance" and "trust." 
The note of dependence is the element most expressive of the 
true status of one who reposes confidence in another. A depen- 
dent person is subject to, in the power of, another. This depend- 
- -  
6. Id. at 376, 157 N.W. at 933. 
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ence is coterminous with the orbit of reliance or confidence. The 
dependence in the one finds the correlative independence in the 
other. . . . 
No more ultimate constituent of the trust lies beyond or 
beneath this dependen~e.~ 
The extent to which the Supreme Court of Iowa intuited this 
ultimate concept is arresting: 
The fiduciary relation may exist wherever special confid- 
ence is reposed, whether the relationship be that of blood, busi- 
ness, friendship or association, by one person in another when 
they are in a position to have and exercise or do have and exer- 
cise influence over each other. Curtis u. Arrnagast, 158 Iowa 
507.8 
In the case of Le Mars, this confidence, reliance, dependence, was 
total. In a word, Le Mars was in the complete custody of John 
Alesch. 
The Custodial Concept of Corporate Control 
[The contrbleur] has custody only, not ownership. 
The corporation is merely entrusted to an office, not 
given to an individual. The custodian must guard, guide 
and nurture the corporation as if it were his own, with 
full knowledge that it belongs to another." 
The directors have the custody and control of the assets 
of the corporation for the benefit of those to whom they 
belong . . . . 10 
The nexus is immediate between the confidence, reliance, 
dependence, and the next logical development of the law of Strict 
Trust. The human mind moves inexorably from the total depend- 
ence of the corporation to the Custodial Concept of Corporate 
Control. Herein lies the first major trust concept. 
In the theoretical-but very real-beginning of every corpo- 
ration the shareholder owners in a deliberate appropriation en- 
trust the corporate assets to the untrammeled dominion of that 
necessary top-level authority, the contrbleur. In acquiescing to 
this appropriation the contrbleur thereby assumes custody of 
the entity, with all its duties and rights. Technically, therefore, 
7. Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEO. L.J. 543, 557 (1965). 
8. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 376-77, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916). 
9. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U .  PA. L. REV. 22, 32 (1963). 
10. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927). 
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corporate control is a relation of total custody subsisting be- 
tween the subjective term, the office of control, and the objec- 
tive term, the corpofate entity itself.I1 
With continuing remarkable insight, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
expressed this custodial concept in similar words: 
The ordinary stockholder gives little or no attention to the de- 
tails or control of corporate affairs. He trusts all with the manag- 
ing officers, and naturally relies on them in all matters touching 
his interest in its business and property. . . . [Plower akin to 
that of an attorney, priest, agent or copartner is conferred on the 
directors and officers by those selecting them to manage corpo- 
rate affairs.I2 
And again, with even greater directness: 
The directors are primarily trustees for the corporation and 
its stockholders, and it is their duty to manage the affairs of the 
corporation and administer its assets in accordance with the law 
and legal rights of all persons interested. . . . The directors 
have the custody and control of the assets of the corporation for 
the benefit of those to whom they belong . . . . 13 
From this foundation concept of custody the Iowa court moved 
effortlessly to the inescapable conclusion: 
The fiduciary obligation is to the stockholders in a body. . . . 
. . . a  
. . . Whether the corporation be treated as an enlarged and 
amplified form of partnership, and the director as managing 
partner, or whether he is called an agent or trustee, elected by 
the stockholders to represent them in the management of the 
concern, he occupies a fiduciary position.I4 
Thus far-and they persist to the end-John Alesch, contrdeur, 
and Le Mars, helpless beneficiary, verify every element of the 
Custodial Concept of Corporate Control outlined by the Iowa 
court. 
Strict Trust 
Since the scope of [the contr6leur'sl responsibility 
is coterminous with the extent of the custody, it follows 
11. Bayne, The Noninvestment Value of Control Stock, 45 IND. L.J. 317, 333 (1970). 
12. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 376, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916). 
13. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927). 
14. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 376, 381, 157 N.W. 929, 933,935 
(1916). 
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that the responsibility of [the contr6leurl is total be- 
cause the entire corporate entity has been entrusted to 
[the contr6leur.l l5 
Equity holds them strictly accountable as trustees.'" 
Nor did the Iowa court stop short with a watered-down defi- 
nition of the "fiduciary duty" incumbent on the contrbleur. To 
the Iowa court the logical consequences of custody were the rigid 
stringencies of the Strict Trust. (And these stringencies include 
notably the Benefit-to-Beneficiary and No-Inquiry Rules.) 
"The fact that he is a trustee for all is not to be perverted 
into holding that he is under no obligation to each. . . . That 
he is primarily trustee for the corporation is not intended to 
make the artificial entity a fetich to be worshipped in the sacri- 
fice of those who in the last analysis are the real parties a t  
interest. "I7 
For a correct understanding of the Iowa embrace of Strict 
Trust, note that the court draws the understandable dichotomy 
between the contrbleur's Strict-Trust obligation to the corpora- 
tion itself, and his quasi-trust duty to the shareholder in the 
course of individual contrbleur-shareholder transactions. Thus, 
although the contrbleur is a strict trustee to the entity, to the 
private shareholder he is " '[nlot a strict trustee, since [the 
contrbleur] does not hold title to the shares, not even a strict 
trustee who is practically prohibited from dealing with his cestui 
que trust, but a quasi trustee as to the shareholder's interest in 
the shares.' "I8 Thus, when the Iowa court injects the qualifica- 
tions "quasi trustee" into its definition, it intends only to qualig 
the Strict-Trust duty of the contrbleur to the individual 
shareholder, but not to the entity itself and its assets. 
The Iowa court was hesitant to apply "strict trustee" to the 
limited dealings with the shareholder because of the absence of 
that  supposed Strict-Trust requisite: possession of title. 
"Undoubtedly, he is not a trustee of the stockholder in the strict 
sense, for he does not have title to the latter's stock. His relation 
is that often denominated quasi tr~stee."~@Thus, only in direct 
15. Bayne, supra note 9, at 33. 
16. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 358 (Iowa 1972). 
17. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 379-80, 157 N.W. 929, 935 (1916) 
(quoting Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367, 45 S.E. 232, 233 (1903)). 
18. Id. at 380, 157 N.W. at 935 (quoting Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367, 45 S.E. 
232, 233-34 (1903)). 
19. Id. at 378, 157 N.W. at 934. 
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dealings with the entity and its assets does Iowa hold the contrb- 
leur to the full strictures of Strict Trust. 
In later years this valid distinction occasionally becomes 
blurred. Sometimes the Iowa court uses "quasi trustee" when it 
means "strict trustee," and vice versa. Throughout this Brief, 
however, the sole concern is the contrbleur's custody of the corpo- 
ration, His dealings with individual shareholders never surface. 
Hence the "possession of title" to the shareholder's shares is of 
no matter. As to the contrbleur's title to corporate assets: 
"[Flrom the custodial aspect, the formal passage of title means 
nil. The property tenure of the corporate [contrbleur] is fully 
tantamount to actual possession of title and could scarcely be 
more complete."20 Clearly, the unfettered domination of the con- 
tr6leur would not be any less fettered by formal possession of the 
title to the assets. From a practical standpoint, the contrbleur has 
tantamount to title to the entity. 
Iowa, therefore, embraces fully the Strict-Trust tradition, 
from beginning to present. In the 1972 decision in Holden, quot- 
ing the 1953 decision in Bechtel, the court employs the traditional 
Strict-Trust rule: "[D]irectors of a corporation are the agents of 
and act for it, and indirectly for its stockholders, and they are 
trustees or quasi trustees, at least, of the property of the corpora- 
tion for the company and its  stockholder^."^^ And this rule was 
later endorsed by the 1974 decision in Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar. 22 
The Iowa court, therefore, holds the contrbleur as a strict trustee 
of the corporation, and a "quasi trustee, at least," of its stock- 
holders. 
, The Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule 
"[Directors] impliedly undertake . . . to exercise the 
powers conferred solely in the interest of the corporation 
or the stockholders as a body or corporate entity, and 
not for their own personal  interest^."^" 
The Iowa court in Schildberg nudged its Strict-Trust reason- 
ing to the next logical level, to the most important Strict-Trust 
20. Bayne, supra note 7, at 561. 
21. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348,357 (Iowa 1972) (quoting Des 
Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1081, 51 N.W.2d 
174, 216 (1952)). 
22. 217 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Iowa 1974). 
23. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 767, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 
(1966) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2~ Corporatiom 9 1272 (1965)). 
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corollary. Necessarily, Schildberg began by laying the Strict- 
Trust base: "Our own and other decisions make it clear, and it is 
conceded, that officers and directors . . . are trustees or quasi- 
trustees of the corporate assets and occupy a fiduciary relation to 
the corporation and its stockholders . . . ."24 From this point, 
one inevitable step leads to the Strict-Trust Benefit-to- 
Beneficiary Rule : 
Because this dependence [of the beneficiary on the contr6- 
leur] is total . . . the resultant responsibility is total. . . . 
This total responsibility for the stewardship of another's 
assets is merely a collective noun describing a complexus of 
duties in regard to these assets. This complexus is the essence 
of the benefit-to-beneficiary rule. This in turn is only another 
way of saying that the custodian has a duty to care for the assets 
entrusted to him as if they were his own. 
This reasoning coalesces into one simple unqualified rule 
enunciated in the Restatement: "The trustee is under a duty to 
the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of 
the beneficiary. "25 
Thus, to the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control must be 
added the second major Strict-Trust concept: All benefit must 
inure to the beneficiary. 
And the Schildberg court did just that. Directors, as trustees, 
must act for the benefit of the corporation, and not 
for their own personal interest. It is the policy of the law to put 
fiduciaries beyond the reach of temptation by making it unprof- 
itable to yield to it. Accordingly an act by the fiduciary in which 
personal interest and duty conflict is voidable a t  the option of 
the beneficiary, regardless of good faith.26 
To that, the court added a formal statement of the Rule: 
" '[Directors] impliedly undertake . . . to exercise the powers 
conferred solely in the interest of the corporation or the stockhold- 
ers as a body or corporate entity, and not for their own personal 
interests.' "27 At another point the Schildberg court was even 
more blunt in its statement of the Rule: In the face of a conflict 
between contr6leur and corporation, if " 'the interests of the cor- 
24. Id. at 766, 140 N.W.2d 136. 
25. Bayne, supra note 7, at 565-66 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS 8 170(1) 
(1959). 
26. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 766, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 
(1966). 
27. Id. at 767,140 N.W.2d at 136 (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2~ Corporations 8 1272 (1965)). 
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poration are betrayed, the corporation may elect to claim all of 
the benefits of the transaction for itself, and the law will impress 
a trust in favor of the corporation upon the property, interests and 
profits so acquired.' "" 
Which is to say that one who willingly assumes, as John 
Alesch did, the stewardship of millions of dollars of "other peo- 
ple's money" has thereby agreed "to administer the trust solely 
in the interest of the benefi~iary."~~ As in fact John Alesch did 
agree formally, annually, with solemn signature, in the Le Mars 
"Annual Policy Statement on Conflicts of Interest": 
Insurance is a business dependent upon public confidence; 
therefore the ethical and legal obligations of insurance company 
officers, directors and responsible employees to act solely for the 
benefit of the company cannot be overemphasized. 
It is the policy of this company that no officer, director or 
responsible employee should use his position in such a manner 
that a conflict between the company's interests and his personal 
interest arises. 
-Le Mars Policy Statement, April 21, 1970. 
This Policy Statement, prepared by Burton Dull, was signed for- 
mally by John Alesch and the Board on April 21,1970, the fateful 
day of the Sale of Control. It was, and had been, an annual rite. 
Clearly, John Alesch and his coterie of subservient directors knew 
full well what the Iowa court meant. Nor does one need to be a 
moral theologian to enunciate the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule. 
Human nature defines clearly the duties of the steward. 
The implications of Strict Trust and the Benefit-to- 
Beneficiary Rule are pervasive. At every turn their cogency will 
carry the day. But a t  this moment a special emphasis is in order. 
The doctrine . . . is but one phase of the cardinal 
rule of undivided loyalty on the part of fiduciaries. Our 
own consideration . . . is mainly in Ontjes v. MacNider, 
. . . 232 Iowa 562, . . . which quotes at length with 
approval from Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, . . . 
a leading case in this area of the law.31 
28. Id. at 768, 140 N.W.2d at 137 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 273,5 
A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1939)). 
29. Bayne, supra note 7, at 565-66. 
30. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939). 
31. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 
(1966) (citations omitted). 
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Guth v. Loft is indeed "a leading case in this area of the law," 
an area concerned exclusively with "the cardinal rule of undi- 
vided loyalty on the part of fiduciaries." More pertinently, Guth 
has been (until the 1976 decision in Borden v. S i n ~ k e y ~ ~  by the 
Third Circuit) the prototypal Strict-Trust case in the United 
States. Guth has been cited and quoted year after year across the 
nation, as well as in Iowa. 
More to the point, Iowa has paraphrased and adopted the 
basic tenet of Guth, the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule: In a 
conflict-of-interest situation, all profits are disgorged to the cor- 
poration, all losses are borne by the trustee. The transaction is 
void. 
"If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his 
duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, the law 
charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of 
the corporation, at its election, while it denies to the betrayer 
all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and uncompromising 
in its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or 
damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confid- 
ence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, 
for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all pos- 
sibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed 
by the fiduciary relation. Given the relation between the parties, 
a certain result follows; and a constructive trust is the remedial 
device through which precedence of self is compelled to give way 
to the stern demands of loyalty. . . . Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 
N.Y. 458 . . . . "33 
Note well: When Guth cites Meinhard v. Salmon, all the stric- 
tures of Partnership and Agency are in turn embodied into Guth, 
and thence into Dawson, Hoyt, Ontjes, Schildberg, Holden, Holi- 
Rest, and the long Iowa line. When then-Chief Judge Cardozo 
wrote Meinhard v. Salmon, he composed the finest statement of 
the loyalty of a fiduciary. Partnership, Restitution, and Agency 
law all impose Strict-Trust standards. 
The Third Circuit's Borden 
[Applying the doctrine first announced in Guth u. 
Loft] the Court below . . . imposed a constructive trust 
32. 530 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1976). 
33. Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 578, 5 N.W.2d 860, 869 (1942) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270-71, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 
1939)). 
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in favor of the plaintiff on Sinskey's stock . . . . In ad- 
dition, plaintiff was awarded . . . the profit . . . as well 
as all salaries, director's fees and dividends received by 
him . . . . 34 
Borden is the crown to this entire Brief, and to the entire 
Iowa, and national, line begun by Guth. Borden is the capstone. 
Borden affirmed unanimously a federal district court. Borden 
denied a rehearing, en banc. The entire circuit, nine judges, ap- 
proved. 
And Borden applied Strict Trust with religious exactitude, 
totally true to the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule. The corporate 
trustee, in Conflict of Interest, disgorged every penny. Not only 
the stock but the profit, fees, and dividends. Even the salaries 
earned while working for the beneficiary. 
However, even if we were now to order an accounting, we would 
not permit Sinsky to retain the reasonable value of his services. 
Although defendants may be able to distinguish the facts of 
Guth . . . they cannot distinguish away the rationale of that 
decision. . . . The [Guth] court refused to allow him to retain 
any of the profits or benefits derived from his misconduct in 
order to deter any disloyalty on the part of a corporate fidu- 
~ i a r y . ~ ~  
Here is the Strict Trust of Guth in both theory and application. 
And so does Iowa follow: "We have quoted quite extensively 
from this [Guth] case, inasmuch as it is our conclusion that this 
late and well-reasoned expression of the Delaware court summa- 
rizes the general holdings of the various jurisdictions and the 
several texts and authorities which we have c~nsul ted."~~ 
Guth, Dawson, Hoyt, Ontjes, Schildberg, Holden, Holi-Rest, 
Meinhard, Borden, all join forces in laying the most stable Strict- 
Trust foundation possible for Iowa, and everywhere. 
(Further, the immediate corollary to the Benefit-to- 
Beneficiary Rule is the No-Inquiry Rule: When the interests of 
contr6leur and corporation conflict, no inquiry is made into the 
fairness of the transaction. The deed is voidable at the option of - 
the beneficiary. The No-Inquiry Rule is another necessary deriva- 
tive of Strict Trust. Again expectably the Supreme Court of Iowa 
has adopted the No-Inquiry Rule. But its applicability in this 
Brief is discussed later.) 
34. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1976). 
35. Id. at 497-98. 
36. Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 579, 5 N.W.2d 860, 869 (1942). 
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But do not be confounded by terminology, or technicality. 
No mystery enshrouds Strict Trust. The concept is elemental. If 
someone entrusts his assets to another, the trustee must adminis- 
ter those assets as if his own, but for the exclusive benefit of the 
owner. It is as simple as that. 
(A transitional interjection must be made: The reasoning 
thus far has produced the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control 
and its immediate corollary, the Strict-Trust Benefit-to- 
Beneficiary Rule. At the present juncture, Strict Trust forms the 
foundation for the Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe. 
Next, Looting. Later, for the Disloyalty of the contrbleurs. Then 
for the law of "Corporate Opportunity." And so throughout the 
Brief .) 
2. The Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe 
[Tlhe transaction would have been none the less repre- 
hensible from a legal point of view, for, as aptly said by 
the trial court, "the office of guardian is not a matter of 
commerce," and "an agreement to resign was against 
public policy. "37 
This Agreement shall not become effective unless and 
until all of the present Directors of the Le Mars Mutual 
have submitted their resignations and qualified succes- 
sors, as designated by [De Witt], have been qualified 
as Directors of the Le Mars Mutual. 
-Agreement to Sell Stock, Alesches and 
De Witt, Exhibit A, 3, 4. 
John Alesch and his minions breached the categorical 
Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule in many respects, as will be analyzed 
apropos. But the control breach-the acceptance of a premium- 
bribe from De Witt for control of Le Mars-was the breach that 
triggered most of the others. This Sale of Control has two major 
facets: (a,) the Premium-Bribe Itself, and (b.) the Triple 
Turpitude. The former is simple. The latter, complex. But both 
produce far-reaching results. 
a. The Premium-Bribe itself. 
The questions is . . . whether [the contr6leurl is bound 
to account for the money received from Levy for the 
transfer to him and his associates of the management 
- 
37. Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 320, 114 N.W. 1047, 1049 (1908). 
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and control of the Life Union [Mutual], together with 
its property and effects. The learned appellate division 
has treated this transaction as a bribe paid to the direc- 
tors . . . . The election of directors, and the transfer of 
the management and property of the corporation, were 
official acts, and whatever money he received from such 
official acts were moneys derived by virtue of his office, 
for which we think he should account.38 
The above is all subject to the election of Directors ap- 
proved by De Witt. 
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, 
Exhibit 4. 
New York's highest court was the first to characterize the 
price paid for corporate office as a plain old bribe, and bribe it 
is. The modern term "premium-bribe" has arisen as more apt 
because the corporate bribe is most often "hidden" in a 
6 6  premium," an extra little bonus added somewhere, e.g., in a sale 
of a stock block (most complex Sale-of-Control cases feature a 
"premium" over market for the contr6leur's personal shares), or 
perhaps in the collateral sale of an insurance agency, or wherever. 
But "bonus," or "premium, " or "premium- bribe, " no matter. 
The result is the same: Bribery. 
De Witt and the Alesch Group left no necessary facts un- 
stated in their methodical chronical of all the requisite elements 
of Premium-Bribery. Premium-Bribery is contractual, and the 
terms of the De Witt-Alesch agreement were summarized with 
precision in one eye-opening document: the Dull-Brown Bribery 
Letter. 
Absent, moreover, are the subtleties so irritatingly present in 
the usual Sale of Control of the complex stock company. With Le 
Mars not only were all the facts set down unabashedly in print, 
but no complicated stock ownership beclouded the issue. The 
Alesches owned no Le Mars stock to sell. In fact the Alesches 
owned nothing of Le Mars at all. So verification of Premium- 
Bribery is effortless. 
From that one principal document, the brazen Bribery Let- 
ter, plus the several supporting records and myriad confirming 
facts, emerges the technical definition of Premium-Bribery: 
Broken down into its five principal parts, the sale-of-control 
premium-bribe can thus be technically defined as (1) some form 
38. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 80, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899). 
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of consideration, monetary or otherwise, (2) flowing to the in- 
cumbent contrdeur, (3) from or on behalf of the prospective 
contrhleur, (4) to induce the appointment to the office of con- 
trol, (5) paid knowingly, scienter. 3n 
Each of these parts is realized in the Alesch Sale of Control to  De 
Witt. 
-Monetary Consideration- 
Broken down . . . (1) some form of consideration, 
monetary or otherwise . . . . 40 
[Tlhe following will outline . . . what in turn De Witt 
will do in consideration therefor. 
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, 
Exhibit 4. 
The first of many problems facing the fact-finder in 
the analysis of the premium-bribe is the ascertainment 
of some consideration. . . . 
The chore for the fact finder is simple when the 
consideration is cash and the parties make no attempt 
to hide it.41 
Undoubtedly, and justifiably, inspired by a deep distrust of 
each other, both the Alesch Group and De Witt insisted on law- 
yerlike exactness in the terms of the premium-bribe. Fortunately 
for present proof, the three segments of De Witt's "consideration 
therefor" were preserved with unlawyerlike permanence in letter, 
contract, and memorandum. 
The "Sale" of the Agency 
Without the onerous, and sometimes impossible, chore 
of segregating the true investment value of accompany- 
ing shares, the [De Witt] premium stands stark, in the 
words of the Appellate Division, "as a bribe."42 
Q. [Tlhe $500,000 wouldn't be paid unless there was 
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Le Mars? 
A. Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of 
them. There is no question about that. 
-Burton Dull, Deposition at  40. 
39. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 MINN. L. REV. 485,497 
(1969). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 498. 
42. Id. at 492-93. 
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The sham sale of the Alesch Agency was the conduit for 
$400,000 of the total premium-bribe. This final figure represents 
the premium paid by De Witt over the actual value of the Agency: 
Contract Price Paid: $500,000 
Liquid Assets: 100,000 
Premium-Bribe: $400,000 
The contract price paid by De Witt to the Alesches was first 
reached in protracted negotiations beginning some time before 
November 12, 1969, (about the time the Employers Mutual 
premium-bribe of $450,000 was rejected) and culminating in the 
formal Agreement to Sell Stock of February 26,1970, prepared by 
Burton Dull and signed by the Five Alesches, and Carman Smith 
and Raymond Brown of the Executive Committee of De Witt. 
The going-concern value of the Agency, as estimated by ex- 
pert and layman alike, was zero, beyond of course the $100,000 
in cash on hand. Faced with a certain cessation of Le Mars sup- 
port (upon sale to competitor De Witt), loss of Le Mars policies, 
the inception of real-life overhead and management salaries, the 
Agency would be worthless. The liquid $100,000 in the Agency 
till, therefore, was the Agency's total value. This amount, of 
course, was recognized by the various agreements and letters as 
deductible from the base price. 
The "Consultant's " Contract 
As with the other facets of premium-bribe consider- 
ation, the only limit to the variety of corporate disburse- 
ment is human resourcefulness.43 
Perhaps the most common method of corporate 
payment is the unearned-salary or consultation-fee de- 
vice. 44 
We understood you only wanted a desk available when 
you occasionally would come to the office. 
-De Witt to John Alesch, Exhibit 93. 
The identification of the $46,000 in unearned fees as 
premium-bribe dollars is airtight: 
(1) The Bribery Letter specified "what in turn De Witt will 
do in consideration therefor." De Witt promised: "Alesch will 
43. Id. at 502. 
44. Id. 
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work for Alesch Agency for a period of three years for $1,000 per 
month," and Alesch will receive "the same type of automobile, 
and the operating expe~ises therefor." Thus, some $36,000 over 
three years (April 1970 to Alesch's death in May 1973) passed to 
Alesch, pursuant to De Witt's word. Another $10,000, minimum, 
passed in the free automobile. As a further fillip, the Consultant's 
Contract between De Witt and Alesch embodies the terms of the 
Bribery Letter in a formal contract. 
(2) Lest there be any doubt that the dollars in unearned 
fees and free car were part of the premium-bribe, the Contract 
obligingly tied together "(1) this Consultant's Contract and (2) 
the Sales Agreement between the owners of the stock of the 
Alesch Agency and De Witt." This "Sales Agreement" of course 
bought the Board. 
That John Alesch actually received $46,000, minimum, is 
indisputable. That the $46,000 was actually unearned is equally 
indisputable. The "consultation" was a mockery to begin with. 
But as the event had it, John Alesch was not even allowed to 
counsel, had he wished to do so (which occasionally he apparently 
did): "I am at  a loss as to know just what is expected of me, since 
I am not advised or asked of any changes. [I am] left in the 
cold." Thus John Alesch to De Witt. (Exhibit 95.) To which, De 
Witt: "We understood you only wanted a desk available when you 
occasionally would come to the office." 
The "Pension Plan" 
A sum in the amount of $154,131.53 for Single-Premium 
Annuities payable to The Manufacturers Life Insurance 
Company of Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
-Check Number 80337, April 20, 1970, 
Exhibit 604. 
The kinds of consideration are limited only by the inge- 
nuity of human desire. Consider, for example, a cumula- 
tive pattern of Christmas gifts, a long-term low-interest 
loan, or perennial purchases below market.45 
Or even better, a resignation-day farewell in the form of fully 
funded pensions for life, all around. The "human desire" was 
great indeed, but the "ingenuity" was not too ingenious, since the 
Alesch Group and De Witt again strewed the evidence of the 
single-premium payment all across their books of account, check- 
45. Id. at 499. 
276 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
books, meeting minutes, Bribery Letter, and on and on. Nothing 
is more readily ascertainable than the $154,131.53 in the lump- 
sum outlay for the new "Pension Plan" for the Alesch Group, 
instituted by De Witt on April 21, 1970. 
In all, the three segments of the Bribery Letter totalled up 
to $600,000 in monetary consideration: 
(1) The "sale" of the Agency: 
(2) The "Consultant's" Contract: 
(3) The "Pension Plan": 
The Total Premium-Bribe: 
No technical niceties complicated or obscured the premium- 
bribe. It was spelled out in document after document. 
-To the Incumbent Contr8leur- 
Broken down . . . (2) flowing to the incumbent con- 
troleur [the Alesch Group] . . . . 46 
, On April 20, 1970, Single-Premium Annuities were pur- 
chased for all of the "old" Directors of Le Mars. 
-J.D. Hattam, Insurance Auditor, 
Arthur Young & Co., Transcript 
at  260-61; Exhibit 604. 
On occasion, the premium-bribe consideration is 
not only visibly present but its path to a point of rest in 
the controleur is also unmistakable. More often, how- 
ever, the path is more like a maze.47 
But always obliging, the Alesch Group and De witUt eschewed 
the "maze," and tracked a highly traceable spoor along a straight 
"path to a point of rest in the contr6leur." But once arrived at 
the contr6leur, the task becomes moderately complicated. 
The dollar amount of total premium-bribe has been clearly 
established at $600,000. Once in the hands of the Alesch Group 
this was divided up exactly according to the share of each in the 
control of Le Mars. J.D. Hattam, Insurance Auditor, Arthur 
Young & Company (Transcript at 260-61) itemized every dollar 
received by each family member. 
The broad analysis of the distribution of the $600,000 splits 
the Alesch Group into three categories, arranged hierarchically 
according to their roles in the power structure: 
- 
46. Id. at 497. 
47. Id. at 499. 
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(1) John Alesch was incontrovertibly the contr6leur of Le 
Mars. Any threat to his position was indiscernible. Hence he 
received the "lion's share": $218,000, of which $100,000 was 
"hidden" in the Agency "sale," $46,000 was for silent "counsel," 
and $72,600 was in a lump-sum "pension." 
Even the share of the four Alesch women was proportioned 
to their control positions. Of the full $400,000 from the Agency 
"sale," wife Alice, who was a director momentarily, received 
$100,000. Add to this a "pension" of $4,000 for her momentary 
service, "even though she has only been on the Board for two 
years, in view of her long and loyal service . . . and as wife of 
John Alesch" (as the Minutes of the fateful April 21, 1970, so 
considerately admitted). The three daughters received in all only 
$200,000 for acceding to the Premium-Bribery. Some $66,667 per 
filial signature. 
The Five Alesches, father, daughters, wife, received a grand 
total of $522,600 of the total premium-bribe. 
(2) President Tappan and wife Wilhelmine, daughter of the 
Le Mars founder, alone composed the second category. Since 1967 
Milton Tappan had been retired in Lauderdale (when he quit his 
$38,000 a year longtime job as chief of Johnson Biscuit in Sioux 
City), but he and Wilhelmine had been powerful forces to reckon 
with (as his Deposition flavorfully attests: "[Alnd if you want 
to know why I went to Florida, because you're sticking your nose 
into so damned many impertinent things, I had an occluded ar- 
tery in my leg." (Deposition at 12, 13.)) So powerful in fact were 
the Tappans that they alone commanded a total of $58,000 in 
"Pension Plan" resignation-day, farewell dollars. And the Tap- 
pans were the most sophisticated-and hence most culpable-of 
the Alesch Group. Undoubtedly their sophistication enhanced 
their command of a premium-bribe. Further they had been more 
intimately privy to all five major malefactions. 
(3) The "lesser parties" of the Alesch Group received their 
share of the $600,000 premium-bribe in the lump-sum single- 
premium annuities granted the same day, April 21, 1970. The 
total: $19,400. As Burton Dull said to Raymond Brown in another 
context, this permitted "us to make the desired changes with the 
least amount of objections. " (Exhibit 39.) 
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-From the Prospective Contrhleur- 
Broken down . . . (3) from or on behalf of the prospec- 
tive contr6leur [De Witt]. . . . 48 
[Tlhe following will outline . . . what De Witt in turn 
will do in consideration therefor. 
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, Exhibit 4. 
As with the identification of the consideration and 
its proven reference to the incumbent [Alesch Group], 
the verification of the third element is at  worst not a 
greatly demanding assignment for the fact-finder.J9 
In his four-page Bribery Letter to De Witt, Burton Dull, 
"with the concurrence of John Alesch," detailed the exact terms 
of the premium-bribe. These terms have totalled $600,000 and 
represented "what in turn De Witt will do." Thus far the spoor 
is unmistakable. 
But a t  this turn in the tracking, the pattern of guilelessness 
disappears. And a recent admonition is pertinent in tracing the 
$600,000 directly to (or better, "from") De Witt: 
Whether there is a patent payinent directly from the ap- 
pointee himself [De Witt], or indirectly from some third party, 
or a complicated series of moves from the controlled corporation 
[Le Mars], one overriding principle prevails-the considera- 
tion must be the responsibility of the appointee [De Witt]. 
Regardless of appearances, all three sources must be reducibly 
the same.50 
For the first time in this unfolding tale, the actors have, 
probably unwittingly, camouflaged their actions. Not fully, but 
somewhat. The premium-bribe totalled $600,000. As to $421,400 
of this $600,000, De Witt openly and deftlessly reached into its 
own pocket and paid the Alesch Group, first, $400,000 via the 
- 
sham "sale" of the Alesch Agency and, second, $21,400 of the 
promised $36,000 in "Consultation" fees. Thus far there was "a 
patent payment directly from the appointee," De Witt. 
But with the remaining $178,600 of the $600,000 premium- 
bribe, the matter was entirely different. Perhaps it would be flat- 
tery to credit De Witt with "a complicated series of moves,'' but 
the fact remains that this $178,600 was not "a patent payment 
directly from" De Witt. Rather, the $178,600 came "from the 
48. Id. at 497. 
49. Id. at 500. 
50. Id. at 501. 
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controlled corporation" itself, Le Man. But this gambit was not 
exactly a De Witt invention. The ploy was slightly devious, but 
far from original: 
Although definitely begging a later question [which is so 
true here and now], nearly every successful premium-bribe is 
sooner or later recouped from the corporation [Le Mars]. 
Often, however, the new appointee [De Witt] avoids the circu- 
ity of a personal payment and later recoupment by an immedi- 
ate raid on the [Le Mars] corporate till.5' 
Which, of course, is exactly what appointee De Witt did. Putting 
the matter grossly, and tracing the circuity move by move, one 
can see that De Witt simply stole the $178,600 directly from Le 
Mars and paid it over to the Alesch Group, pursuant to agree- 
ment. Fortunately, as has been true thus far, De Witt and the 
Alesches left none of this complicated circuity to conjecture. 
Every step was tracked: 
(1) Complicated negotiations over several months finally 
crystallized the total premium-bribe at $600,000, and reduced the 
terms to writing in the Bribery Letter. The repetition of the terms 
in several other documents left no doubt that the remaining 
$178,600 unpaid balance of the total $600,000 was integral to the 
premium-bribe. This $178,600 balance was broken down into 
$14,600 of Consultant fees, the $10,000 in free automobile and the 
$154,000 embedded in the "Pension Plan." The amount was high- 
lighted as "what in turn De Witt will do in consideration." This 
was Burton Dull, "with the concurrence of John Alesch." 
(2) To this specific inclusion of the $178,600 in the terms of 
the premium-bribe, De Witt replied: "Our Executive Committee 
are in complete agreement with the proposal outlined in your" 
Bribery Letter. (Exhibit 3.) The deal was sealed. 
(3) The formal commitment of De Witt (covenanted in the 
"Consultant's" Contract) to the full payment of the $36,000 in 
"Consultation" fees and the $10,000 in automobile was later con- 
firmed and ratified over many months of actual payment. The 
remaining unpaid debt of $24,600-of the total $46,000-needed 
no further proof than the acknowledged part payment of the 
$21,400 already made. (Exhibit 508, IV.) Once De Witt confirmed 
the total amount due of $46,000 by actually paying John Alesch 
$21,400, that partial remittance attested incontrovertibly to full 
commitment to the remainder, the $24,600. 
51. Id. at 502. 
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(4) The facts surrounding De Witt's assumption of liability 
for the $154,000 segment of the premium-bribe are equally confir- 
matory. This lump-sum, single-premium "Pension" fund was in- 
tegral to the $600,000 premium-bribe. The amount was itemized 
specifically in the Dull-Brown Bribery Letter. (Exhibit 4.) 
Lest any doubt remain that the $154,000 "consideration 
[was] the primary responsibility of the appointee [De Witt]," 
De Witt waited till after the takeover of Le Mars to do the deed 
personally. Make no mistake: This delay was no accidental hap- 
penstance. De Witt waited till after the takeover because the 
Alesch Group insisted that De Witt wait. Because De Witt had 
agreed to pay the full $600,000. Because that was essential to the 
deal. Because the $154,000 was part of the premium-bribe. Be- 
cause the Alesch Group was not- about to be guilty of looting Le 
Mars. Note this last point well. 
Thus on the day the $154,000 passed from De Witt to the 
Alesch Group, De Witt was in charge at Le Mars. The deed was 
done by De Witt: "BE IT RESOLVED that . . . in consideration 
of the long and continued service . . . as Director . . . comment- 
ing on the first day of May, 1970 . . -. a Single Premium Annuity 
. . . ." (Minutes, Le Mars Annual Meeting, April 21, 1970.) The 
motion was made by Raymond Brown, seconded by George 
Howes, both of the Executive Committee. The Executive Com- 
mittee was true to its word, and the terms of the Bribery Letter. 
De Witt did do the deed. 
So in the end, the entire $600,000 premium-bribe was "the 
primary responsibility of the appointee," De Witt. Of that, 
$421,400 came in "a patent payment directly from the ap- 
pointee," De Witt, and $178,600 "in a complicated series of moves 
from the controlled corporation," Le Mars. But all were the re- 
sponsibility of De Witt. 
-To Induce the Appointment- 
Broken down : . . (4) to induce the appointment to 
the office of control . . . . 52 
This Agreement shall not become effective unless 
and until successors, as designated by [De Witt], have 
been qualified as Directors of the Le Mars Mutual. 
-Agreement to Sell Stock, Alesches 
and De Witt, Exhibit A, 3, 4. 
52. Id. at 497. 
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The innermost essence of bribery, and correspond- 
ingly of the premium-bribe, lies in its purpose. . . . 
. . . If the goal is not the appointment to the office, 
the premium-bribe is absent. . . . To induce the in- 
cumbent [Alesches] to appoint must be, by definition, 
the sole purpose of the considerati~n.~~ 
The De Witt intent to "induce the appointment[s]" to the 
directorate of Le Mars was reduced to formal writing at  least 
twice. Once, explicity, in the Agreement to Sell Stock. Twice, 
again explicitly, in the Bribery Letter: The three segments, totall- 
ing $600,000, are "all subject to the election of Directors approved 
by De Witt." 
To the same effect were references passim in various letters 
and depositions. Item: "There isn't any question that the overall 
agreement was all a part of one overall transaction." (Burton 
Dull, Deposition at 71.) Item: "I will bring the certified check 
with me. [I]n turning over control of Le Mars Mutual on April 
21 . . . ." (Raymond Brown to John Alesch, Exhibit 41.) Item: 
"Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of them. There 
is no question about that." (Burton Dull, Deposition at  40.) And 
more and more. 
-Paid Knowingly, Scienter- 
Broken down . . . (5) paid knowingly, s ~ i e n t e r . ~ ~  
In accordance with the conversation which John 
and I had with you, enclosed are copies of what we feel 
is our understanding . . . . 
-Burton Dull to Raymond Brown, 
Exhibit 19A. 
Our Executive Committee are in complete agreement. 
-Raymond Brown to Burton Dull, 
Exhibit 3. 
The real question is not going to be the simple one of 
"scienter, paid knowingly," but rather "scienter, paid deliber- 
ately, callously, with long months of malice aforethought." The 
full extent of moral culpability-of assent of intellect and free- 
dom of will-was reiterated in the countless instances of calcu- 
lated planning that characterized the Sale-of-Control Premium- 
Bribery of De Witt and the Alesches. 
53. Id. at 503-04. 
54. Id. at 497. 
282 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
The fact of Premium-Bribery is simple. The law, complex. 
b. The triple turpitude. 
In the entire control spectrum, the legitimacy of the 
premium-bribe is probably the most basic, the most 
vexing, and certainly the most recurrent question.55 
For the avoydinge of corrupiron, Be it therefore en- 
acted by the Kinge . *. . That yf any person bargayne or 
sell any Office . . . everie suche person . . . shall yme- 
diatlye . . . be adjudged a disabled Person in the 
lawe. . . . 
And be it also enacted . . . That all and everie 
suche Bargaynes . . . shalbe voide . . . . 56 
The fact of the premium-bribe has been established. The five 
essentials of the definition have been verified. With these factual 
necessaries in hand, the positive argumentation resumes. 
The painstaking study of Strict Trust has thus far progressed 
through the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control and its im- 
mediate corollary, the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule. The Alesch 
Group, in assuming complete dominion over Le Mars, correspon- 
dingly assumed complete responsibility for its well-being: 
In one indivisible act the contrbleur accepts the absolute 
stewardship of the entity and thereby acknowledges, and 
accedes to, the mandatory norms of corporate excellence. At 
that moment he becomes a strict trustee, with all the demands 
of unswerving loyalty and devotion to corporation and share- 
holders. He assents unreservedly to every implication of the 
benefit-to-beneficiary rule.57 
The applicability of the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule extends 
to every facet of the contr6leur's conduct of corporate affairs. 
Necessarily the Rule is not limited solely to the context of the 
Sale of Control. In its broadest application, the Rule specifies 
three "major objectives: (1) the erection of the best possible cor- 
porate structure; (2) the employment of the most enlightened 
managerial policy; (3) the selection of the most competent per- 
s ~ n n e l . " ~ ~  Of these three all-encompassing goals, the first has only 
limited impact on Le Mars. The second certainly governs much 
55. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TEX. L. REV. 
215, 216 (1969). 
56. An Acte againste buyinge and sellinge of Offices, 1551-52, 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16. 
57. Bayne, supra note 55, at 220 (footnote omitted). 
58. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Quandary, 51 CORNELL .Q. 49, 59 (1965). 
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of the conduct of both the Alesch Group and De Witt. These two 
are for later. 
But the third, the Selection of Competent Personnel, affects 
intimately the choice of a successor to John Alzsch. Of all the acts 
of John Alesch, contrhleur, the most crucial by far was his ap- 
pointment of De Witt as his successor. At this instant, the third 
subduty of the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule has preeminent appl- 
icability: 
As important as is the chairman, the chief executive officer, the 
operating head, the board, nevertheless the role of the successor 
to the contr6leur is transcendant. Those norms of selection of 
personnel that governed the incumbent contr6leur during ten- 
ure, guide him as well in departing that tenure, in the proper 
and beneficial transfer of control. The choice of a successor is 
undeniably the crowning act of the contrdeur's career, as well 
as his last, and hence invites the commensurate scrutiny of the 
standards of a fiduciary.59 
All this is an elemental deduction from the Benefit-to-Beneficiary 
Rule. The entire future of Le Mars rested with De Witt. Yet, to 
buy the appointment, De Witt passed a $600,000 premium-bribe 
to the incumbent Alesch Group. 
At this point the reasoning leads to the next major proposi- 
tion: The premium-bribe is in its essence corrupt. "For the avoyd- 
inge of corrupih, everie suche Bargaynes shalbe voide." This 
proposition supports the remainder of the Brief. 
[Tlhe legitimacy, or illegitimacy, of the premium-bribe is focal 
to every later sale-of-control analysis-the suitability of the pro- 
spective contrdleur [De Witt], the culpability of the incumbent 
[Alesch Group], possible damages, the disposition and role of 
the premium-bribe itself. . . . 
. . . Here all the theories and principles push forward for 
concrete dollars-and-cents application in day-to-day interplay."' 
This one statement would seem to encompass most of the pending 
issues. 
The Suitability of the Successor 
From the aspect of either contrdleur or successor, 
therefore, the rule is clear: The benefit to beneficiary 
and the suitability of the appointee are the only legiti- 
59. Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 583, 591-92 (1965). 
60. Bayne, supra note 55, at 216-17. 
284 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
mate considerations at the time of appointment. Suita- 
bility is the sole final cause that may flow legitimately 
into the selection of the new c~nt rd leur .~~  
All these Defendants, Howes, Smith, the Defendants of 
De Witt, I said I never heard of these fellows, never even 
heard of them. 
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition at  59. 
When we submitted our resignations I had no idea who 
would replace us. 
-John Vollmar, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition at 23. 
The heart of the corruption inherent in the premium-bribe, there- 
fore, is the appointment of a new contr6leur for any reason other 
than his suitability. With the Alesch Group, the "reason other" 
was premium-bribe dollars. The suitability of "these fellows" was 
far from the Alesch thoughts. 
Interestingly, however, the blame lay equally on De Witt. 
The Alesch Group was bribed. But De Witt did the bribing. And 
De Witt had already agreed to the stewardship of Le Mars. 
At that split conceptual second when the premium-bribe is 
changing hands the fiduciary duty of a strict trustee rests with 
exactly equal weight on the outgoing contrdleur and the incom- 
ing appointee. At this transitional moment corporate custody is 
being entrusted by the one and accepted by the other. The 
bonum commune of the entity rests in a delicate balance be- 
tween incumbent and successor. Each consequently faces the 
identical custodial obligation defining the suitability of the 
successor-contr61eur.62 
Henceforward, remember that De Witt and the Alesch Group had 
conspired together, over many months, to pass and receive the 
premium-bribe. Each had assumed the custody of Le Mars. 
Wherein, therefore, lies the "corrupEon " inherent in the 
premium-bribe? "The totality of the turpitude of the premium- 
bribe consists of three conceptually distinct elements caused by 
separate breaches of fiduciary duty, each with its own peculiar 
contribution and coalescing into a distinctive moral unit ."" Each 
of these three elements will apply separately to different divisions 
- -- 
61. Id. at  221. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 221-22. 
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of the Brief, as will appear apropos. This triple turpitude of 
Premium-Bribery has been described as 
(1) the perversion of the judgment of the incumbent contrbleur, 
engendered by an appointment of a successor induced by a 
cause other than suitability, (2) that is, for consideration illicit 
in itself, (3) resulting in the appointment of a candidate unsuit- 
able by reason of his own active role in the ind~cernent .~~ 
Each of these distinct elements must now be pulled out and ex- 
plored separately, because each is intertwined with each, and all 
three together comprise one indivisible act, Premium-Bri bery . 
But only one, the second, applies directly to the instant problem: 
disgorgement of the premium-bribe dollars into the Le Mars 
treasury. The first and third will be picked up later. 
The Perversion, the Principal Illegitimacy 
Moral turpitude is the deviation from acknowledged 
norms of conduct. Any digression from the straight path 
to the goal of a suitable successor is culpable. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . This is perfectly true of the premium-bribe 
perversion. No part of the illicit cash has any relation 
whatsoever to the suitability of the succe~sor .~~ 
Q. [Tlhe $500,000 wouldn't be paid unless there was 
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Le Mars? 
A. Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of 
them. There is no question about that. 
-Burton Dull, Deposition at 40. 
Both the Alesch Group and De Witt had agreed to act in all 
things for the benefit of Le Mars. Both recognized that the ap- 
pointment of the all-powerful contrbleur entailed the maximum 
potential of benefit-or of evil-for ~e Mars. If ever they were 
bound "to act solely for the benefit of the companyw--as they 
swore in the Le Mars Policy Statement-it was then. 
Yet this sole objective was pushed aside. No longer was the 
welfare of Le Mars the consideration. Rather, premium-bribe dol- 
lars supplanted suitability as the final cause motivating the par- 
ties. Both the Alesch Group and De Witt turned away from their 
sworn promise. 
64. Id. at 222. 
65. Id. at 224. 
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This forcible turning away is the perversion. Syllogistically: 
(1) The suitability of the successor is the sole final cause 
that may flow legitimately into the selection of the new 
contr6leur. (2) The consideration of the premium-bribe 
is totally irrelevant, foreign, antagonistic to suitability. 
(3) Yet the premium-bribe consideration does flow as a 
final cause into the selection of a successor. 
Here is the quintessence of the per~ers ion.~~ 
In so far as premium-bribe dollars supplant suitability, thus far 
are the parties perverted. Not a single premium-bribe dollar is 
legitimate. The premium-bribe is wholly illegitimate. 
The prefix "per" carries the important concept of completeness 
into the meaning of perversion. "Per" is the intensive, not the 
prepositional, prefix and correctly expresses the idea of thor- 
oughness, totality, as in "perfervid," "pellucid" and more aptly 
in "perfect"-unsullied by any foreign substance, integral. This 
is perfectly true of the premium-bribe perversion. No part of the 
illicit cash has any relation whatsoever to the suitability of the 
successor. It is totally foreign, unrelated, antagonistic to suita- 
bility. It is totally "other." As antagonistic, this cause enters 
into the formation of the contr6leur's judgment of selection. As 
completely foreign, with no admixture of suitability as a cause, 
this illegitimate cause perforce supplants, to the total extent of 
its influx, the legitimate one. As totally supersessive, therefore, 
this causal influx is totally perverse-a perfect pe r~ers ion .~~  
This, then, is the principal element of the turpitude of the 
premium-bribe. Principal, yes, but not sole. 
The Illicit Consideration 
The perversion of the contr6leur's judgment may be 
the core of the premium-bribe illegitimacy, but what of 
cold cash that constituted the consideration? After all, 
as the New York court said in Caplan-Lionel, the "price 
. . . being paid for . . . control . . . [is] the all impor- 
tant emolument of the transaction." Does this all- 
important emolument add anything to the turpi t~de? '~  
[Tlhe following will outline John's understanding of 
what will be expected from him and what in turn De 
Witt will do in consideration therefor. 
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, 
Exhibit 4. 
66. Id. at 223. 
67. Id. at 224. 
68. Id. at 233. 
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Before, during, and after the extensive premium-bribe nego- 
tiations, every single party to the malefaction was being amply 
and fully compensated for performing their respective duties. 
Among their most obvious duties was the selwtion and appoint- 
ment of a successor contr6leur for Le Mars. Yet, at this very 
moment, De Witt was passing $600,000 to John Alesch, to this 
top corporate executive, as a corporate official, because of his 
official position, and pocketed personally, even though every 
minute of time and ounce of energy had been dedicated to the 
exclusive benefit of the beneficiary-shareholder. Most impor- 
tant . . . the money was paid for the performance of an official 
corporate act, even though concededly that act was seriously 
harmful to the corporate ~ell-being.~g 
In a word, none of this $600,000 belonged to John Alesch. Every 
penny was accepted "in compensation for corporate acts, per- 
formed pursuant to a corporate program, in fulfillment of a corpo- 
rate duty, in the course of official business, during the regular 
workweek, for which he was already amply rem~nerated."~" 
Herein lay the second indivisible element of the triple turpitude: 
disloyalty in personally pocketing dollars rightfully belonging to 
Le Mars. "The chief illegitimacy of the [$600,000] rests in the 
disloyalty inherent in the repudiation of the contrbleur's unquali- 
fied dedication of all of his endeavors to the general welfare of the 
firm. 
Yet the perfidy in taking the $600,000 had no intrinsic 
connection with the perversion of contrbleur judgment. Either 
could have been effected without the other. Each is a separate 
constituent of the total turpitude. 
(Interjection: The disloyalty of a steward is not the only 
charge of turpitude levelled at the Alesch Group: 
Completely apart from custody and the loyalty strictures of 
a trustee, no employee from contrdleur to janitor can licitly be 
paid twice for doing his job. The turpitude consequent on the 
breach of the simple contractual quid pro quo is generally char- 
acterized as dishonesty, or in less refined circles as plain old 
stealing. This particular aspect of the intrinsic illegitimacy of 
the premium-bribe, stemming from the violation of commuta- 
- - -  
69. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 637 
(1969). 
70. Bayne, supra note 55, at 235. 
71. Id. at 237. 
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tive justice, is completely nonfiducial and unrelated, a t  least in 
its primary sense, to the custodial concept of corporate contr01.'~ 
This violation of commutative justice will serve as yet another 
imperative for the disgorgement of the premium-bribe.) 
The Unsuitability of a Premium-Bri ber 
The turpitude engendered by successor unsuitability 
stems from the uncomplicated fact that the corporation 
is therewith burdened with all the potential damage and 
present disadvantages of an incompetent in the most 
important position in the firm.73 
This Agreement shall not become effective unless 
and until all of the present Directors of the Le Mars 
Mutual have submitted their resignations and qualified 
successors, as designated by [De Witt], have been 
qualified as Directors of the Le Mars Mutual. 
-Agreement to Sell Stock, Alesches 
and De Witt, Exhibit A, 3, 4. 
The third constituent of the triple turpitude has its peculiar 
applicability later in the Brief. For now, however, it must round 
out the total turpitude of the single indivisible act of Premium- 
Bribery . 
This third turpitude is simple: The Alesch Group and De 
Witt conspired together to foist a known premium-briber on the 
firm. John Alesch consciously and deliberately selected a new 
contrdeur who was ready (1) to pass $600,000 in premium-bribe 
and (2) to divert that $600,000 from the Le Mars treasury into the 
personal pocket of its chief executive. 
This joint imposition of a premium-briber on Le Mars is the 
capstone of the illegitimacy: 
In strict practicality, the crucial distinction for future sale- 
of-control litigation lies in the built-in nature of the premium- 
bribe-induced unsuitability. No true premium-bribe under any 
conditions whatsoever can be passed without engendering the 
triple blemish of the perversion, the illicit consideration, and 
the resultant unsuitability. To the extent, therefore, that an 
appointee is prepared to twist the judgment and to divert the 
corporate dollars, thus far is he already an unsuitable custodian. 
As thus unsuitable he caps it off by imposing a premium-briber 
72. Id. a t  237-38. 
73. Id. at  240. 
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[himself] on the firm. Whatever further deficiencies he may 
possess do not affect this ever-present built -in di~ability.~" 
Note well: This premium-bribe-induced unsuitability of De 
Witt says nothing about De Witt's propensity to loot, to embez- 
zle, to steal the Alesch Agency. Those unsuitabilities are for an- 
other time. 
The Coalesced Turpitude 
Being so long so close to the trees one forgets that the forest 
is an integral moral unit, the single act of premium-bribery. . 
Correspondingly, the tripartite turpitude is only conceptually 
divisible. True, each of its indispensable coconstituents-the 
perversion, the illicit consideration, the premium- bribe- 
engendered unsuitability-can be individually isolated in the 
abstract. Indeed, the illicit consideration can even have an inde- 
pendent existence of its own. Each certainly is a distinct turpi- 
tude, with its own individuating notes and amendable to spe- 
cific definition. In losing its identity in the new entity, more- 
over, each does not fully disappear but remains theoretically 
identifiable.75 
As "theoretically identifiable," each will henceforth serve as 
the foundation for successive sections of the Brief. For now, the 
second constituent: the Illicit Consideration. 
3. ' Disgorgement 
[Alny bonus received for such transfer of their office 
[must] be returned to the corp~rat ion.~~ 
"[Tlhe law will impress a trust in favor of the corpora- 
tion upon the property, interests and profits so ac- 
quired. "77 
Once the reasoning has progressed thus far, the law of the 
land has been unanimous: disgorgement over to the injured entity 
of the proven premium-bribe. The collected cases, the commenta- 
tors, cold logic, have all concluded that the unearned recom- 
pense, the stolen emolument, the $600,000 in premium-bribe, be- 
longs in law and justice to Le Mars. 
74. Id. at 243. 
75. Id. 
76. In re Lionel Corp., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1964, at 14, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd sub nom., 
Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd men. ,  14 N.Y.2d 
, 
679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964). 
77. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 
(1966) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del Ch. 255, 273, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 19'39)). 
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The  Illicit Consideration 
Although the total tort has a triple turpitude, only the 
specific turpitude of the illicit consideration is referable 
to the [$600,000]. Here is the sole rationale of the dis- 
position.78 
Now the importance of the triple breakdown of the turpitude 
is manifest. The perversion of the contrbleur's judgment, the ap- 
pointment of a premium-briber successor, both have later applic- 
ability. But for now, the unearned dollars are "the all-important 
emolument of the transaction. " 
Here, standing isolated, is one element common to the 
premium-bribe, unearned recompense, without the perversion 
of the officer's judgment or any question of an unsuitable suc- 
cessor. The malefaction is a clear case of illicit emolument, 
without more. The chief executive officer . . . accepted 
[$600,000] in compensation for corporate acts, performed pur- 
suant to a corporate program, in fulfillment of a corporate duty, 
in the course of official business, during the regular workweek, 
for which he was already amply r em~ne ra t ed .~~  
Cold logic mandates, therefore, that the $600,000 in unjust re- 
compense be disgorged to Le Mars. This is the only tenable dispo- 
sition of the premium-bribe dollars. 
Recall, moreover, that the strictures of Strict Trust were not 
alone in issuing this mandate of disgorgement: 
Completely apart from custody and the loyalty strictures of 
a trustee, no employee from contr6leur to janitor can licitly be 
paid twice for doing his job. The turpitude consequent on the 
breach of the simple contractual quid pro quo is generally char- 
acterized as dishonesty, or in less refined circles as plain old 
stealing.80 
Commutative justice issues a much more earthy mandate: return 
stolen property. 
The  Law of Restitution 
Thus a principal is entitled to a bribe received by his 
agent from a third person, although the principal's 
profit from the transaction, aside from the bribe, was 
78. Bayne, supra note 69, at 637. 
79. Bayne, supra note 55, at 235. 
80. Id. at 237. 
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the same as it would have been if no bribe had been 
given (see Restatement of Agency, $403) 
Predictably, the labors of the Restatement reduced this rea- 
soning to succinct pronouncements. The Restatements of Trusts, 
Agency, Restitution, all have similar mandates.H2 
The most sophisticated and exacting rationale is the deft 
blending of restitution with trust, and the conjunction in turn 
of this blend with the basic tort action [of Premium-Bribery]. 
The law of restitution has a long and reliable history and com- 
plements admirably the benefit-to-beneficiary rule of trusts: 
Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the 
beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or 
other profit, he holds what he receives upon a construc- 
tive trust for the b e n e f i ~ i a r y . ~ ~  
The Comment to the Restatement singled out the Alesch Group 
and De Witt: 
Bribes and Commissions. The rule stated in this Section is 
applicable not only where the fiduciary receives something in 
the nature of a bribe given him by a third person in order to 
induce him to violate his duties as a fiduciary, but also where 
something is given to him and received by him in good faith, if 
it was received for an act done by him in connection with the 
performance of his duties as f i du~ ia ry .~~  
With De Witt and the Alesches, the matter was a fortiori, since 
certainly "good. faith" never entered the machinations. To the 
contrary, calloused months of competitive Premium-Bribery 
characterized the De Witt- Alesch conspiracy. 
The Collected Cases 
I am also of the opinion that [the Directors] are trus- 
tees for the plaintiff and the shareholders [of the Lon- 
don Mutual] on whose behalf he sues. There is a clear 
admission that 5711., 8s., 7d.  has been paid [for the Sale 
of Control] . . . . 85 
Again predictably, neither cold logic nor the commentators 
81. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 128, Comment f at 531 (1937). 
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (1958); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 
§ 197 (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206, Comment k (1959). 
83. Bayne, supra note 69, at 638-39 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 9 197 
(1937)). 
84. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 197, Comment a at 808 (1937). 
85. Gaskell v. Chambers, 122 Rev. R. 138, 140 (Ch. 1858). 
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of the Restatements are divorced from the long line of judicial and 
legislative pronouncements beginning in the earliest England and 
reaching to the American 1970's. An exhaustive litany of cases 
would be a vulgar exhibition. Pertinent samples over the years 
and from various jurisdictions should buttress the logic and the 
Restatements: 
[Tlhe trustee derived the profit . . . from the [sale of the] 
office itself. I shall therefore direct that the £75. be repaid 
by Horsfield and dealt with as part of the assets [of the t r u ~ t ] . ~ "  
The election of directors and the transfer of the management 
and property of the corporation were official acts, and whatever 
money he received from such official acts were moneys derived 
by virtue of his office for which we think he should account [to 
the Life Union M u t ~ a l ] . ~ ~  
[Tlhe moneys or other secret profit which Marshall received by 
selling out his trust, belonged, "not to him, but to the insurance 
company," . . . . 88 
If the succession was worth $125,000 in the market, the sale (if 
it were lawful) should have been made by the directors for the 
benefit of the owners of the [Mutual Life], not of Gray. For 
Gray had nothing legally saleable. . . . So the arrangement 
. . . was a betrayal of trust.8v 
[Hlis official position is not his individual property in any 
sense, and he has no right, either directly or indirectly, to use it 
for his own selfish ends; . . . all money thus made belongs either 
to the corporation, or . . . in common to its  shareholder^.^" 
A secret profit realized by a director from an undertaking to 
deliver the corporate control of a company inures to the corpora- 
tion. Fletcher, Cyclopedia, "Corporations," vol. 4, $2321; 2 
Thompson on Corporations, $ 1237.91 
[I]t indisputably was a condition of the sale that all the officers 
and directors then in office should forthwith resign . . . and 
elect a new directorate chosen wholly by the purchaser of the 
stock . . . . 
- 
86. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620, 621 (V.C. 1856). 
87. McCiure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 81, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899). 
88. Heineman v. Marshall, 117 Mo. App. 546, 556, 92 S.W. 1131, 1134 (1905). 
89. Moulton v. Field, 179 F. 673, 675 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 219 US. 586 (1910). 
90. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 437, 91 A. 428, 432 (1914). 
91. Keely v. Black, 90 N.J. Eq. 439, 443, 107 A. 825, 827 (Ch. 1919), reu'd on other 
grounds, 91 N . J .  Eq. 520, 111 A. 22 (1920). 
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. . . [Olrdinarily . . . these officers and directors must 
account to the corporation . . . for the sum and for . . . dam- 
ages .g2 
Hence to the extent that the price received by Feldmann 
and his codefendants included such a bonus [for the Sale of 
Control], he is accountable to the minority shareholders . . . . 93 
The rationale of the rule is undisputable: persons enjoying man- 
agement control hold it on behalf of the corporation's stockhold- 
ers, and therefore may not regard it as their own personal prop- 
erty to dispose of as they wish.94 
[Alny bonus received for such transfer of their office [must) 
be returned to the corpora t i~n .~~  
Even ratification by the beneficiaries would not save a fiduciary 
from accountability for any amounts realized in dictating or 
influencing the choice of a successor unless this was secured 
with notice that the beneficiaries were entitled to the profit if' 
they wished . . . . 96 
The sole appropriate remedy is a declaration that the con- 
sideration paid to the trustees by Lytton Financial Corporation 
allocable to a transfer of control of the Association is an asset 
held for its benefit in the hands of the trustees.97 
The theory is not that all the shareholders are entitled to share 
in the bribe but rather that one who sells an asset he does not 
own must turn over the proceeds to the true owner. The true 
owner is the corporation. The malefactor, according to 
Rosenfeld, is the selling shareholder. He owes that part of the 
proceeds which is the premium to the corporation that owned 
the asset. As in the case of corporate opportunity, the opportun- 
ity diverted must be recompensed to the corporation, not to its 
 shareholder^.^^ 
Yet further support for disgorgement over to Le Mars of the 
$600,000 premium-bribe will be found in the tortlcrime analysis. 
- - - - -- 
92. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 651, 659 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
93. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 
(1955). 
94. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962). 
95. In re Lionel Corp., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1964, a t  14, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), aff 'd sub nom., 
Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 
679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964). 
96. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1343 (2d Cir. 1971). 
97. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 371 F. 
Supp. 306, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1973). 
98. Gordon v. Fundamental Investors, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
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B. Commercial Bribery 
The criminal interdiction of modern state codes 'confirms the 
public-policy abhorrence of the sale of office, expressed as early 
as 1388 (if not earlier), with the statute of 12 Richard 2, k. 2,n 
and reiterated in 1551 in 5 & 6 Edward 6, c. l6.lo0 The present- 
day statutes add nothing new, but simply restate a truism: 
Premium-Bribery is inherently corrupt: 
[Briber:] Every person who shall . . . give to any officer, agent, 
or trustee . . . any money . . . with intent to influence his . . . 
judgment . . . shall, on conviction, be imprisoned in the peni- 
tentiary not more than ten years, or fined not more than one 
thousand dollars, or both.lol 
[Commercial Bribing:] A person is guilty of commercial brib- 
ing . . . when he . . . agrees to confer any benefit upon any . . . 
fiduciary . . . to influence his conduct . . . . 102 
[Gratuities and Tips:] It shall be unlawful for any . . . officer 
. . . of a private corporation . . . to receive, for his own use . . . 
any . . . bonus, or gratuity . . . connected with . . . [a] busi- 
ness transaction.lo3 
And so in Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, etc., etc. The punish- 
ment for the crime of Commercial Bribery varies from state to 
state, but the rationale is the same everywhere. Every criminal 
code, moreover, condemns both briber and bribed equally. 
The transition from crime to tort is effortless, and part of the 
common law of every jurisdiction. The crime-derived tort may be 
per se, prima facie, or inferential, but acknowledged tort it is."'" 
The provisions of this contract, of course, will be the 
means of [De Witt's] method of recouping its payment 
to the owners of the stock of the Alesch Agency. 
-The Dull-Brown Recoupment Letter, 
Exhibit 19A. 
99. No Officers shall be appointed for Gifts, & C., 12 Rich. 2, c. 2 (1388). 
100. An Acte againste buyinge and sellinge of Offices, 1551-52, 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16. 
101. MISS. CODE ANN. Q 97-11-11 (1972). 
102. N.Y. PENAL AW 4 180.00 (McKinney 19'75). 
103. IOWA CODE ij 741.1 (1975). 
104. See Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1977). 
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We don't intend to milk [Le Mars] for a t  least five 
years. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, to 
Russell W. Sandy, Le Mars Supervisor, 
Deposition a t  48. 
Both orally and in writing, De Witt stated its calculated 
intent to loot Le Mars. This admitted intent was supported by 
an admitted motive: to "[recoup] its payment to the [Alesch 
Group]" of the $600,000 in premium-bribe. 
De Witt thus "milked" Le Mars in two stages. (1) From the 
takeover of Le Mars, April 21,1970, to mid-1973, De Witt coerced 
Le Mars under the Management Contract to purchase fabricated 
"services" from De Witt's wholly owned Alesch Agency. This 
totalled $190,000. (2) When the Insurance Department outlawed 
this patent ploy, De Witt simply shifted the "services" from the 
Agency to De Witt itself. For the next four years, 1973-1977, De 
Witt forced Le Mars to accept $552,000 in multifarious "services" 
from De Witt. Grand total: $742,000. 
-Strict Trust- 
The corporate entity and the stockholders . . . are not 
required to be ever on their guard and watchful lest 
those trustees misapply, destroy, embezzle, steal the 
corporate assets, or defraud them.Iu5 
Equity holds them strictly accountable as trustees."'" 
However, even if we were now to order an accounting, 
we would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable 
value of his services.lu7 
This Brief has labored long to lay out the Doctrine of Strict 
Trust: "The authorities are agreed that the officers and directors 
of a company are trustees . . . in the transaction of the business 
and care of property of the corporation . . . ."lUWnto this broad 
Strict-Trust base, established by Guth, Dawson, Hoyt, Ontjes, 
Schild berg, Holden, Holi- Rest, Meinhard, Borden, the courts 
have erected the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control: "The 
directors have the custody and control of the assets of the corpo- 
105. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1081, 
51 N.W.2d 174, 216 (1952). 
106. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 358 (Iowa 1972). 
107. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 497 (3d Cir. 1976). 
108. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 369, 157 N.W. 929, 931 (1916). 
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ration for the benefit of those to whom they belong . . . .""" The 
Custodial Concept flows inexorably into the Benefit-to- 
Beneficiary Rule: "They [directors and officers] . . . impliedly 
undertake . . . to exercise the powers conferred solely in the in- 
terest of the corporation or the stockholders as a body or corporate 
entity, and not for their own personal interests."llu 
These elemental principles have specific applicability to the ' 
Looting of Le Mars. 
Conflict of Interest 
I think a director can adequately serve two different 
masters. 
-William Couch, Executive Committee, 
Deposition a t  67. 
I see no problem in representing both sides. 
-George Howes, Executive Committee, 
Deposition a t  52. 
I did not see anything inherently contradictory in my 
position of president of both [De Witt and Le Mars]. 
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition a t  50. 
Perhaps the core concept of the law of Looting is the univer- 
sal reprobation of Conflict of Interest. "One of the most familiar 
doctrines of the law of trusts is that a trustee cannot purchase 
from himself, or at his own sale. He cannot lawfully be the seller 
and the buyer in the same transaction. . . . This doctrine rests 
upon the ground of public policy.""l The legal consequences of 
directoral Conflict of Interest are radical and pervasive. Impartial 
directors in arm's-length dealings may resort to all manner of 
defenses: good faith, business judgment, fairness, negligence, 
good motives. But when a director deals with himself, sits on both 
sides of a bargain, the law speaks categorically and undeviat- 
ingly. 
Yet, throughout the seven years of enforced "services," t t e  
Executive Committee dealt only with the Executive Committee: 
To my knowledge, nobody represented Le Mars in purchasing . 
109. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927). 
110. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 767, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 
(1966) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2~ Corporatiom § 1272 (1965)). 
111. In re Estate of Holley, 211 Iowa 77, 81-82, 232 N.W. 807, 809 (1930) (citations 
omitted). 
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the Management Services from De Witt through the Alesch 
Agency. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition at  18. 
When the Management Contract was negotiated, there wasn't 
anyone representing Le Mars. 
. -Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t  52. 
We never asked anyone a t  Le Mars whether they felt our charges 
were fair and reasonable. 
-John Howes, De Witt Director, Deposition at 40. 
Q. And it was the Executive Committee of Le Mars then . . .? 
A. Well, the Executive Committee of De Witt, too. 
Q. They were substantially the same people? 
A. Yes. 
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, Deposition a t  120. 
Both the flagrant Conflict of Interest and the governing law are 
equally patent. So, too, are the succeeding steps in the argumen- 
tation. 
The No-Inquiry Rule 
This doctrine [of Conflict of Interest] rests upon the 
ground of public policy. The law does not stop to inquire 
into the fairness of the sale, or the adequacy of price, but 
stamps its disapproval upon a transaction which creates 
a conflict between the self-interest and integrity of the 
trustee. The trustee is clearly disabled from becoming 
a purchaser of the trust estate, whether the cestui que 
trust be an infant or an adult, and whether the sale be 
public or private .'I2 
As with so many basic moral concepts, the ultimate rationale 
of the No-Inquiry Rule has historically been left unstated. So 
universally embraced, yet so rarely explained: 
Now it is clear why the courts-without perhaps full adver- 
sion-added the no-inquiry prescription. It is not a question of 
good faith or fairness because there is never good faith or fair- 
ness when a trustee stands on both sides of a bargain. There is 
no question of damages because there are always damages when 
an employee performs service for one while in the pay of an- 
other. There is no question of fraud since the disloyalty is wrong 
a t  the outset. There need be no inquiry because the proof of the 
112. Id. at 82, 232 N.W. at 809. 
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very act of divided allegiance ends the matter. Whatever follows 
belongs to the fund.li3 
One of the more perspicacious insights into the No-Inquiry ra- 
tionale comes from England's highest court: 
So strictly is this principle adhered to, that no question is al- 
lowed to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of a contract 
so entered into. It obviously is or may be impossible to demon- 
strate how far in any particular case the terms of such a contract 
have been the best for the cestui que trust which it was impossi- 
ble to obtain.l14 
This primitive Rule, moreover, is imposed pervasively, in every 
Conflict context: "The doctrine applies, though the purchaser be 
one of several cotrustees. . . . It matters not whether the sale be 
made with or without the sanction of judicial authority. . . . "1 15 
This pervasive applicability is understandable: 
The prohibition that a trustee cannot be the seller and buyer in 
the same transaction acts, not on the possibility that, in some 
cases, the sense of duty may prevail over the motives of self- 
interest, but it provides against the probability in many cases, 
and the danger in all cases, that the dictates of self-interest will 
exercise a predominant influence and supersede that of duty."" 
Lest one might conclude that a different rule would obtain in the 
case of directors, the law painstakingly confronts the issue. In the 
specific context of a Conflict-of-Interest contract "[tlhe court 
will not inquire into its profitableness to the trustee or prejudice 
to the beneficiary. This rule is applicable to the acts of boards of 
 director^.""^ To which the court appended a long line of author- 
ity. 
Precautionary Note: Not only was De Witt in bald Conflict 
of Interest throughout the entire seven years of the imposed 
6 6 services," but a t  no time did De Witt mitigate its culpability by 
even the slightest exculpatory disclosure. Secrecy emphasizes lia- 
bility. 
113. Bayne, supra note 7, at 583. 
114. Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros., 23 L.T.R. (n.s.) 315, 316 (H.L. 1854). 
115. In re Estate of Holley, 211 Iowa 77, 82, 232 N.W. 807, 810 (1930) (citations 
omitted). 
116. Id. 
117. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 220, 214 N.W. 718, 725 (1927). 
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"Voidable from the Outset" 
"The policy of the law is to put fiduciaries beyond the 
reach of temptation, by making it unprofitable for them 
to yield to it. To that end an act by the fiduciary in 
which personal interest and duty conflict is voidable at 
the mere option of the beneficiary, regardless of good 
faith or results. The court will not inquire into its profit- 
ableness to the trustee or prejudice to the beneficiary. 
This rule is applicable to the acts of boards of direc- 
tors."l18 
Thus does the 1972 decision in Holden express the long tradi- 
tion of voidability in the face of a Conflict-of-Interest contract. 
Whether the "contract" between the Executive Committee and 
the Executive Committee was oral or written, no matter. The 
agreement "is voidable at the mere option of the beneficiary, 
regardless of good faith." Holden is firm: "The court will not 
inquire into its profitableness to the trustee or prejudice to the 
beneficiary." To which, numerous citations. 
One of the better statements of the Rule comes from Hoyt: 
The directors have the custody and control of the assets of the 
corporation for the benefit of those to whom they belong . . . . 
A fiduciary may not, directly or indirectly, appropriate the trust 
fund to himself without the concurrence of the cestuis with full 
knowledge of the facts. . . . Such an appropriation would be 
voidable a t  the option of the cestuis, without any showing of 
fraud, negligence, or prejudice.llg 
These statements are reflective of the "voidable" rule across 
the country. The classic expression of the rule comes from the 
highest court of New York: 
He stood in the attitude of selling as owner and purchasing as 
trustee. The law permits no one to act in such inconsistent rela- 
tions. It does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transac- 
tion was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is 
disclosed, and sets aside the transaction or refuses to enforce it, 
at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary undertook to 
represent, without undertaking to deal with the question of ab- 
stract justice in the particular case. It prevents frauds by mak- 
ing them as far as may be impossible, knowing that real motives 
118. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 345, 357 (Iowa 1972) (quoting 
Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 220, 214 N.W. 718, 724-25 (1927)). 
119. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208-09,214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927) (citations omit- 
ted). 
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often elude the most searching inquiry, and it leaves neither to 
judge nor jury the right to determine upon a consideration of its 
advantages or disadvantages, whether a contract made under 
such circumstances shall stand or fa11.120 
With this, the Court of Appeals of New York proceeded to explain 
its position, again consistently with the universal rule: 
The law cannot accurately measure the influence of a trustee 
with his associates, nor will it enter into the inquiry, in an action 
by the trustee in his private capacity, to enforce the contract in 
the making of which he participated. The value of the rule of 
equity, to which we have adverted, lies to a great extent in its 
stubbornness and inflexibility. Its rigidity gives it one of its chief 
uses as a preventive or discouraging influence, because it weak- 
ens the temptation to dishonesty or unfair dealing on the part 
of trustees, by vitiating, without attempt a t  discrimination, all 
transactions in which they assume the dual character of princi- 
pal and representative. 121 
This early statement of the American tradition carries on through 
the decades and finds a succinct expression of the rule in Pepper 
v. Litton by the Supreme Court of the United States: "The es- 
sence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the 
transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it 
does not, equity will set it aside."122 This uniform rule has found 
frequent reiteration in the federal courts. In 1954 the Sixth Cir- 
cuit in Seagrave expatiated on the reason for the "voidability": 
Although good faith on the part of the Directors and the 
disclosure of the material facts eliminate the question of actual 
fraud, equity will still act to enforce the fiduciary obligation 
under circumstances amounting to constructive fraud. Con- 
structive fraud refers to acts which may have been done in good 
faith, with no purpose to harm the corporation, but which are 
done by one who has placed himself in a position of conflict 
between a fiduciary obligation and his own private interests. In 
such a situation, by reason of the strict rule applicable to fidu- 
ciaries, equity will take appropriate action to prevent the harm 
resulting from such actions, regardless of the good intentions of 
the fiduciary.'* 
The judicial tradition moves forward with a restatement of 
120. Munson v. Syracuse, G.  & C.R.R., 102 N.Y. 59, 73-74, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886). 
121. Id. at 74, 8 N.E. at 358. 
122. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939). 
123. Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954) (citations omitted). 
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the "voidability" rule by the Sixth Circuit in the 1974 decision 
in Ohio Dri11.lZ4 Note that the Sixth Circuit has recourse to the 
distinguished Learned Hand in the knowledgeable Second Cir- 
cuit: 
In Marcus v. Otis , . . Judge Learned Hand observed: 
. . . The wrong is much simpler and more fundamen- 
tal-the misappropriation of funds-and it is neither an 
excuse that they later repaid what they had taken . . . .. 
The bargain was voidable from the outset, no matter 
how favorable the terms might be, and "Automatic" can 
follow and reclaim the abstracted funds in any form 
they may take, however enhanced in value.Iz5 
Here succinctly is the solution for Le Mars: "The bargain was 
voidable from the outset, no matter how favorable the terms may 
be." So says the Sixth Circuit, quoting Learned Hand of the 
Second Circuit. And finally: Le Mars "can follow and reclaim the 
abstracted funds in any form they may take, however enhanced 
in value." (How poignant that Learned Hand should anticipate 
De Witt's self-condemning return of some $48,000 of the looted 
sums. No matter. The return merely branded the unreturned 
remainder with one large word: "Looted." This $48,000 refund 
was scarcely founded on any moral compulsion. The Deposition 
of William Couch, Executive Committee (of "two different mas- 
ters" fame) immediately antedated the disgorgement. (Tran- 
script a t  1286.)) 
The culmination of the tradition comes in the 1976 decision 
of Borden u. Sinskey by a unanimous Third Circuit. Borden fol- 
lowed Guth u. Loft exactly, applied Strict Trust and the Benefit- 
to-Beneficiary Rule precisely. "[Applying the doctrine first an- 
nounced in Guth u. Loft, the court below] imposed a constructive 
trust in favor of the plaintiff on Sinskey's stock . . . . In addition, 
plaintiff was awarded . . . the profit . . . as well as all salaries, 
director's fees and dividends received by him . . . ."126 But most 
important, Borden is on all fours with the Looting in Le Mars. 
Mr. Sinskey was in Conflict of Interest. Over the years he per- 
formed valuable services-not questionable "services"-as 
president and director. Not only were all profits disgorged by 
Sinskey, but even his hard-earned salaries: 
124. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974). 
125. Id. at 191 (quoting Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, 654 (2d Cir.), modified, 169 
F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1948)). 
126. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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However, even if we were now to order an accounting, we would 
not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable value of his services. 
Although defendants may be able to distinguish the facts of 
Guth from those of the instant case, they cannot distinguish 
away the rationale of that decision. . . . [A111 the salaries he 
received from Pepsi-Cola while serving as Loft's chief Executive 
. . . were stripped away because Guth had gained them . . . in 
violation of his fiduciary duties. The court refused to allow him 
to retain any of the profits or benefits derived from his miscon- 
duct in order to deter any disloyality on the part of a corporate 
fiduciary.lZ7 
Sinskey was denied even a quantum-meruit recovery, so inveter- 
ate and firm is the Rule. 
In terms of dollar-and-cents recovery, therefore, De Witt 
must disgorge to Le Mars every dollar thus extracted: $742,000, 
without interest. Not only was every non-"contract" voidable, 
but the court may not permit De Witt "to retain the reasonable 
value of [its] services." Thus the nine-judge Third Circuit in 
1976 summarizes the long tradition of Guth, Damson, Hoyt, 
Ontjes, Schildberg, Holden, Holi-Rest, and Meinhard. 
(Interjectory Note: The philosophy and law of the line of 
cases culminating with the 1976 American Timber (which now 
follow) are integral to this Looting study and are to be incorpo- 
rated herein.) 
Burton Dull and Friends- 
However, even if we were now to order an accounting, 
we would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable 
value of his services.128 
[A111 the salaries he received . . . were stripped away 
because Guth had gained them . . . in violation of his 
fiduciary duties.lZo 
But many ramifications of the law yet remain. Not only must 
De Witt disgorge even "the reasonable value of [its] services" 
but all the coconspirators who were privy to the years of Looting 
must forfeit every penny received during the perpetration. No 
elaborate syllogism is needed to conclude that thieves should 
never receive a salary during the theft. 
(Note: The legal principles here applicable to Looting have 
127. Id. at 497-98. 
128. Id. at 497. 
129. Id. at 497-98. 
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dollar-and-cents pertinency to the periods of Premium-Bribery, 
Embezzlement, the Twice-Stolen Agency, and Disloyalty, and 
will not be repeated apropos. A malefactor can scarce expect 
remuneration during the malefaction.) 
The work of Arthur Young & Company, auditors, uncovered 
at  least some of the illicit compensation received by the conspira- 
tors over the years of the Looting. (Exhibit 508, IV.) As a begin- 
ning, Arthur Young & Company totalled $163,691 in wages and 
directors' fees for the period 1970-1975. This sum went to defen- 
dants on both ends of the Le Mars-De Witt axis, and seemingly 
spanned exactly the days of the Looting, at least until October 
1975. Listed in this survey are all the principals, the ubiquitous 
Executive Committee, Burton Dull (as director), John Alesch, 
the Alesch Group, the Smith Group. The years 1976 and 1977 
remain to be computed. 
During this same 1970-1977 period-and for thirteen years 
before under John Alesch-Burton Dull wore a second fiduciary 
hat: general counsel of Le Mars. (What Burton Dull received 
before 1970-beyond the "bonus" of $10,000 for "services" in ef- 
fecting the Premium-Bribery-has not been fully explored.) But 
certainly Burton Dull did receive $87,000 as counsel for his role 
as the Le Mars liaison for De Witt. This minimum of $97,000 
places Burton Dull among the conspirators wearing his second 
hat. 
Certainly the Guth, Schildberg, Holden, Borden tradition 
would deal summarily with Burton Dull and Friends: "[Wle 
would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable value of his 
services. . . . [A111 the salaries [Guth] received . . . were 
stripped away because [he] had gained them . . . in violation 
of his fiduciary duties. . . . In order to deter any disloyalty on 
the part of a corporate The general principles of this 
tradition would alone dispose of the Le Mars claim to Restitution. 
But a subspecies of this tradition has expectably grown up in 
specific response to the question of salaries and fees of faithless 
fiduciaries. Both state and federal courts would require Burton 
Dull and Friends to disgorge all monies, in any form, received 
over the entire span of the Disloyalty. Thus the Southern District 
in 1971, interpreting New York law: "Under New York law, a 
disloyal employee forfeits his right to compensation for services 
'and if he is paid without knowledge of his disloyalty he may be 
130. Id. 
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, compelled to return what he has improperly received. . . . 7 "131 
Le Mars, therefore, may follow the funds wherever necessary. 
The rule, moreover, is also expectably exacting and encom- 
passes all compensation, even dollars otherwise justly earned. 
Not even a quantum meruit. The "compensation" rule is clearly 
a corollary of the Guth, Schildberg, Holden, Borden line. The 
federal treatment of the law has been synthesized in Riffel" by 
the Tenth Circuit. The Riffe Court, as do most of the courts, has 
resort to the Restatement of Agency. 
When a corporate officer engaged in activities which consti- 
tute a breach of his duty of loyalty, or if it is a wilful breach of 
his contract of employment, he is not entitled to compensation 
for services during such a period of time although part of his 
services may have been properly performed. In the Restatement 
(Second), Agency $ 469 the above doctrine is set forth, and this 
is followed by the comment which states in part: 
"An agent, who, without the acquiescence of his 
principal, acts for his own benefit or for the benefit of 
another in antagonism to or in competition with the 
principal in a transaction is not entitled to compensa- 
tion which otherwise be due him."133 
The Tenth Circuit then expatiates on the all-pervasive rigor of 
the rule: 
The [Restatement] comment continues and states that the 
agent is not entitled to compensation although the acts may not 
actually harm his principal and even if he thinks his actions will 
benefit the principal or he is otherwise "justified" in "so act- 
ing." See also Fletcher, Corporations (Perm. Ed.) § 2145; J. C. 
Peacock, Inc. v. Hasko, 196 Cal.App.2d 353, 16 Cal.Rptr. 518, 
88 A.L.R.2d 1430; United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40 (5th 
Cir.) .134 
The rule is so generally accepted that most courts, as did Riffe, 
cite Fletcher on Corporations in support. The rationale of the 
rule, of course, is embedded in the Guth, Schildberg, Holden, 
Borden philosophy. 
The most recent application of the rule, American Timber & 
Dading Co. v. Niederme~er , '~~ is also the most rewarding from 
131. Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. 1043, 1061 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (citations omitted). 
132. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas v. Riffe, 406 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1969). 
133. Id. at 1062. 
134. Id. 
135. 276 Or. 1135, 558 P.2d 1211 (1976). 
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the standpoint of ad hoc pertinence to Le Mars. Ben Niedermeyer 
played the same role as Burton Dull and Friends. Ben was contr6- 
leur of American Timber, in clear conflict of interest, and over a 
span of ten years was disloyal to his firm. Furthermore the stakes 
were high. 'In one four-year period alone, "Ben received a total of 
$226,798 in salaries from"138 American Timber. Even more to the 
point: 
[Tlhe evidence is also clear that the board knew that these 
salaries, as well as those of the other officers, were being paid, 
and the amount of these salaries is reflected on the books of the 
corporation. We agree with the trial court's findings that these 
salaries were reasonable, that the corporation has ratified them 
through its acquiescence in the face of full knowledge of these 
payments, and that it is now estopped from seeking their recov- 
ery on those gr0~nds . I~~ 
"Reasonableness," therefore, is not the issue. The reasonableness 
of the "services" of Burton Dull and Friends is equally not the 
issue. (Just as the reasonableness of the $742,000 in multifarious 
"services" enforced on Le Mars was not the issue.) 
The Supreme Court of Oregon in late 1976 faced the issue 
squarely: 
However, a more difficult question is posed by AT&T's con- 
tention that Ben should be required to refund his salaries to the 
corporation as a matter of equity because of his numerous 
breaches of his fiduciary obligations which resulted in a serious 
diminution of the assets of the corporation. This is a separate 
and independent basis for recovery of executive ~a1aries.I~~ 
Manifestly the Oregon court is not considering the question on a 
quantum-meruit basis. The philosophy is founded in "equity be- 
cause of his numerous breaches of his fiduciary obligations." 
In this context of equity and fiduciary duty, a unanimous 
Oregon court aligns itself with the general rule: 
The general rule . . . is that a corporate officer who engages in 
activities which constitute either a breach of his duty of loyalty 
or a wilful breach of his contract of employment is not entitled 
to any compensation for services rendered during that period of 
time even though part of those services may have been properly 
~erf0rmed. l~~ 
136. Id. at 1154, 558 P.2d at 1222. 
137. Id. at 1154-55, 558 P.2d at 1223. 
138. Id. at 1155, 558 P.2d at 1223. 
139. Id. (citations omitted). 
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The American Timber court then specifies the "continuing 
series of deliberate diversions of corporate funds, secret account- 
ing manipulations, and other wilful breaches of Ben's fiduciary 
duties, which culminated in the looting of corporate assets."14u 
The proof of the pudding-for Ben and for Burton Dull and 
Friends-came in the practicalities of thc adjudication. (Remem- 
ber Ben's four-year salaries.) "Therefore, we concluded that Ben 
should be ordered to return to the corporation all compensation, 
whether in the form of salaries or bonuses, which he received from 
AT&T after August 15, 1966, with interest."141 With that the Ore- 
gon court "remanded for an additional accounting in accordance 
with this opinion."142 This meant ten years of salaries. 
This Brief is a "seamless web." The 1976 American Timber 
must spread its philosophy throughout. 
Whether there is a patent payrrent directly from 
the appointee [De Witt] . . . or a ~3mplicated series 
of moves from the controlled corporation [Le ,Mars], 
one overriding principle prevails-the consideration 
must be the primary responsibility of the appointee 
[De Witt] 
Here, perhaps, is the only area where the facts need pain- 
staking reemphasis. The scene must be exactly set. 
De Witt wanted desperately to buy control of Le Mars. Em- 
ployers Mutual had offered the Alesches a premium-bribe of 
$450,000. De Witt had to top this offer. Protracted negotiations 
culminated in the Executive Committee response: "[C]omplete 
agreement with . . . your letter." And that Bribery Letter de- 
tailed De Witt's bribe. This is of consuming importance. By 
agreeing to this Bribery Letter, De Witt agreed to pass $600,000 
to the Alesches, in the Agency "sale," "Consultation" fees, free 
auto, "pensions." Unless De Witt gave the Alesches this $600,000, 
no Sale of Control. By its firm agreement, therefore, De Witt 
openly and irrevocably stamped the $600,000 as premium-bribe 
dollars passing from De Witt to the Alesch Group. Proof has 
already been established that these premium-bribe dollars must 
be disgorged by the Alesch Group to Le Mars. 
140. Id. at 1156, 558 P.2d at 1223. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 1158, 558 P.2d at 1224. 
143. Bayne, supra note 39, at 501. 
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The Garden- Variety Bribery 
[Tlhe following will outline . . . what in turn De Witt 
will do in consideration [for control]. 
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, 
Exhibit 4. 
If De Witt had had this $600,000 in its own till, De Witt 
would have reached into the till, paid the $600,000 to the Alesch 
Group, and taken over Le Mars. If that had happened, this law- 
suit would be simpler. Under the Strict-Trust law of Sale of Con- 
trol, the Alesch Group would then disgorge the premium-bribe to 
Le Mars, and go home. De Witt, as it should have expected had 
it thought the matter through, would then be out-of-till the entire 
$600,000. That is the just dessert for "bribers" and "bribeds. " 
The "bribed" disgorges dollars to the corporation. The "briber" 
never sees the bribe dollars again. 
The De Witt Variety 
Our Executive Committee are in complete agreement 
with the proposal as outlined in your letter. 
-Letter, Brown to Dull, Exhibit 3. 
The Alesch Group remains irrevocably liable to Le Mars for 
the disgorgement of the full $600,000 in premium-bribe. But when 
De Witt agreed to pay the Alesch Group the $600,000, De Witt 
did not have the premium-bribe dollars in the till. Or at least not 
all of them. True, part of the $600,000 came from De Witt's own 
till. But some $178,600 did not. Either De Witt did not have the 
money, or was afraid to use it, or was simply greedy and larcen- 
ous. No matter. The fact is that De Witt decided to steal $178,600 
of the total $600,000 premium-bribe that it had promised the 
Alesch Group in the Bribery Letter. 
De Witt could have stolen the $178,600 from the local bank 
(and thus made this explanation simpler), but it chose an ap- 
proach not uncommon in Premium-Bribery: De Witt first stole 
the $178,600 from Le Mars itself, and then handed over the stolen 
money to the Alesch Group according to promise. "[Nlearly 
every successful premium-bribe is sooner or later recouped from 
the corporation. Often, however, the new appointee avoids the 
circuity of a personal payment and later corporate recoupment by 
an immediate raid on the corporate till."144 The De Witt raid on 
144. Id. at 502. 
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the Le Mars till netted: (1) some $10,000 in free car for John 
Alesch, (2) "Pensions" of $154,000, (3) "Consultation" fees to 
John Alesch of $14,600. So now De Witt must restore the $178,600 
to Le Mars. Otherwise De Witt will get off scot-free without losing 
its premium-bribe money, which it stole from Le Mars. 
Note well: If De Witt had not accepted responsibility for full 
payment of the premium-bribe, the Alesch Group would never 
have delivered the Board. Translated into other words: The 
Alesch Group was not prepared to accept the same old Employers 
Mutual offer and be forced to loot Le Mars personally before 
leaving office (and be liable for looting). The Alesch Group in- 
sisted that De Witt premium-bribe them in the full amount of 
$600,000. Where De Witt got the dollars did not matter to the 
Alesch Group. If Le Mars later sued De Witt, no matter to the 
Alesch Group. And so, to beat out Employers Mutual, De Witt 
agreed to the full $600,000 bribe-and stole the difference, 
$178,600, directly from Le Mars, without the circuity of later 
recoupment, as was necessary with the remainder. 
Le Mars now has a right to the stolen $178,600-which is not 
to be confused with the $600,000 premium-bribe to be disgorged 
by the Alesch Group as trustees of Le Mars, under the law of 
Restitution. 
IV. THE TWICE-STOLEN AGENCY 
And Mr. Alesch ran his Agency and also managed [Le 
Mars]. 
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, 
Director, Deposition at 84. 
Q. Why was Alesch Agency given 700 square feet in the 
new building, utility-free space? 
A. The Agency had always been with the Company. It 
always, even though it was separate, it had always been 
in the same building. 
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, 
Director, Deposition at 84. 
We wanted the business from the Alesch Agency itself, 
which a good deal of it had been going into other insur- 
ance companies. So, we was interested in getting that 
business in De Witt. 
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  26. 
That little "pup," the Alesch Agency, was stolen from Le 
Mars: (1) by John Alesch over the period from 1950(?) to April 
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21, 1970, and (2) by De Witt from April 21, 1970, to mid-1977. 
Voluminous facts detail the grossest Conflict of Interest be- 
tween: (1) Alesch as Le Mars and Alesch as Alesch Agency, and 
(2) De Witt as Le Mars and De Witt as Alesch Agency. Both 
malefactors had total control and custody of both Le Mars and 
the Agency. At no time did either Le Mars or the Agency have a 
viable life of their own. 
Throughout this entire period, first John Alesch and then De 
Witt successfully stole: (1) all the Agency Assets, (2) Insurance 
Commissions, (3) Salaries, (4) Dividends and (5) in the case of 
De Witt, Profits diverted from Le Mars Home Office business. 
Fortunately the law of Corporate Opportunity is clear, cate- 
gorical, and uniform. This law will be applied in Corporate Op- 
portunity, Strict Trust, and Benefit to Beneficiary. 
A. Corporate Opportunity 
"[Ilf there is presented to a corporate officer or director 
a business opportunity which . . . is, from its nature, in 
the line of the corporation's business and is of practical 
advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an 
interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing 
the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or direc- 
tor will be brought into conflict with that of his corpora- 
tion, the law will not permit him to seize the opportun- 
ity for himself. L 
The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity has been explained 
and applied with undeviating regularity since the days of Guth 
v. Loft and before. Every norm of Schildberg is verified in the 
Alesch and De Witt usurpations. Certainly the ownership of the 
Agency was within Le Mars' "line of business." De Witt conceded 
as much by "buying" the Agency from John Alesch. That Le 
Mars had "an interest or a reasonable expectancy" in notable 
benefits from the Agency is beyond cavil. 
By any test, that little "pup" was indeed the "Twice-Stolen 
Agency." To dilate would be supererogatory. 
B. Strict Trust 
The directors have the custody and control of the assets 
145. ~ c h i l d b e r ~  Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 
(1966) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 272-73, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 
1939)). 
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of the corporation for the benefit of those to whom they 
belong . . . . 148 
"[Directors] impliedly undertake . . . to exercise the 
powers conferred solely in the interest of the corporation 
or the stockholders as a body or corporate entity, and 
not for their own personal interest."IJ7 
The law of Corporate Opportunity is simply a species of the 
overall law of Strict Trust. Most courts have acknowledged that 
the doctrine is nothing other than a specific application of Strict 
Trust in a special context. Thus the painstaking construction 
thus far of the Strict-Trust foundation may now be used for the 
superstructure of Corporate Opportunity. , 
The doctrine of "corporate.opportunity" is not new to the 
law and is but one phase of the cardinal rule of undivided loyalty 
on the part of fiduciaries . . . . Our own consideration . . . is 
mainly in Ontjes v. MacNider, . . . 232 Iowa 562. . ., which 
quotes a t  length with approval from Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. 
Ch. 255. . ., a leading case in this area of the law.IJn 
At this juncture, recall the early argumentation and go forward 
to the Twice-Stolen Agency. 
C. Benefit to Beneficiary 
"And, if, in such circumstances [Conflict of Interest], 
the interests of the corporation are betrayed, the corpo- 
ration may elect to claim all of the benefits of the trans- 
action for itself, and the law will impress a trust in favor 
of the corporation upon the property, interests and prof- 
its SO acquired."14@ 
The age-old and ever-fresh Strict-Trust doctrine-with its 
implicit corollaries, the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control, 
Conflict of Interest, the Benefit-to-Beneficiary and No-Inquiry 
Rules-now finds application to the Twice-Stolen Agency. 
(Note: The application of Strict Trust to Corporate Oppor- 
tunity should enhance the other divisions of this Brief. Here 
Strict Trust has never been bedeviled by the "disintegrating ero- 
sion" occasionally found elsewhere in corporate law.) 
146. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927). 
147. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 767, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 
(1966) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2~ Corporatiom # 1272 (1965)). 
148. Id. at 768, 140 N.W.2d at 137 (citations omitted). 
149. Id. (quoting Guth v .  Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 273, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 
1939)). 
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The Inveterate Rule 
"The general rule is that a director or other corporate 
officer cannot acquire an interest adverse to that of the 
corporation . . . . [Sluch acquisition will be taken to 
be for the benefit of the corporation. * * *. 'They can- 
not have or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest 
' in conflict with their duty as trustees.' "15@ 
Schildberg has stated the universal Corporate-Opportunity 
Rule: Any act, transaction or contract performed under a 
Conflict-of-Interest disability is voidable by the beneficiary, re- 
gardless of good faith. Countless courts over the decades have 
buttressed the Rule by resort to Cardozo's Meinhard: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, 
while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for 
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by 
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio 
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. 
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and 
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of 
the courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of 
undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular 
exceptions. 151 
This "tradition that is unbending and inveterate" has never been 
undermined by "the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular excep- 
tions." 
State Law 
It is the policy of the law to put fiduciaries beyond the 
reach of temptation by making it unprofitable to yield 
to it. Accordingly an act by the fiduciary in which per- 
sonal interest and duty conflict is voidable a t  the option 
of the beneficiary, regardless of good faith.152 
The Rule is all-embracing. Nothing is excused. The total 
value of the assets stolen, dividends, salaries, commissions, prof- 
150. Id. at 767, 140 N.W.2d at 137 (quoting 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDLA OF THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS # 861 (rev. perm. ed. 1965)). 
151. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). 
152. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 766, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 
(1966). 
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its, whatever, all without exception must be disgorged to the 
injured beneficiary. The Rule is categorical: 
The doctrine of "corporate opportunity" is not new to the 
law and is but one phase of the cardinal rule of undivided loyalty 
on the part of fiduciaries. . . . Our own consideration of the 
quoted term as such is mainly in Ontjes v. MacNider, . . . 232 
Iowa 562, 579. . ., which quotes a t  length with approval from 
Guth v. Loft, Inc., . . . a leading case in this area of the law. 
". . . And, if, in such circumstances [Conflict of Interest], the 
interests of the corporation are betrayed, the corporation may 
elect to claim all of the benefits of the transaction for itself, and 
the law will impress a trust in favor of the corporation upon the 
property, interests and profits so acquired.?7153 
Here is the culmination: "[T]he.law will impress a trust in favor 
of the corporation." The law first voids the transaction and then 
sequesters all "the property, interests and profits so acquired" for 
the benefit of the entity. The uniformity of the Rule is referable 
to the almost universal reliance on the prototypal Guth u. Loft. 
The statements set forth in the case of Guth v. Loft . . . 
disclose the general principles that apply to a corporate officer 
and director in connection with their duties and relations to the 
corporation of which they are an officer. . . . 
. . .  
We have quoted quite extensively from this case inasmuch 
as it is our conclusion that this late and well-reasoned expres- 
sion of the Delaware court summarizes the general holdings of 
the various jurisdictions and the several texts and authorities 
which we have c0nsu1ted.l~~ 
Among the most modern state applications of the Rule, the 
1971 MonacolS from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, is aptly 
illustrative. All of the prerequisites were met. Identical parties on 
both sides of the deal, patent injury to the helpless beneficiary, 
with only the law for protection. Pennsylvania (using Cardozo's 
Meinhard and citing Guth v .  Loft) quotes from an earlier Penn- 
sylvania case to state the standard rigid rule: 
"[Officers and directors] . . . cannot, either directly or indi- 
rectly, utilize their position to obtain any personal profit or 
advantage . . . . [I]f he does so, the corporation may elect to 
claim all the benefits of the transaction. Nor is it material that 
-- - 
153. Id. at 768, 140 N.W.2d at 137 (citations omitted). 
154. Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 577, 579, 5 N.W.2d 860, 868-69 (1942). 
155. Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Monaco, 442 Pa. 256, 276 A.2d 305 (1971). 
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his dealings may not have caused a loss or been harmful to the 
corporation . . . . "156 
Every opinion, whether state or federal, adds further insights into 
the genius of Strict Trust. 
Today's world of corporate enterprise, with all its variations 
and complexities of control, management and finance, and the 
public's extensive participation in corporate ventures, renders it 
more imperative than ever before that corporate directors and 
officers adhere to the highest standards of responsible fiduciary 
conduct. If our competitive market economy is to operate in the 
best interests of shareholders and society in general, we can 
condone no intentional violations of corporate fiduciary duties. 
Only in this way can the necessary confidence in corporate insti- 
tutions so essential to the vitality of our economic and social 
way of life be maintained.15' 
Monaco affirmed the lower court. The fiduciaries "were ordered 
to file accountings and to return to the corporation all monies 
received. "158 
The 1972 Holden decision trod the same ground: "Therefore, 
Warren must be held strictly accountable to CMC for the Cham- 
berlain stock or its fair market value, and for all increases, in- 
come, proceeds or dividends realized therefrom."15g 
In Illinois in 1973 the court (quoting without citation from 
Schildberg?) highlighted the universality of the Rule: 
The doctrine of corporate opportunity is not new to our law. 
It is only one phase of the cardinal rule that requires undivided 
loyalty from corporate fiduciaries. In other words, one who is a 
fiduciary to a corporation may not acquire, in opposition to it, 
any property or tangible expectancy in which it has an interest 
. . . .  
160 
Citing a line of Illinois cases, the court stated the Benefit-to- 
Beneficiary Rule: 
Directors and officers of a corporation are fiduciaries. They 
are the trustees of its business and property. In this capacity, 
they are subject to the general rule of trusts and trustees that 
- - 
156. Id. at 261-62, 276 A.2d at 309 (quoting Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 
151, 53 A.2d 143, 147 (1947)) (citations omitted). 
157. Id. at 264, 276 A.2d at 310. 
158. Id. at 257, 276 A.2d at 306. 
159. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 358 (Iowa 1972). 
160. Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Ass'n, 11 Ill. App. 3d 766, 773-74, 297 N.E.2d 699, 704- 
05 (1973), aff'd in part, reu'd on other grounds in part, 58 Ill. 2d 20,317 N.E.2d 39 (1974). 
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they cannot, in their dealings with the business or property of 
the corporation, use their relation to it for their own personal 
gain. lsl 
Interestingly, Kerrigan dealt with the appropriation of the insur- 
ance business of the plaintiff. 
In the 1974 Miller,la the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
aligned itself with the "inveterate rule": "If such a business op- 
portunity is usurped for personal gain, it is equally well recog- 
nized that the opportunity and any property or profit acquired 
becomes subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the 
corporation. Guth v. Loft, Inc. . . . "163 
This Brief has already adverted to the identity of the law of 
Agency, Strict Trust, Restitution: 
This principle, usually referred to as the doctrine of corporate 
opportunity, is derived essentially from fundamental rules of 
agency concerning the duty of utmost good faith and loyalty 
owed by a fiduciary to his principal and also from the law of 
constructive trusts embodying equitable principles of unjust 
enrichment .Is4 
Borden and the Federal Cases 
Consequently, [the district court] imposed a construc- 
tive trust in favor of the plaintiff on Sinskey's stock in 
the . . . bank. In addition plaintiff was awarded a 
money judgment encompassing, among other things, 
the profit Sinskey derived on his dispositi6n of the 
Edgewater stock as well as all salaries, director's fees 
and dividends received by him in connection with the 
above banks.165 
The best and most authoritative federal applications of Cor- 
porate Opportunity come from Redmont, la6 handed down by the 
Second Circuit in 1973, and Borden by the Third Circuit in 1976. 
Both are on all fours with Le Mars and both enunciated the 
unvarying Rule. Thus, the Second Circuit in Redmont; 
"Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their 
position of trust and confidence to further their private inter- 
161. Id. at 774, 297 N.E.2d at 705. 
162. Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974). 
163. Id. at 219-20, 222 N.W.2d at 78. 
164. Id. at 220, 222 N.W.2d at 78. 
165. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1976). 
166. Abbott Redmont Thinlite Corp. v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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ests. . . . The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish 
loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no con- 
flict between duty and self-interest. . . . 
If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his 
duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, the law 
charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of 
the corporation, at its election, while it denies to the betrayer 
all benefit and profit . . . . "167 
Again the Second Circuit has resort to Guth and Meinhard, 
among others. 
But the apex has been reached in Borden u. Sinskey. It is 
herewith stated for the record that Borden will prove to be the 
most important single opinion in the field of corporate philosophy 
in decades, surpassing Perlman v. Feldmann, Diamond v. 
Oreamuno, and even Guth u. Loft. Borden not only enunciates 
and applies the traditional Rule with unabashed thoroughness, 
but supports its decision with invaluable commentary and in- 
sight. 
So important is Borden, so pat with Le Mars, that the paral- 
lel would without more solve most problems posed by this Brief. 
Sinskey was John Alesch, and of course, later, De Witt. Sin- 
skey controlled Corpamerica, just as John Alesch and De Witt 
had total custody of Le Mars. Corpamerica, as Le Mars, was 
owned by the public. 
Corpamerica was a bank holding company. Its business was 
to acquire banks. Three choice little Jersey bank opportunities 
appeared on the horizon. All three banks, Carteret, Edgewater, 
and Perth Amboy, would fit perfectly into Corpamerica's plans, 
just as the Alesch Agency would have been an excellent augment 
to Le Mars. 
But Sinskey, as did John Alesch and De Witt, had his own 
designs. In a word, Sinskey himself, personally, took over the 
three little Jersey banks, while the Sinskey-dominated Corpa- 
merica stood mute on the sidelines. Corpamerica was as helpless 
as Le Mars. 
Corpamerica's champion was not a policyholder-owner, but 
rather a chapter X trustee under the Bankruptcy Act. In a direct 
action, trustee Borden sought a disgorgement of (1) all stock in 
the three banks, (2) all profits earned, (3) all salaries, (4) all 
director's fees, and finally (5) all dividends received by Sinskey 
167. Id. at 88 n.3 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270-71, 5 A.2d 50'3, 
510 (Sup. Ct. 1939)). 
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throughout the entire period. The Third Circuit in 1976 spoke 
with a loud voice on behalf of Le Mars: 
The above events led the district court to the conclusion 
that fiduciary obligations had been violated to "an extra- 
ordinary degree" and it  therefore entered judgment for the 
plaintiff on his state law claims. More specifically, the court 
below held that Carteret, Edgewater, and Perth Amboy were 
corporate opportunities rightfully belonging to Corpamerica. 
Consequently, it imposed a constructive trust in favor of the 
plaintiff on Sinskey's stock in the [banks]. In addition, plain- 
tiff was awarded a money judgment encompassing, among other 
things, the profit Sinskey derived on his disposition of the 
[banks'] stock as well as all salaries, director's fees and divi- 
dends received by him in connection with the above banks.16x 
That was the New Jersey District Court. The Third Circuit, on 
appeal, affirmed unanimously. More than that, the Third Circuit 
first denied a rehearing, and then denied a second request for a 
rehearing, this time en banc. Nine circuit judges in all. 
The Third Circuit introduced its affirmance in Borden with 
a solidifying nexus with the past: "Applying the doctrine first 
announced in Guth v. Loft, . . . the court below held that the 
Carteret, Edgewater, and Perth Amboy banks constituted 
'corporate opportunities' that belonged in all fairness to Corpa- 
merica."lm With this the Borden court stated the Corporate- 
Opportunity Rule exactly as did Schildberg. The court then 
treated the specific holdings below and approved each in turn. 
But the most insightful commentary in Borden centers on 
the thoroughness of the Third Circuit's application of Strict Trust 
and the Benefit-to-Beneficiary and No-Inquiry Rules. The paral- 
lel to Le Mars (not only regarding the Twice-Stolen Agency, but 
also the Premium-Bribery, Restitution for coerced "services," 
Disloyalty) is parlously close to inspired. 
Once the court ordered Sinskey to disgorge all assets, profits, 
personal salaries, personal director's fees, dividends, everything, 
Sinskey begged for a t  least a quantum-meruit allowance for all 
the work he had expended over the many years as president and 
director of each of the banks. Sinskey had actually worked hard 
for Carteret, Edgewater, and Perth Amboy. To the contrary, his 
work was minimal for Corpamerica. (In this, John Alesch differed 
-- - - 
168. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1976). 
169. Id. at 489 (citation omitted). 
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from Sinskey, since John Alesch did work for Le Mars.) Sinskey 
argued: 
[Tlhat even if Sinskey could not retain those salaries, he 
should have been awarded the reasonable value of the services 
rendered. . . . Consequently, - [Sinskey asserts] that it is ine- 
quitable to require Sinskey to turn over the full amount of his 
salaries without offering him any compensation for the valuable 
services he performed. [Sinskey] then ask[s] this Court to 
order an accounting to determine the reasonable value of such 
services. 170 
With this, the Third Circuit applies with traditional logic the 
exacting norms of the Strict-Trust Corporate-Opportunity Doc- 
trine: "Since [Sinskey's] claim is, in essence, one for credits, we 
might find that [the] failure to offer evidence on this issue a t  
trial is fatal. However, even if we were now to order an account- 
ing, we would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable value 
of his services. 
The Third Circuit next explains the rationale of the Rule and 
dissects Guth u. Loft. The Third Circuit noted that Guth had had 
to pay over all his Pepsi Cola salaries, earned while serving as 
Loft's chief executive officer. Guth personally had stolen Pepsi 
Cola out from under Loft, the public company Guth controlled. 
Borden emphasized that Guth was forced to disgorge his Pepsi 
Cola salaries (as Sinskey his bank salaries and as John Alesch and 
De Witt all benefits from the Alesch Agency) not because Loft 
(that is, Corpamerica and Le Mars) 
had fairly compensated him during that period. Rather, they 
were stripped away because Guth had gained them through his 
usurpation of the Pepsi-Cola opportunity in violation of his fidu- 
ciary duties. The court refused to allow him to retain any of the 
profits or benefits derived from his misconduct in order to deter 
any disloyalty on the part of a corporate fiduciary. As the court 
stated: 
If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of 
his duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, 
the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for 
the benefit of the corporation, . . . while it denies to the 
betrayer all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and 
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the 
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation 
170. Id. at 497. 
171. Id. 
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resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a 
broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the 
purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all 
possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confid- 
ence imposed by the fiduciary relation. 5 A.2d at 510 
(emphasis added). 172 
With this, the Third Circuit in Borden capped off its opinion by 
affirming the lower court: "We, therefore, find no error in the 
order of the District Court directing Sinskey to pay Corpamerica 
all salaries received from Carteret, Perth Amboy and Edge- 
water. 
If any point could be characterized as the climax of this 
Brief, certainly this analysis and adjudication in 1976 of the 
Third Circuit in Borden would be that climax. Here was a unani- 
mous court supporting a federal district court, denying en banc 
a rehearing. The philosophy and rationale of Borden could well 
form the basis for the instant court's adjudication of all the major 
questions of this Brief: Premium-Bribery, Looting, Corporate 
Opportunity, the Twice-Stolen Agency. And now Disloyalty. 
(Recall, moreover, the powerful support of the 1976 
American Timber decision, handed down by a unanimous Su- 
preme Court of Oregon.) 
The doctrine . . . is not new to the law and is but 
one phase of the cardinal rule of undivided loyalty on 
the part of fiduciaries. 174 
[It] follows, then, that the chiefest breach of loy- 
alty would be the faithlessness of the steward. . . . 
There is a fundamental repugnance in serving two mas- 
ters. . . . Without more, just being on the other side is 
[a breach of loyalty]. . . . 175 
As for Disloyalty, all defendants are divided into: (1) the 
Alesch Group, with custody of Le Mars from the beginning to 
April 21, 1970, and (2) De Witt and the Smith Group, the custodi- 
ans thereafter. At no time whatsoever did Le Mars breathe a 
breath of its own. One Group or the other always controlled its 
172. Id. at 497-98. 
173. Id. at 498. 
174. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 
( 1966). 
175. Bayne, supra note 7, at 577-78. 
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breathing. Both Groups were trustees of Le Mars's well-being. 
At that split conceptual second when the premium-bribe is 
changing hands the fiduciary duty of a strict trustee rests with 
exactly equal weight on the outgoing contr8leur and the incom- 
ing appointee. At this transitional moment corporate custody is 
being entrusted by the one and accepted by the other. The 
bonum commune of the entity rests in a delicate balance be- 
tween incumbent and successor. Each consequently faces the 
idential custodial obligation defining the suitability of the 
successor - contr6leur 
As such trustees, every member of both Groups betrayed their 
trust and were false to their signatures of loyalty on the Le Mars 
Policy Statement of April 21, 1970. 
With this comes a subtle point. Each defendant has been 
guilty of Premium-Bribery, Embezzlement, Looting, Stealing the 
Twice-Stolen Agency. For these Torts and Crimes each defendant 
will accordingly be mulcted in specific ~ a m a ~ e H ,  both Compensa- 
tory and Punitive. But beyond these detailed derelictions, each 
defendant was guilty, deliberately, thoughtfully, over months 
and years, of another distinct malefaction: Each breached his 
Trust, eroded the fabric of the entity entrusted to his custody and 
care. 
The results of this erosion are incalculable, or better, are 
calculable only with thoughtful meditation on the manifold, 
baneful effects of years of subversion, conflict of interest and 
betrayal. Disloyalty itself might well be the worst sin of all. 
It follows, then, that the chiefest breach of loyalty would be 
the faithlessness of the steward. . . . There is a fundamental 
repugnance in serving two masters. This is what Christ meant 
when he said, "He who is not with me is against me." . . . It is 
not a question . . . of illicit gain, but of simply being "against 
me." Sworn allegiance has been broken by the very act of serv- 
ing a second master. Basic loyalty is an elemental virtue and 
goes to the heart of human nature. Without more, just being on 
the other side is inconsistent with true honor and devotion.li7 
The key concept here is the harm done to Le Mars by the Disloy- 
alty itself, irrespective of the other injuries inflicted indepen- 
dently by a disloyal person. 
176. Bayne, supra note 55, at 221. 
177. Bayne, supra note 7, at 577-78 (footnotes omitted). 
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Basic loyalty becomes vividly realistic when reduced to two 
simple human participants, father and son, priest and penitent, 
attorney and client, husband and wife. The anguish and shock 
of a son, a penitent, a client, a wife, at the slightest intimation 
of infidelity are most forceful expressions of the innermost es- 
sence of the virtue of loyalty. Merely, moreover, because the 
innocent and trusting party happens to be the millions-plus 
shareholders of A.T.& T. does not diminish an iota the natural- 
law demands of the utmost in loyalty. Here the requirement is 
"not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensi- 
t i ~ e . " ' ~ ~  
This is what Schildberg meant when it referred to "the cardinal 
rule of undivided loyalty on the part of fiduciaries."17Y 
Disloyalty, the Wrong Itself 
[A]n allegation of damages [for fiduciary breaches] is 
not a prerequisite to a recovery.'8c 
The astute Second Circuit in Schein v. Chasen was analyzing 
with approval the famous Diamond v. Oreamuno. Handed 
down in 1969 by New York's highest court, Diamond has the 
finest judicial exposition (with the possible exception of the Third 
Circuit's Borden v. Sinskey) of the rationale of the Disloyalty 
Damages. 
Diamond was a case of first impression and dealt specifi- 
cally with the use of inside information to the detriment of the 
corporate beneficiary. But, as the New York court said: "This, in 
turn is merely a corollary of the broader principle, inherent in the 
nature of the fiduciary relationship, that prohibits a trustee or 
agent from extracting secret profits from his position of trust."lx2 
Diamond had all the prerequisites for Strict Trust. Here again is 
the quintessence of Disloyalty: 
It is true that the complaint before us does not contain any 
allegation of damages to the corporation but this has never been 
considered to be an essential requirement for a cause of action 
founded on a breach of fiduciary duty. . . . This is because the 
function of such an action, unlike an ordinary tort or contract 
178. Id. at 578 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 
(1928)). 
179. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 
(1966). 
180. Schein v.  Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 824 n.9 (2d Cir. 1973). See id. at 823-24. 
181. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,248 N.E.2d 910,301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). 
182. Id. at 497-98, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80. 
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case, is not merely to compensate the plaintiff for wrongs com- 
mitted by the defendant but, as this court declared many years 
ago (Dutton v. Willner, 52 N.Y. 312, 319 . . .), "to prevent 
them, by removing from agents and trustees all inducement to 
attempt dealing for their own benefit in matters which they 
have undertaken for others, or to which their agency or trust 
relates. "la 
One must, however, read Diamond closely. In strict exacti- 
tude, Disloyalty always and everywhere inflicts very real injury 
on the beneficiary. Disloyalty itself (over and above the 
Premium-Bribery, the Embezzlement, the Looting, the Stealing 
of the Twice-Stolen Agency, malefactions unrelated to Disloyalty 
itself beyond the fortuity of being the handiwork of an otherwise 
disloyal steward) inflicts double damages on the helpless entity. 
First, the Disloyalty wounds the beneficiary through the very 
infidelity itself. "Without more, just being on the other side" is 
an actionable wrong. How calculate the extent of injury? How 
estimate the damages suffered in the betrayal itself? These calcu- 
lations are difficult, but  "mere difficulty in ascertaining and 
measuuring damages does not alone constitute a cause for denial 
of recovery."184 These intangible, difficult-to-evaluate Damages 
were in mind when Diamond said: Damages have "never been 
considered an essential requirement" in a breach of trust. Con- 
sider the anguish of a son, a wife. 
Second and more readily discernible, Disloyalty does pro- 
duce very visible scars. This the Diamond court also knew, and 
ticked off some of the scars from Disloyalty's wounds: 
In addition, it is pertinent to observe that, despite the lack 
of any specific allegation of damage, it may well be inferred that 
the defendants' actions might have caused some harm to the 
enterprise. Although the corporation may have little concern 
with the day-to-day transactions in its shares, it has a great 
interest in maintaining a reputation of integrity, an image of 
probity, for its management and in insuring the continued pub- 
lic acceptance and marketability of its stock. When officers and 
directors abuse their position in order to gain personal profits, 
the effect may be to cast a cloud on t.he corporation's name, 
injure stockholder relations and undermine public regard for the 
corporation's securities. As presiding Justice Botein aptly put it, 
in the course of his opinion for the Appellate Division, "[tjhe 
183. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (citations omitted). 
184. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 364 (Iowa 1972). 
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prestige and good will of a corporation, so vital to its prosperity, 
may be undermined by the revelation that its chief officers had 
been making personal profits out of corporate events which they 
had not disclosed to the community of stockholders."1n5 
New York's highest court might well be summarizing the calcula- 
ble harm inflicted by all defendants on hapless Le Mars. 
The most recent and equally apt expression of the subtle (or, 
in the case of Le Mars, are they really subtle?) nuances of Disloy- 
' alty Damages has come from the Third Circuit in the predictably 
timeless Borden v. Sinskey. The familiar facts of Borden again 
carry all prerequisites of Strict Trust. The Third Circuit superim- 
posed its own explanation on that of Guth v. Loft: 
The court refused to allow him to retain any of the profits or 
benefits derived from his misconduct in order to deter any dis- 
loyalty on the part of a corporate fiduciary. As the [Guth] court 
stated: 
"If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of 
his duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, 
the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for 
the benefit of the corporation . . . while it denies to the 
betrayer all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and 
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the 
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation 
resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a 
broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the 
purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all 
possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confi- 
dence imposed by the fiduciary relation."186 
The key words are italicized: Damages do "not rest upon the 
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting 
from" Disloyalty. 
We are aware that our conclusions may result in very 
serious consequences to defendants, notwithstanding 
their freedom from evil motives. To sustain, however, 
their dealings with the company would be subversive of 
elementary principles governing fiduciary relationships 
185. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13, 301 
N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-82 (1969). 
186. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 498 (3d Cir. 1976) (emphasis altered). 
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in general and the management of corporations in par- 
ticular, and would open the door to the grossest frauds 
by corporate managers.Ix7 
Since dissimilarities exceed similarities, Damages must be 
considered separately: Compensatory Damages and Punitive 
Damages. 
A. Compensatory Damages 
The corporate entity and the stockholders, in particular, 
may presume that these trustees will perform their du- 
ties with the diligence, honesty and the utmost good 
faith, inherent and implicit in their functions. They are 
not required to be ever on their guard and watchful lest 
those trustees misapply, destroy, embezzle, steal the 
corporate assets, or defraud them.lxx 
New York's highest court in Bosworth u. Allen, in a Sale-of- 
Control case on all fours with Le Mars, sets the tone: 
[Tlhe directors of a corporation are charged with the duties of 
trustees and bound to care for its property and manage its af- 
fairs in good faith, and for a violation of that duty resulting in 
waste of its assets, injury to its property, or unlawful gain to 
themselves, they are liable to account in equity the same as 
ordinary trustees. The corporation has the right to call upon 
them to account, not only for all the property intrusted to their 
care, but also for all moneys furtively made by them at its 
expense. It is the peculiar province of courts of equity to super- 
vise the execution of trusts and to call trustees to an accounting 
for their management of trust estates, and especially for every 
violation of their primary duty not to deal with trust property 
for their own advantage. . . . Equitable jurisdiction extends to 
all culpable acts and omissions of the directors, by which the 
pecuniary interests of the corporation are or may be injured. If 
they are treacherous to its interests and appropriate its prop- 
erty, or intentionally waste its assets, or take money for official 
action, or "sell out" by resigning and thus giving control to 
others, they are liable to account in equity to the corporation 
. . . .  
189 
187. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 221-22, 214 N.W. 718, 725 (1927). 
188. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1081, 
51 N.W.2d 174, 216 (1952). 
189. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 165-66, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901) (citations 
omitted). 
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At varying times and circumstances, every single defendant was 
a Trustee of the assets and interests of Le Mars. 
Joint and Several Liability 
All persons conspiring or co-operating with or aiding 
and abetting the officers or directors of a corporation in 
defrauding the corporation are equally liable with 
them.lgO 
Every defendant, from beginning to end, was on notice that 
De Witt was passing a substantial premium-bribe to the Alesch 
Group to buy control of Le Mars as part of an indivisible conspir- 
acy to loot, embezzle, and steal. "In a single equitable action the 
court may go to the bottom of the wrong, and work out, in such 
form as the facts require, all the relief called for by the conspiracy 
of the defendants against the corporation towards which they - 
stood as trustees."1g1 The rule has long been indisputably clear: 
Directors and their abettors are subject to joint and several liabil- 
ity for every act integral to the conspiracy. As Beehtel put it: 
"Conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence and 
may be inferred from concert of action, declarations and con- 
duct."lg2 Beehtel added several opinions in support. The law has 
never been controverted: 
It is axiomatic that directors and officers of a corporation 
are jointly as well as severally liable for mismanagement, willful 
neglect or misconduct of corporate affairs if they jointly partici- 
pate in the breach of fiduciary duty or approveof, acquiesce in, 
or conceal a breach by a fellow officer or director.lM 
Thus the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. So, too, the corporate- 
wise Second Circuit in 1973 in Schein: "Indeed, the general rule 
has always been that 'one who knowingly participates in or joins 
in an enterprise whereby a violation of a fiduciary obligation is 
effected is liable jointly and severally with the recreant fidu- 
ciary.' "I" In the most recent 1976 Gould decision the Third Cir- 
cuit reiterated the rule: 
190. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1082, 
51 N.W.2d 174, 217 (1952). 
191. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 168, 61 N.E. 163, 166 (1901). 
192. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007,1082, 
51 N.W.2d 174, 217 (1952). 
193. Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Monaco, 442 Pa. 256, 263, 276 A.2d 305, 309 (1971) 
(citations omitted). 
194. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting Oil & Gas Ven- 
tures-First 1958 Fund Ltd. v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1966)) (citations omitted). 
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This duty they negligently fail to perform. Where two or more 
persons fail to perform a common duty each is liable for the 
entire harm resulting from the breach. Restatement of Torts $ 
878 (1939). As joint tortfeasors they are jointly and severally 
liable for the plaintiffs' entire damage which they have inflicted. 
Bigelow v .  Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 
U.S. 111, 132, 32 S. Ct. 641, 644, 56 L. Ed. 1009, 1023 (1912); 
Prosser, Law of Torts, 314-315 (4th ed. 1971).IY5 
Joint and several liability is patent. Only appropriate apportion- 
ment of Damages remains. 
Liability Without Sharing 
One who knowingly and intentionally participates in 
effecting a fraud is liable even though he did not share 
in the fruits of the wrongdoing.IY6 
The gravamen is the infliction of injury, not a share of the 
spoils. Thus, De Witt, the briber, is equally responsible with the 
Alesch Group, the bribed, for the disgorgement over to Le Mars 
of the premium-bribe dollars. Thus also, the Board of De Witt is 
equally liable with De Witt for the Restitution of the tainted 
dollars extracted from Le Mars for years of coerced "services." In 
neither of these examples did any of the defendants pocket any 
dollars personally. 
Casey points out that he received no part of the premium 
received by the favored defendants . . . and he contends that 
it was error to hold him liable to the plaintiffs for their share of 
the premium . . . . This is, however, not an action for account- 
ing for premium received but rather a suit to recover the dam- 
ages suffered by the plaintiffs as the result of the defendants' 
wrongful acts. The fact that the plaintiffs' damages may be 
measured by a proportion of the premium received by the fa- 
vored defendants does not make the judgment recovered any the 
less an award to compensate the plaintiffs for the loss which 
they suffered from the wrongful conduct of Casey and any other 
defendants who may be found liable.IY7 
With this background the Third Circuit in the 1976 Gould deci- 
sion. went on in specific answer to the present Damages question: 
195. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976). 
196. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007,1082, 
51 N.W.2d 174, 217 (1952). 
197. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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This duty they negligently failed to perform. Where two or more 
persons fail to perform a common duty each is liable for the 
entire harm resulting from the breach. Restatement of Torts 5 
878 (1939). As joint tortfeasors they are jointly and severally 
liable for the plaintiffs' entire damage which they have in- 
flicted. . . . [Alnd this is true even though one of the tortfea- 
sors held liable has received no benefit from his wrongdo- 
ing. . . . It follows that Casey is liable in damages, both sever- 
ally and jointly with any other defendants held liable, for the 
loss suffered by the plaintiffs.Ig8 
This universal rule, stated by the Third Circuit in the 1976 Gould, 
is consonant with Bechtel and the numerous opinions in support. 
In specific reference to most defendants, the court must heed 
the Sixth Circuit in the 1974 Ohio Drill decision. When directors 
place themselves in a conflict of interest, all question of good faith 
and good motives evanesces. 
In Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 
1954), this Court in considering the extent to which equity will 
go in upholding a fiduciary obligation stated: 
Although good faith on the part of the directors and 
the disclosure of the material facts eliminate the ques- 
tion of actual fraud, equity will still act to enforce the 
fiduciary obligation under circumstances amounting to 
constructive fraud. Constructive fraud refers to acts 
which may have been done in good faith, with no pur- 
pose to harm the corporation, but which are done by one 
who has placed himself in a position of conflict between 
a fiduciary obligation and his own private interest. In 
such a situation, by reason of the strict rule applicable 
to fiduciaries, equity will take appropriate action to pre- 
vent the harm resulting from such actions, regardless of 
the good intentions of the fiduciary.lYY 
Thus all defendants face joint and several liability irrespective of 
a share in the Premium-Bribery, the Looting, the Embezzlement, 
the Twice-Stolen Agency, and regardless of good motives or good 
faith. 
Consequential Damages 
The loss of money by the corporation subsequent to the 
conspiracy, [the Sale of Control,] and in consequence 
198. Id. (citations omitted). 
199. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186,192 n.12 (6th Cir. 1974) (citations 
omitted). 
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thereof through the wrongful acts of the defendants' suc- 
cessors, placed in office by treachery, was the natural, 
and therefore the expected, result of the conspiracy it- 
self .200 
The law of "Proximate Causality" is elemental. When direc- 
tors set in motion known and danger6us"forces, those directors are 
held to an obvious liability for all foreseeable consequences of 
their conspiracy. 
The value of the assets wasted and the amount of expense 
incurred as the direct and natural result of the [Sale of Con- 
trol] conspiracy must be accounted for by the defendants, be- 
cause those assets were intrusted to their care and protection as 
trustees, and, having broken their trust they are liable for all the 
proximate consequences. Through an action for an accounting 
a court of equity has power to discover and fix the value of all 
assets improperly withheld pursuant to the conspiracy, and of 
all property lost and damages caused by the wrongful acts of the 
defendants, and to compel them jointly and severally to pay the 
aggregate amount over to the plaintiff. Through the conspiracy 
and the overt acts in execution thereof, the defendants violated 
their duty as trustees, and equity will award complete relief in 
a single action for all the consequences of such violation . . . . 201 
Thus spoke New York's highest court. In another specific Sale- 
of-Control litigation, a federal court trod the same ground: 
[I]t may be said that the owners of control are under a duty 
not to transfer it to outsiders if the circumstances surrounding 
the proposed transfer are such as to awaken suspicion and put 
a prudent man on his guard-unless a reasonably adequate in- 
vestigation discloses such facts as would convince a reasonable 
person that no fraud is intended or likely to result. Thus, what- 
ever the extent of the primary duty may be, circumstances may 
be sufficient to call into being the duty of active vigilence and 
inquiry. *02 
This rule is nothing other than the logical application of Tort 
"Proximate Causality" to the recondite area of Sale of Control. 
Schoolboy acumen would tell any director that every premium- 
bribe is scheduled for early recoupment. The most outrageous 
naivete could never exonerate any of the defendants from the 
ready conclusion that Le Mars was about to be "milked" to a very 
appreciable degree. 
200. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 167, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901). 
201. Id. at 167, 61 N.E. 165-66. 
202. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22,25 (E.D. Pa. 1940). 
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From a careful reading of the voluminous evidence in this 
case, I have become convinced that facts and circumstances 
leading up to the [Sale of Control] . . . were sufficient to indi- 
cate to any reasonable man in his position that the Boston group 
were acquiring the control of the corporation by improper means 
and for an improper purpose.203 
In a third, equally cogent, Sale-of-Control case, again on all fours 
with Le Mars, a New York court reiterated the accepted rule. As 
with Le Mars, Gerdes is a primitive Sale of Control for a substan- 
tial premium-bribe: 
These defendants contend however that these losses to the 
corporation should not be charged against them because they 
represent a consequence "not reasonably foreseeable by them"; 
that they should not be held accountable because they could not 
anticipate the looting which occurred. Even the premise on 
which this argument proceeds may be questioned. It is certainly 
arguable that these defendants should have foreseen, as a t  least 
a possible result of their surrender of possession of the corpora- 
tion's assets, that a conversion might follow. However, under the 
law as it stands they must be held responsible for the damages 
which naturally flow from their wrongdoing, even though the 
precise result could not have been foreseen.2u4 
Bosworth, Insuranshares, and Gerdes are classic Sale-of- 
Control cases, cited by most courts faced with Premium-Bribery. 
A study of these three cases alone could provide an adequate 
analysis of the philosophy and implications of the Sale of Control. 
To hold a trustee liable only for the profit he has received from 
the surrender of his trust and relieve him from all responsibility 
for the ensuing loss would establish a principle permitting trus- 
tees to gamble on the outcome of their acts of malfeasance with 
nothing to lose but the gain received. The dissipation of the 
corporate assets can be traced directly to the wrongdoing 
against the corporation by [De Witt and the Alesch Group], 
and hence they must be held liable for the resulting 
The Insuranshares court asked a question clearly directed to 
the defendants in Le Mars: 
Why were the purchasers willing to pay so much for control? I 
should think this question might well have occurred to one who 
was selling it. . . . 
203. Id. 
204. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755, 772 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
205. Id. a t  773. 
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. . . There was simply too much of the sort of thing de- 
scribed for this transaction to pass as a perfectly normal stock 
sale. I think that the circumstances were such as to indicate to 
any reasonable person . . . that there was more than a possibil- 
ity of fraud and consequent injury to the corporation in the sale. 
That being so, there plainly was a duty upon the sellers to make 
a genuine effort to obtain and verify such information as they 
reasonably could get about . . . the character, aims and respon- 
sibility of the purchasers, or, in the absence of adequate infor- 
mation, to refrain from making the sale.*06 
In one pregnant sentence, New York's highest court in 
Bosworth sums up the solution to the instant question of Dam- 
ages: "In a single equitable action the Court may go to the bottom 
of the wrong, and work out, in such form as the facts require, all 
the relief called for by the [Sale-of-Control] conspiracy of the 
defendants against the corporation toward which they stood as 
trustees."207 This mandate leaves the court with the pedestrian 
chore of attributing .and apportioning the Damages among the 
defendants. The joint and several liability has been established. 
That liability must be imposed without regard for good motives 
or good faith, and irrespective of a share in the loot. 
The Apportionment of Damages 
This duty they negligently failed to perform. Where two 
or more persons fail to perform a common duty each is 
liable for the entire harm resulting from the 
breach. . . . As joint tortfeasors they are jointly and 
severally liable for the plaintiff's entire damage which 
they have inflicted. . . . [Alnd this is true even 
though one of the tortfeasors held liable has received no 
benefit from his wrongdoing. . . . It follows that Casey 
is liable in damages, both severally and jointly with any 
other defendants held liable, for the loss suffered by the 
 plaintiff^.^^ 
The norms for Damages attributable to each defendant must 
now be applied to the five major malefactions. 
206. ~nsuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 26-27 (E.D. Pa. 
1940). 
207. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 168, 61 N.E. 163, 166 (1901). 
208. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761,778 (3d Cir. 1976) (citations 
omitted). 
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1. Prernium-Bri bery 
This money they could not lawfully receive for them- 
selves. They received it as the price of the transfer of' all 
the corporate assets to the custody of irresponsible third 
parties, and the law, in order to protect the corporation, 
treats it as its property, and therefore, money which it 
is entitled to recover from all the defendants. . . . The 
loss of money by the corporation subsequent to the con- 
spiracy, and in consequence thereof, through the wrong- 
ful acts of the defendants' successors placed in office by 
their treachery, was the natural, and, therefore, the ex- 
pected result of the conspiracy itself. 
The value of the assets wasted and the amount of' 
expense incurred as the direct and natural result of the 
conspiracy must be accounted for by the defendants, 
because those assets were intrusted to their care and 
protection as trustees, and having broken their trust 
they are liable for all the proximate consequences."'!' 
The malefaction, Premium-Bribery, has induced two dis- 
tinct categories of liability: (1) Restitution of the premium-bribe 
itself, and (2) Damages directly consequent on the Premium- 
Bribery. 
Restitution. The various members of the Alesch Group are 
liable for the disgorgement to Le Mars of the total $600,000 
premium-bribe. This liability is founded on the law of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment. The disgorgement is totally unrelated to 
any other Damages, but is solely the result of Strict Trust applied 
to Conflict of Interest. Moreover, De Witt and the Smith Group 
are also jointly and severally liable for the full disgorgement. 
Damages. The Tort of Sale-of-Control Premium-Bribery is a 
distinct malefaction. Apart completely from the premium-bribe 
dollars themselves, this malefaction inflicted palpable harm on 
Le Mars. For many years, policyholders and prospective policy- 
holders of Le Mars have become increasingly aware that both 
incumbent and predecessor management of Le Mars were guilty 
of flagrant Premium-Bribery. Bribery is not a recondite or eso- 
teric crime. The man on the street can taste and touch it. The 
harm to the reputation, prestige, good will, business, of Le Mars 
has been very real indeed. Defendants' liabiliy, therefore, is 
equally real. 
209. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 167, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901). 
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2. Looting 
However, even if we were now to order an accounting, 
we would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable 
value of his services . . . . "The rule, inveterate and 
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the 
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation 
resulting from a betrayal of confidence . . . . "210 
De Witt looted Le Mars in two stages: (1) Under a Manage- 
ment Contract Le Mars paid $190,000 to De Witt via De Witt's 
wholly-owned Alesch Agency. (2) Without a contract, De Witt 
charged Le Mars directly for $552,000 in coerced "services." 
Restitution. At the time of these contracts, both written and 
oral, De Witt sat on both sides of the "negotiations." In this 
Conflict-of-Interest situation, the law of Restitution, Unjust En- 
richment, Strict Trust, Agency, all univocally mandate a dis- 
gorgement of all monies. The "contracts" were voidable at the 
option of Le Mars. De Witt may not even "retain the reasonable 
value of'' its "services." In addition to De Witt's liability, all 
other defendants are jointly and severally liable as well. The 
Alesch Group as Trustees are liable for all proximate and foresee- 
able consequences of their Sale of Control to premium-briber 
successors. So, too, the Smith Group as coconspirators. 
Damages. Over and above the mere restoration of illicit mon- 
ies, De Witt, the Alesch Group and the Smith Group are all 
jointly and severally liable for the harm inflicted on Le Mars 
resultant on the Looting: disruption of business, lowering of em- 
ployee morale, injury to reputation, et cetera, et cetera. 
3. Embezzlement 
Often, however, the new appointee [De Witt] avoids 
the circuity of a personal payment and later corporate 
recoupment by an immediate raid on the corporate till 
[of Le Mars].*ll 
In order to pay to the Alesch Group the total premium-bribe 
dollars, De Witt was forced to steal (1) $154,000 directly from Le 
Mars for the "pensions," (2) $14,600 for part of John Alesch's 
"Consultant's" Contract, (3) $10,000, a t  least, for the free auto 
for John Alesch. These three items were integral parts of "what 
210. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 497-98 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939)). 
211. Bayne, supra note 39, at 502. 
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in turn De Witt will do in consideration" for getting control of the 
Le Mars Board. 
As with Premium-Bribery and Looting, so too with Embez- 
zlement. Restitution is mandated. De Witt must return $178,600 
directly to the Le Mars treasury. Over and above the restoration 
of this amount, all parties are jointly and severally liable for 
Damages to the integrity of Le Man. 
4. The Twice-Stolen Agency 
[Sinskey] assert[s] that it is inequitable to require 
[him] to turn over the full amount of his salaries with- 
out offering him any compensation for the valuable 
services he performed. . . . 
. . . [W]e [do] not permit Sinskey to retain the 
reasonable value of his services. . . . "The rule, inveter- 
ate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest 
upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the 
corporation resulting from a betrayal of confi- 
dence. . . . "212 
The Alesch Theft. Beginning sometime in the early 1950's, 
the Five Alesches systematically stole the assets, commissions, 
salaries, and profits of its captive Alesch Agency. Under the law 
of Restitution, all these monies, plus interest, must be returned 
to Le Mars. Further, all directors and especially Milton Tappan, 
longtime president of Le Man, and Burton Dull, counsel, are 
jointly and severally liable as trustees of Le Mars. As with the 
Premium-Bribery, Looting, Embezzlement, all parties are liable 
for Damages over and above the restoration to Le Mars of all the 
fruits of the Usurpation of a Corporate Opportunity. 
The De Witt Theft. From the date of the takeover of Le 
Mars, April 21, 1970, De Witt in its turn systematically stole the 
assets, commissions, salaries, profits (and, in addition, the Le 
Mars Home Office business) of the Alesch Agency. The liability 
of all De Witt defendants tracks exactly the liability of the Alesch 
Group, both as to Restitution and independent Damages. 
5. Disloyalty 
[A]n allegation of damages for fiduciary breaches is not 
a prerequisite to a recovery.213 
212. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 497-98 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., 23 Del Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939)). 
213. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 824 n.9 (2d Cir. 1973). See id. at 823-24. 
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[It] follows, then, that the chiefest breach of loy- 
alty would be the faithlessness of the steward. . . . 
There is a fundamental repugnance in serving two mas- 
ters. This is what Christ meant when he said, "He who 
is not with me is against me." . . . It is not a question 
. . . of illicit gain, but of simply being "against me." 
Sworn allegiance has been broken by the very act of' 
serving a second master. Basic loyalty is an elemental 
virtue and goes to the heart of human nature. Without 
more, just being on the other side is [harmful] . . . . 21  J 
The Damages inflicted by every single defendant, irrespec- 
tive of Premium-Bribery, Looting, Embezzlement, the Twice- 
Stolen Agency, are ponderable and calculable by a court deeply 
familiar with the myriad instances of Disloyalty strewn across the 
volumi.nous record. No one better than the court, after assimilat- 
ing the details, weighing the testimony, can conclude to the great 
harm inflicted on Le Mars by some twenty years of betrayal, 




lming the mandated Restitution for Premium-Bribery, Loot- 
Embezzlement, Usurpation of Corporate Opportunity-had, 
the Alesch Group and then De Witt and the Smith Group, 
been loyal and steadfast in the constant prosecution of Le Mars' 
best interests and welfare? 
In specific reference to the estimation of the Damages pecu- 
liar to Disloyalty (a most delicate, and perhaps most important, 
chore), and in general reference to the overall Damages assess- 
ment, this court must be fearlessly true to the tradition of all 
conscientious courts: 
We are aware that our conclusions may result in very serious 
consequences to defendants, notwithstanding their freedom 
from evil motives. To sustain, however, their dealings with the 
company would be subversive of elementary principles govern- 
ing fiduciary relationships in general and the management of 
corporations in particular, and would open the door to the 
grossest frauds by corporate managers.215 
B. Punitive Damages 
It appears to me that everything is shaping up just as 
we anticipated and I am sure that this venture can and 
214. Bayne, supra note 7, at 577-78 (footnotes omitted). 
215. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 221-22, 214 N.W. 718, 725 (1927). 
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will be advantageous and profitable to all parties con- 
cerned. 
-Burton Dull, Esq., Le Mars Counsel, 
to Raymond Brown, Esq., De Witt 
Counsel, Executive Committee, Exhibit 19A. 
It would seem to me that this pup corporation [the 
Alesch Agency] could be used for perhaps some other 
things in the business between the two companies [Le 
Mars and De Witt]. 
-John Alesch to Raymond Brown, Exhibit 63. 
Little controversy surrounds the question of Exemplary 
Damages. Some few references will aid the court. 
Individual Liability 
Q. Would you tell the Court whether or not you have 
been threatened by any Officer or Director of Le Mars 
Mutual with loss of your employment because of your 
testimony in this case? 
A. Yes. 
-Donald Coats, Transcript at 1908. 
Every defendant is personally liable for Punitive Damages, 
irrespective of possible corporate liability: " '[A] director, officer 
or agent of a corporation . . . cannot escape liability on the 
ground that in committing the tort he acted as a director, officer, 
or agent of the corporation, or on the ground that the corporation 
may also be liable.' "21Thus, each member of the Smith Group 
is subject to Punitive Damages, as is also De Witt itself. 
Corporate Liability 
The fund raising for Westmar College started . . . . 
[Tlhe Agency has written [Westmar] business with 
the understanding that the Agency donate [sic] at least 
50 percent of the commissions back to the College. I took 
the liberty of continuing the [rebate] donations of the 
Agency and Le Mars as in the past. This amounted to 
$1,250 from each, the Agency and Le Mars. 
-John Breese, Le Mars Officer and 
Director, to the Executive Committee, 
Exhibit 331. 
216. American Universal Ins. Co. v. Scherfe Ins. Agency, 135 F. Supp. 407,415 (S.D. 
Iowa 1954) (quoting 19 C.J.S. Corporations 9 845 (1940)). 
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Every requisite of Exemplary Damages is verified in the case 
of De Witt. Every malefaction was carefully thought out, dis- 
cussed, approved by the Board through its Executive Committee. 
Every malefaction was directly related to De Witt's business and 
was "subsequently ratified and confirmed with full knowledge of 
the facts."217 De Witt's ratification was both formal, by explicit 
approval of the Board, and informal, by the acceptance of the 
spoils. 
Culpability 
Q. What did Mr. Gearke tell you? 
A. He told me that he had no choice but to let me go. 
Q. Did he give you a reason? 
A. Yes. He said that I had been discussing the litiga- 
tion then in prospect, and in fact, [against] the Le 
Mars Mutual Insurance Company. 
Q. And is that the sole and only reason he gave for 
your termination? 
A. Yes, it was. 
-William Downs, Transcript at 567. 
The judicial thinking on Punitive Damages has coalesced in 
the now-famous 1973 Holi-Rest: 
In Holden, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 359 we said: 
"[Iln a stockholder's derivative action an equity court 
may, in its discretion, award exemplary damages upon 
a showing that some legally protected right has been 
invaded, such as an intentional act of fraud or other 
wrongful conduct. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [A]n intentional act of fraud in a court of 
equity includes all acts, omissions and concealments 
which involve a breach of either legal or equitable du- 
ties, trust or confidence, justly reposed, which are inju- 
rious to another or by which an undue or unconscionable 
advantage is taken."218 
The horror stories spread over these pages go far beyond the de- 
mands of Holi-Rest, Holden, and Epperson. Further dilation 
would be offensive. 
One comment, however, should be particularly cogent. Even 
a cursory reading of the concise facts in Holi-Rest will immedi- 
- 
217. Ashland v. Lapiner Motor Co., 247 Iowa 596, 601, 75 N.W.2d 357, 360 (1956). 
218. Holi-&st, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 525-26 (Iowa 1974). 
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ately convince that "Treloar's flagrantly wrongful acts" were 
child's play compared to the protracted, deliberate, and calloused 
machinations of the Alesch Group, De Witt, and the Smith 
Group. 
Treloar's flagrantly wrongful acts, omissions and conceal- 
ments have been injurious to the corporation and its stockhold- 
ers. Without question, his self-dealing has caused the corpora- 
tion losses not only in the sums above specified but in undeter- 
mined amounts which under' this record cannot be ascertained. 
We hold Holi-Rest is entitled to exemplary damages from Tre- 
loar in the amount of $25,000.*19 
Note further that the 1973 Holi-Rest, for acts best described as 
innocent compared to the depredations against Le Mars, exacted 
Punitive Damages against a single officer in an amount in excess 
of 25 percent of the Compensatory Damages. This most modern 
application of Exemplary Damages should be a minimum in the 
case of Le Mars. 
The Rationale 
After considerable discussion by all [9] Policyholders 
in attendance . . . a Management Contract . . . for the 
operation of Le Mars by Alesch, Inc. [was approved]. 
-Recessed Meeting of Le Mars Policyholders, 
April 21, 1970, Exhibit 601 B. 
I [John Alesch] have been elected Chairman of the 
Board, and Chief Executive Officer, and will continue 
as General Manager of Le Mars, the same as I have in 
the past. 
-De Witt Newsletter, July 1970, (to 
Le Mars Agents and Employees), 
Exhibit 503(2). 
The fourfold purpose of Exemplary Damages is aimed di- 
rectly a t  each defendant in this case, from John Alesch (through 
his estate) and his cohorts in Le Mars on to Raymond Brown, 
Esq., and his in De Witt. Punitive Damages are awarded: (1) "as 
a punishment for the particular party involved," (2) "as a warn- 
ing and example . . . to all other who may offend in like man- 
ner," (3) "[as] a salutary protection to society and the public in 
general," (4) " [as] adding to the complainant's award. "220 The 
219. Id. at 526. 
220. Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 100-01, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844-45 (1954). 
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imposition of Exemplary Damages on every single defendant will 
justly achieve each of these four objectives. 
The question of indemnification by the corporations for 
officer and director attorney fees is governed by $ 
469A.4(19), The Code, and ultimately depends upon the 
outcome of the 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Iowa has already ruled on 
the liability for any disbursement of any kind by Le Mars to any 
attorneys defending any of the defendants in this action. The 
court so ruled pursuant to a motion in this litigation. This ruling 
includes all attorneys' fees, expenses, any sums spent by the de- 
fendants in aid of their cause against the Le Mars they mal- 
treated. 
The court in the earlier Le Mars was acting pursuant to the 
explicit Iowa Code: "[Nlo indemnification shall be made in re- 
spect of any claim, issue, or matter as to which such person shall 
have been adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in 
the performance of his duty to the corporation . . . ."nZ At least 
the most innocent defendant is guilty of Negligence in the per- 
formance of his directoral duties. Every single defendant, there- 
fore, must support his own defense. All monies disbursed must be 
fully restored. 
In strict practicality, the crucial distinction for fu- 
ture sale-of-control litigation lies in the built-in nature 
of the premium-bribe-induced unsuitability. No true 
premium-bribe under any conditions whatsoever can be 
passed without engendering the triple blemish of the 
perversion, the illicit consideration, and the resultant 
unsuitability. To the extent, therefore, that an ap- 
pointee is prepared to twist the judgment and to divert 
the corporate dollars, thus far is he already an unsuita- 
ble custodian. As thus unsuitable he caps it off by im- 
posing a premium-briber [himself] on the firm. What- 
ever further deficiencies he may possess do not affect 
this ever-present built-in disability.223 
221. Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 905, 916 (Iowa 1975). 
222. IOWA CODE 8 496A.4(19)(6) (1977). 
223. Bayne, supra note 55, at 243. 
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De Witt and the Smith Group are calculating premium- 
bribers. "Whatever further deficiencies [they] may possess do 
not affect this ever-present built-in disability." Never will De 
Witt or the Smith Group successfully gainsay this blemish of 
Premium-Bribery . 
But De Witt and the Smith Group do "possess" many 
"further deficiencies," over and above the Premium-Bribery . The 
other four major malefactions were deliberate, consciously excogi- 
tated, over months and years. The Looting, the Embezzlement, 
the Usurpation of Corporate Opportunity, the Disloyalty, all were 
further forceful proof of Successor Unsuitability. Under no condi- 
tions could the court continue to entrust Le Mars to such male- 
factors. The only question is how to assure the total removal of 
De Witt and the Smith Group. 
The Court-Supervised Election 
ORDERED that this Court shall appoint a new in- 
terim independent Board of Directors for Equity Fund- 
ing Corporation of America.224 
Federal Judge Charles E. Stewart Jr. Friday signed 
a consent order providing for court appointment of a 
new board of directors . . . . 225 
Mr. Waszkowski has been approved by the court as 
chief executive officer . . . . 226 
The all-encompassing powers of the equity court-so vividly 
implemented by Holi-Rest-mandate a court-fashioned remedy 
to meet the peculiar exigencies surrounding Le Mars. Here is an 
insistent need for a watchful court in prosecuting the entrustment 
of Le Mars to a wholly new and honorable group of Directors. 
Indefinite retention of jurisdiction is a necessary concomitant of 
a court-supervised election. Holden stated the underlying philos- 
ophy: "Wherever a situation exists which is contrary to the prin- 
ciples of equity and which can be redressed within the scope of 
judicial action, a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the 
224. SEC v. Equity Funnding Corp. of America, 11973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) 11 93,917 (C.D. Cal. 1973). 
225. International Controls Reaches an Accord with SEC; Court Will Appoint a New 
Board, Wall St. Journal, Mar. 19, 1973, at 10, col. 1. 
226. SEC Taps Waszkowski To Head Clinton Oil-In Partial Settlement of Suit He's 
Designated as President; Four Others Named for Board, Wall St. Journal, Mar. 22, 1973, 
at 28, col. 1. 
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situation, though no similar relief has been given before."227 Ex- 
amples after examples, especially in recent days, have stumbled 
one over the other in which courts have ousted malefactors and 
then, toward future protection, devised foolproof machinery to 
guarantee a brand new, impartial Board. Among the most recent 
and appropriate is Phillips. 
Phillips Petroleum 
The conduct of the individual defendants consti- 
tuted a breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, theft and loot- 
ing.228 
As with Equity Funding and Le Mars the federal court was 
faced with an essentially corrupt Board. As did the court in 
Equity Funding, Federal Judge Curtis handled the turnover of 
control in two stages. First the Phillips court personally named 
six nationally known persons (among them Harold Williams, now 
Chairman of the SEC) to fill the vacuum created by the ousted 
malefactors. 
After this preliminary stage, the court provided surety for the 
future: 
The newly elected Board of Directors shall a t  its first meet- 
ing appoint a Nominating Committee, consisting of a t  least 
three members and composed entirely of independent outside 
directors, which shall have sole authority to recommend to the 
Board of Directors the nominees to be presented to the voting 
security holders.22B 
With this the court closed its order with a sage precedent for Le 
Mars-a two-year retention of jurisdiction: "Phillips may, after 
March 31, 1978, petition the Court for an order terminating juris- 
diction, and the Court may, pursuant to such petition, make such 
an order if it finds Phillips has fully complied with the Final 
Judgment."23o Minor differences with Le Mars cannot blunt the 
efficacy of Phillips as an approach consonant with Holden: "[A] 
court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the situation." 
227. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 363-64 (Iowa 1972) (cita- 
tions omitted). 
228. Notice to Stockholders of Phillips Petroleum Co. Concerning Hearing on Confir- 
mation of Settlement, Wall St. Journal, Feb. 23, 1976, at 13, col. 1 (involving a settlement 
approved without opinion in Gilbar v. Keeler, No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1976)). 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
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IV. THE SPECIAL MASTER 
[Tlhe court in which any action is pending may ap- 
point a special master therein. As used in these rules the 
word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, an exam- 
iner, a commissioner, and an asses~or .~ '  
Iowa has not adopted Rule 53 of the Federal Rules. This is 
probably just as well, since the court is thereby spared any tech- 
nical limitations and has a free, equitable hand to "devise a rem- 
edy to meet the situation." 
No divination is needed to conclude that the intricacies of 
this litigation have yet to be fully untangled. In several areas the 
court, sitting as a special master, or aided by a special master of 
particular expertise, must now implement the court's forthcom- 
ing conclusions of law. Some holdings will not require any special- 
ized enforcement. But many aspects of the five major malefac- 
tions do demand detailed study and exact implementation. 
The special master, guided by the court's directives and the 
findings of fact, may now effectuate the conclusions of law 
through intensive investigation, hearings if necessary, and what- 
ever remains to give full force and effect to the court's adjudica- 
tion. This tandem effort by court and special master will effec- 
tively tie all the loose ends together. 
Detailed suggestions to the court would seem to be out of 
order. A cursory review of the pages of this Brief gives ample 
indication of the work of a special master. The apportionment of 
Restitution, joint-and-several liability, the manifold accounting 
problems, the computation of interest, the complexities of the 
Twice-Stolen Agency. Even more onerous will be the separation 
of Le Mars from De Witt. Untangling the interrelated operations 
alone will be a considerable task. The conclusion of the Oregon 
court in the  1976 American Timber  decision is pat :  
"[Rlemanded for an additional accounting in accordance with 
this opinion."23z 
The same special master might conceivably monitor the 
selection of independent directors. The required competence 
here, however, is markedly different from the accounting-oriented 
tasks elsewhere, and might well require a person of peculiar tal- 
ents. 
231. FED. R. CG. P. 53. 
232. American Timber & Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 276 Or. 1135, 1158, 558 P.2d 
1211, 1224 (1976). 
CORPORATE CONTROL 
My Dad started De Witt. My Father was President. My 
brother was President. I was President and now my son 
is President. 
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, 
Deposition at  7, 18. 
Q. Well, as a normal thing, a t  your annual meeting, 
what percentage of your policyholders actually attend? 
A. Very few. 
Q. And there is no requirement for a quorum? 
A. No. 
-Raymond Brown, Deposition at  84. 
These mutual insurance companies arose on the back of 
their founders. 
-Milton Tappan, Le Mars Director, 
Deposition at  29. 
The Custodial Concept of Corporate Control, the salutary 
power of the Guth, Holden, Borden tradition, the thoroughness 
of American Timber, have all had long acceptance in the overall 
field of corporation law. Now it falls to this court to confirm their 
efficacy by specific application to the narrow area of the mutual 
insurance company. Here will be a sign to the nation, and a first 
step toward the removal of that curse of corporate control so long 
afflicting the mutual company. 
